IDB PRESIDENT MORENO OFFERS INSIGHTS INTO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 002216 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EFIN EAID AR SUBJECT: IDB PRESIDENT MORENO OFFERS INSIGHTS INTO THE KIRCHNERS Classified By: Ambassador E.A. Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) IDB President Luis Alberto Moreno urged the Kirchners to rebuild their relationship with the USG during his November 5-6 visit to Buenos Aires. Moreno relayed this to Ambassador November 6, noting that President-elect Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) seemed to understand that USG support is crucial for a Paris Club agreement and to attract badly needed investment. Moreno lobbied for a high-level USG official to attend CFK's December 10 inauguration to send a message that the U.S. is ready for a new start. Moreno also discussed: 1) the IDB's intention to expand lending in general, and to Argentina in particular (and its use as a tool to reduce Argentina's dependence on Chavez' largesse); 2) his thoughts about CFK's cabinet and economic policies; and 3) his concerns about the Banco del Sur (and rumors that China and Iran might help fund it). End Summary. IDB President Discusses Paris Club with the Kirchners -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) IDB President Moreno met November 6 with President Nestor Kirchner and President-elect Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner at the tail end of his two-day visit to Argentina. During a subsequent, evening meeting with Ambassador, Moreno noted that the Kirchners were both ecstatic about the results of the October 28 election, and especially pleased with their new roles. President Kirchner appeared happy to be relinquishing his presidency, and Cristina was "beaming" on account of her electoral win and her upcoming presidential term. ¶3. (C) Moreno told the Ambassador that he has a "good, joking," type of relationship with the Kirchners, which allows him to join in on their often sarcastic jokes, and also lets him speak frankly about difficult issues (which not many in Argentina can claim to do). Moreno said he took advantage of this to emphasize strongly the need for the CFK government to improve relations with the U.S. ¶4. (C) Moreno said the Kirchners seemed serious about negotiating a deal with Paris Club creditors. Nestor Kirchner is more stubborn, however, and Moreno commented that the President is willing to pursue an agreement with the IMF to get a Paris Club deal, but wants it to be his kind of IMF deal. Cristina, however, seemed to understand better that the USG plays a key role. She also seemed to understand that the GoA needs to do a better job of creating the environment to attract investment. ¶5. (C) Moreno urged the U.S. to send signals that it is interested in using the change of government to realign the relationship. He thought that having Treasury Secretary Paulson or Commerce Secretary Gutierrez attend the December 10 inauguration would send the right message. His hope was that the U.S. could help format the dialogue on important bilateral and multilateral issues, allowing Argentina to move without being pressured towards sounder policies (and away from Chavez). This was also the basis for Moreno's interest in Paris Club. In his opinion, a Paris Club deal would not do much for Argentina in itself. The main benefit, he argued, was that the process of reaching a Paris Club deal would impose valuable disciplines and guide Argentina in the right direction on broader investment and fiscal issues. Expanding IDB Lending to Argentina -------------- ¶6. (C) The IDB is trying to expand lending in every country, but Moreno accepted that there would be an over-concentration in Brazil and Argentina, because of the size of their economies. He noted that the IDB had disbursed $2.6 billion in loans to Argentina so far in 2007 and another $1.6 billion in 2006, and he was considering options to increase what he thought was an "artificial" $6 billion lending ceiling under the 2004-2008 Country Strategy. (IDB Board approval of a Strategy Update would be required should Argentina exceed the $6 billion envelope.) ¶7. (C) Moreno stressed that the IDB (and other IFIs) needed to reinvent themselves and become more private-sector oriented. However, at the moment the IDB is considering more policy-based loans to the GoA, which he said would need an IMF assessment. Acknowledging some critics of IDB lending policies, he asked whether it would be better for the IDB to limit its lending ("pull out") and "let 'You Know Who' (Chavez) take over." BUENOS AIR 00002216 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) As an aside, Moreno acknowledged press reports that the IDB is planning an Argentine peso bond issue in local capital markets, but said it would be only about $50 million (compared to earlier press reports of around $300 million). The idea would be to issue a longer term bond (of up to 10 years) to help build out the local currency issue yield curve. The problem, he said, was that the IDB's charter forbade it from taking on foreign exchange risk, and the market for longer term foreign exchange hedge derivatives remains shallow. Gradual Change from Cristina's Cabinet and Policies -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Moreno's sense was that Cristina would only make limited changes to her cabinet and gradual economic policy changes. He thought Cristina understood that the GoA needed to rebuild credibility (for example, removing Internal Secretary Guillermo Moreno and reorganizing statistical SIPDIS agency INDEC). But the most the IDB's Moreno expected Cristina to do to control inflation was to take minor efforts to tighten fiscal policy and limit wage increases. He said she would do this through her tripartite "Social Pact" between government, labor and industry, modeled on Spain's "Pacto de Moncloa." Moreno came away from discussions convinced she was serious about trying for such an accord. He also thought that Paris Club was on her short list of priorities. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador commented that the worry of many observers was that the CFK administration would not do enough or act fast enough (or go only part way),and the economy could unravel. Moreno seemed to agree, but hoped that Cristina understood that change was necessary to increase credibility and bring in investment. Increasing Concern about Banco del Sur -------------- ¶11. (C) Moreno said that until recently he had not been too concerned about Venezuela's initiative to create the Banco del Sur (BdS -- to be inaugurated in Argentina on December 9 -- Nestor Kirchners last act as President). However, a senior Venezuelan government official recently told him that China and Iran were both considering a contribution of $6 billion (each) to capitalize the bank. If this were true, Moreno thought the BdS (and China and Iran) would suddenly have major influence in the region. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Moreno has excellent access to the Kirchners and the President-elect appears to listen to his advice. Also, with its $6 billion (or more) in realized or potential loans, the IDB is the largest player in town -- and is highly valued by the Kirchners. One reason for this is that, unlike the World Bank, the IDB has been willing to provide substantial credits to support the build-out of Argentina's debilitated energy sector. Moreno is an interlocutor well worth listening to, and is also a possible conduit on sensitive subjects to both Kirchners. End Comment. WAYNE