AMIA: ARGENTINA'S REQUESTS FOR HELP AT INTERPOL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUENOS AIRES 002060 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS WHA FOR CRAIG KELLY AND CHRIS MCMULLIN WHA/BSC FOR BRUCE FRIEDMAN, JANINA SLATTERY AND CAROLINE CROFT S/CT FOR DELL DAILY AND ARNOLD SIERRA L FOR CLIFF JOHNSON NEA FOR GORDON GRAY DOJ FOR THOMAS MONHEIM FBI FOR MICHAEL MASON ASST DIR CRIMINAL DIV FBI FOR TOM FUENTES OFFICE OF INTL OPS NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2027 TAGS: PTER PREL IR AR SUBJECT: AMIA: ARGENTINA'S REQUESTS FOR HELP AT INTERPOL GENERAL ASSEMBLY REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1991 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 1971 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission TOM Kelly for reasons 1.4(b)(c)and(d) ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: DCM and EmbOffs met October 16 with the Argentine government's point man on AMIA issues, Ambassador Guillermo Gonzalez, recently returned from meetings in Lyon with Interpol's secretariat. Gonzalez formally requested USG assistance in lobbying Interpol member governments in preparation for the November 5-8 Interpol General Assembly (GA) meeting in Marrakech, and stressed that Argentina needed not just positive votes in the GA but positive advocacy on its behalf from friendly Executive Committee (EC) members and key GA member countries. In particular, Gonzalez asked for assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia. Gonzalez confirmed that Iran has asked the Secretary General to postpone the vote on the capture notices SIPDIS until the next General Assembly meeting. He related that the Interpol Secretary General told him that this would have to be taken up by the EC in its meetings in Marrakech just prior to the GA. Noble told him it was unlikely the EC would reverse its decision. Gonzalez, nevertheless, said that doubt remains at the Interpol Secretariat on the possible procedural scenarios, and he asked for USG assistance in tracking developments in the run-up to Marrakech. He also stated his opinion that Noble was looking for a way to navigate the very sensitive political and legal issues and not "humiliate" any member countries, i.e. not drive Iran from Interpol. ¶2. (C/NF) Interpol told Gonzalez that an Iranian delegation would be in Lyon this week for further discussions with the Secretariat and that Iran would be sending a senior SIPDIS delegation to Marrakech. Gonzalez requested USG assistance in trying to find out the composition of that delegation. He also said that the MFA had received a diplomatic note from Iran on October 16, regretting Argentine "unwillingness to cooperate" with Iranian efforts to "amicably settle the case." The note proposes a joint commission to cooperate on legal issues leading to resolution of discrepancies on the AMIA case. Gonzalez stated that Argentina would not agree to any deal with the Iranians, and were determined to see the General Assembly vote through to the end, win or lose. With this information, Post recommends we move forward with Department's instruction cable to U.S. Missions. End Summary. ¶3. (C/NF) DCM, A/LegAtt and PolOff met October 16 with MFA's AMIA lead, Ambassador Guillermo Gonzalez, and North America Deputy Director Jose Ureta to share information and discuss next steps in preparation for the November 5-8 Interpol General Assembly meeting in Marrakech. Gonzalez, just back from meetings the previous week in Lyon with Interpol's Secretary General Ron Noble and General Counsel Dr. Rustel SIPDIS Martha, related that the trip was useful and that the Interpol Secretariat was receptive and friendly. Noble and Martha did have, he said, some questions about the purpose of Argentine President Nestor Kirchner's UN General Assembly speech in September, in which he admonished the GOI to cooperate in the investigation. Gonzalez said that Nobel and Martha were concerned that the Kirchner was shifting the case from the judicial realm to the political -- in other words, going over Interpol's head -- and asked whether Argentina was preparing another presentation against Iran. Gonzalez said he assured them that Kirchner only called for Iran to cooperate in the judicial investigation and stressed that Argentina had only called for the GOI's full cooperation. Iran's Pre-Marrakech Maneuvering BUENOS AIR 00002060 002 OF 004 -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Gonzalez confirmed that Iran has requested the Secretariat change the agenda for the Marrakech meeting, SIPDIS dropping consideration of the Argentine capture notices and postponing the issue until the next GA "in order to develop related cooperation." He also said that Iran had contacted Argentina's Interpol representative in Buenos Aires stating its willingness to hold consultations. Noble told Gonzalez that this was an issue the Executive Committee (EC) would have to discuss in its meetings in Marrakech, just prior to the GA. Noble noted, however, that it was unlikely the EC would reverse its decision, although there were a couple of precedents. General Counsel Martha informed Gonzalez that Iran was sending a delegation to Lyon (the week of October 15) for further discussions with the Secretariat. Martha also told Gonzalez that Iran was planning to send a senior delegation to Marrakech, and Gonzalez asked the USG, perhaps through our Interpol representative, to try and determine the makeup of that delegation. ¶5. (C/NF) Gonzalez also confirmed that the MFA had received an October 16 diplomatic note from Iran regretting Argentina's "unwillingness to cooperate" with Iranian efforts to "amicably settle the case." In the note, the GOI proposes forming a joint judicial and political commission to discuss cooperation on legal issues leading to resolution of discrepancies on the AMIA case. Gonzalez said this is obviously a pre-Marrakech tactic by the GOI to show its "flexibility." In regards to this and other recent GOI overtures to Argentina, we asked point blank whether the Argentines would cut a deal with the Iranians. Gonzalez unequivocally said "no;" President Kirchner has gone out on a limb at the UNGA on this and won't climb back down. Gonzalez said the GOA would rather lose the vote at the Interpol GA than reach an accommodation with GOI on this matter. ¶6. (C/NF) On the mechanics of the voting, the MFA had earlier expressed some concern about the "secret" nature of the vote, i.e. an electronic vote that does not indicate how each individual member vote. Gonzalez said he learned in Lyon that there is, apparently, a procedural mechanism whereby one of the parties could ask that there be a public vote, but that this has never been done, and the Secretariat is unclear on the procedures. In any case, the MFA is now leaning towards the view that the secret vote may, in fact, work in the GOA's favor and is therefore not inclined at this time to ask for a public vote. Gonzalez said that the last thing the GOA wants to do is risk angering GA members with procedural maneuverings. However, he also asked for USG views on the wisdom of a secret vote (with particular interest in the opinion of the FBI's Thomas Fuentes, who is on the Interpol EC). (Embassy's LegAtt will follow up with FBI HQ on this.) INTERPOL SECRETARIAT: SEEKING A "COMPROMISE?" -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Gonzalez said he felt positive following his trip to Lyon, but said the MFA was still concerned about Iranian efforts to sway the vote against issuance of the capture notices. He said that, apart from positive votes at the GA, Argentina needs "advocates" for its position, particularly during the EC's meetings just prior to the GA. Here, he said, is where U.S., Brazilian, Chilean and EU support were crucial if Iran tries to procedurally derail the process, as they anticipate. Noble told Gonzalez that he thought it unlikely the EC would reverse itself, i.e., grant Iran a one-year delay. ¶8. (C/NF) Gonzalez said it was also clear that Noble and the Secretariat were looking for the best way to manage the issue SIPDIS BUENOS AIR 00002060 003 OF 004 and the vote and avoid the political fallout from unduly "humiliating" either party. Gonzalez relayed that Interpol General Counsel Martha told him they were concerned about driving Iran from Interpol and the ramifications with countries sympathetic to Iran. Lining Up Votes: USG Assistance Required -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) DCM asked if the MFA had received any feedback from its diplomatic demarches and if the MFA had any recommendations regarding where it thought U.S. efforts might be most effective. Gonzalez said they had heard back from some missions but not all, and that they had received some positive indications, both from their missions and here in Buenos Aires. (Swedish Ambassador told Ambassador 10/17 that EU Ambassadors had been called to the MFA later in the day for a briefing and request for support on AMIA.) Gonzalez was not very precise in advising us whom they think we should target, but stressed that they needed particular help in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia. He also asked for any updated information we might have on who is likely to attend Marrakech. -- AFRICA: Gonzalez stressed that this is where they need the most help from the USG. In sub-Saharan Africa, the GOA has embassies in South Africa, Angola, Kenya, and Nigeria, and Gonzalez admitted that those missions do not have the best contacts, especially with law enforcement agencies that are likely to represent governments at Interpol. Gonzalez said we have the green light to demarche as we see as appropriate in that region -- Argentina recognizes that it needs all the help it can get, he said. (Deputy Foreign Minister Garcia Moritan pulled Ambassador aside 10/12 to make the same point.) The exception is South Africa. Gonzalez said he thinks they have worked out an understanding with the RSA, and that a U.S. demarche would be counterproductive. The current President of the Interpol EC (and thus Chair of the GA) is South African Jackie Selebi, with whom the Argentines have a good relationship. Gonzalez noted that the current RSA Ambassador to Argentina is a former aide to Selebi. It is possible, Gonzalez said, that Selebi may not attend Marrakech due to some ongoing legal issues he faces in South Africa. If Selebi does not chair the GA, the European representative from Italy, Rodolfo Ronconi, would chair, a situation that would also suit Argentina, Gonzalez said. -- MIDDLE EAST: Gonzalez stated that U.S. demarches in places like Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States could help. In many of those states, the GOA does not have diplomatic representation. He noted that we would know better than the GOA where we could help and where we couldn't. -- WESTERN EUROPE: Gonzalez said he believed they have the votes from Western Europe. They are also asking the French, British, and Germans for help with African countries, and would not mind the USG reinforcing the message with these three governments. -- EASTERN EUROPE: Gonzalez admitted that the Argentine presence in Eastern Europe is weak, and that the USG has influence with governments in the region, from the Caucasus to the Balkans to the Baltic. U