Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUENOSAIRES2142
2007-10-30 13:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Buenos Aires
Cable title:  

STATUS OF POST ADVOCACY FOR HUMAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON PHUM AR 
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VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #2142/01 3031306
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301306Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9613
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002142 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR GREGG RICKMAN, SPECIAL ENVOY DRL/SEAS
NSC FOR KOSAK AND ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM AR
SUBJECT: STATUS OF POST ADVOCACY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS/ANTI-SEMITISM CASE OF JEWISH ARGENTINE CITIZEN

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1943

B. BUENOS AIRES 1924

Classified By: Ambassador E.A. Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR GREGG RICKMAN, SPECIAL ENVOY DRL/SEAS
NSC FOR KOSAK AND ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM AR
SUBJECT: STATUS OF POST ADVOCACY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS/ANTI-SEMITISM CASE OF JEWISH ARGENTINE CITIZEN

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1943

B. BUENOS AIRES 1924

Classified By: Ambassador E.A. Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Ambassador and Emboffs have devoted major resources to
raise and investigate the human rights (and anti-Semitism)
case of Argentine citizen Eduardo Saiegh (victim in 1980 of
kidnapping, torture, and expropriation -- Reftels). The
Ambassador has raised the case at high levels, and
Econ/Poloffs have pursued it through the GoA bureaucracy.
Result: the GoA and Eduardo Saiegh provide starkly different
positions that appear very difficult to reconcile. The GoA
states that Saiegh has never received a judicial ruling in
his favor, and administrative rulings (including a Human
Rights Secretariat ruling of state terrorism and
anti-Semitism) are non-binding. Saiegh argues that an
administrative ruling in his favor, instructing the GoA to
forward a settlement offer to the President for decision, is
binding; he accuses GoA and Central Bank (BCRA) officials of
misleading Emboffs. Saiegh has been unsuccessful for over 27
years in swaying Argentine authorities to resolve the case,
and his case is technically still in court. The Embassy was
likewise unable to influence the outgoing (and now lame-duck)
Kirchner administration to strike an out-of-court settlement.
Post requests Washington guidance on next steps, and notes
that beginning again from the top will require Embassy to
argue details and merits of the case (see para 13). End
Summary.

Advocacy Efforts Detailed
--------------

2. (C) Since the actions described in reftel, the Embassy has
continued to devote significant resources to communicating to
the GoA and BCRA high-level USG interest in the complex case
of Eduardo Saiegh, as well as investigating the facts of the
case with various Ministries and the BCRA. Embassy has been
pursuing the case because of reported human rights and
anti-Semitism aspects. Saiegh, a Jewish citizen of
Argentina, alleges that the military dictatorship kidnapped
and tortured him and expropriated his assets in 1980.
Specifically, the military government seized Mr. Saiegh's
bank, Banco LatinoAmericano. (Post will forward a more
complete SBU briefing via email to WHA/BSC, EB/OIA, and
L/CID.)


3. (C) The Ambassador raised Saiegh's case with Economy
Minister Peirano on August 24, Foreign Minister Taiana on
September 20, and Central Bank President Redrado on October

3. Taiana and Redrado (but not Peirano) were somewhat

familiar with the case, and all requested Emboffs to
follow-up at the staff level. Econ and Poloffs have held
numerous follow-up meetings and telephone conversations with
the BCRA (including BCRA Vice President, Chief of Staff, and
Head of bank liquidation department),Economy Ministry (new
Legal Secretary and U/S, Chief of Advisors, Finance U/S),and
the U/S for Human Rights (under the Justice Ministry).
Ambassador met with Mr. Saiegh September 21, and Emboffs
remain in almost daily contact with him. Ambassador also
discussed the case September 17 with Gregg Rickman, Special
Envoy for Monitoring and Combating Anti-Semitism.


4. (C) Post notes that a number of factors have complicated
efforts to focus GoA attention on this matter, and have
greatly slowed responses to Embassy inquiries. Principally,
for the last three months the GoA has been focused to the
exclusion of almost all else on the October 28 elections.
Not only have high-level officials been distracted, but mid-
and low-level officials have avoided potentially
controversial issues. The numerous financial scandals in
2007 further encouraged the bureaucracy to avoid making
decisions, signing documents, or offering opinions. Also, a
new Economic Minister took over July 17 and totally replaced
senior levels of the Economy Ministry's Legal Secretariat,
which has the primary responsibility for this case. Finally,
Post's contacts allege that there is general avoidance within
the GoA and BCRA of issues related to late-1970s/early 1980s
Military dictatorship.

Apparently Irreconcilable Differences
--------------

5. (C) The bottom line is that the GoA and Eduardo Saiegh
provide completely opposite positions on the nature and

status of the case. The arguments from both sides are opaque
and difficult to interpret, and their positions appear at
present to be irreconcilable. The extreme difference of
opinion over the basic facts of the case is surely one of the
principal reasons that Saiegh has failed over 27 years to win
his case here.


6. (C) Saiegh and his main advocate in the United States,
Rabbi Morton Rosenthal (who has been in direct contact on
this case with the Special Envoy's office and the NSC),
informed the USG in July 2007 that Saiegh had favorable court
judgments that the GoA was refusing to honor. They also
noted that Saiegh has offered a settlement offer (of $15
million),which the Economy Ministry had refused to forward
to the President for decision (in alleged violation of an
administrative ruling and several judicial orders). Rabbi
Rosenthal suggested in his July 5 letter to the NSC and
during his August 2 meeting with the Special Envoy's office
that all that was required to convince the Economy Ministry
to forward the settlement offer was for the Embassy to
express USG interest and concern to high-level GoA officials.



7. (C) Nevertheless, the Embassy's approaches to top Kirchner
cabinet officials have not succeeded in influencing the GoA
to resolve this case. On the contrary, the Economy
Ministry's new Legal Secretary, Eduardo Prina, informed
Econoffs that Saiegh has never received a Judicial Sentence
in his favor. While Saiegh still has several outstanding
court cases (particularly regarding the bankruptcy of Banco
LatinoAmericano),Prina said he does not believe the GoA will
lose in court.


8. (C) Prina also argued that the administrative decision in
Saiegh's favor and the GoA Human Rights Secretariat's 2004
declaration (that the kidnapping, torture, and expropriation
were acts of "state terrorism" and "anti-Semitism") were
non-binding. Therefore, Prina noted, the Economy Ministry is
under no legal obligation to negotiate a settlement deal.
For its part, the BCRA argues that it is legally prohibited
from taking any role settlement negotiations, and would have
to recuse itself from any deliberations on the merits of the
case. The BCRA says the Economy Ministry has responsibility
for negotiating deals. The BCRA also denied to Econoff that
it was on the verge of liquidating Saiegh's bank (as Saiegh
had insisted to Emboffs). According to the BCRA, it cannot
liquidate Banco LatinoAmericano until Saiegh's court case is
adjudicated.

Saiegh Accuses GoA/BCRA of Misleading Embassy
--------------

9. (C) Saiegh disagrees with GoA and BCRA versions of events,
and accuses GoA and BCRA officials distorting facts. He
believes that the various officials the Embassy has spoken to
are providing misleading information (or even lying outright)
and taking advantage of Econ and Poloffs' lack of knowledge
of the case and of Argentine law. He has asked to accompany
the Embassy on meetings with GoA and Central Bank officials,
to set the record straight.


10. (C) Saiegh notes that the GoA's top lawyer (the
Procurador del Tesoro) confirmed the administration judgment
in his favor, and ordered Economy to forward the settlement
deal to the Presidency. However, despite this confirmation
and numerous judicial orders, Economy has not forwarded the
offer. Saiegh also alleges that the GoA wants him to pursue
a legal solution (obtain a judicial rather than
administrative ruling) because the case would drag on forever
through the court system and he would never receive justice.

Embassy Viewpoint
--------------

11. (C) Although Saiegh and his story strike us as
legitimate, he has been unable after 27 years to obtain a
resolution of his case in his own country either through
judicial or administrative means -- even though, during the
1990s, he held high-level positions in the Menem government.
Saiegh is now looking to use USG pressure to convince a
reluctant GoA to strike a deal, as he does not expect to
achieve justice through the courts. Nevertheless, it is not
yet clear to Post that there has been a defining or binding
legal or administrative judgment in his favor.


12. (C) Post's GoA and BCRA interlocutors have not been
especially forthcoming or responsive in providing

information, returning telephone calls, or agreeing to
meetings. Nevertheless, this case (or at least the
bankruptcy) is still in the courts. As such, further USG
intervention on behalf of Saiegh, an Argentine citizen, to
press the GoA to agree to a settlement, could well in effect
be encouraging the GoA to disregard its own legal system and
procedures.

Next Steps
--------------

13. (SBU) Washington guidance is needed to determine next
steps. Saiegh clearly wants the Embassy to broker a deal for
him with the GoA. Since the GoA contends that Saiegh's case
is still in court, we need to reconcile our desire to help
Saiegh resolve his case with our respect for judicial
autonomy. The Embassy is prepared to continue raising
Saiegh's case with high and mid-level officials of the new
administration that takes office December 10. However, Post
does not have local staff expert in Argentine law to judge
fully the merits put forth by parties in this case. In
Post's view, the available options that might actually have
some success would appear to require the USG to take at least
an implicit position on the merits and facts of the case:

1) With elections over, the Ambassador could raise the case
again at high-levels to urge GoA to settle, on the basis that
it is a case of state terrorism against a Jewish citizen;

2) Allow Saiegh and his lawyers to accompany Emboffs on
mid-level meetings to prevent GoA officials from giving
misleading information;

3) Push mid-level officials for official response to Saiegh's
counter-arguments, which would requires detailed discussions
of legal facts.

-- There may be other options evident from a Washington
perspective, but Post would like guidance and instructions
before proceeding further.
KELLY

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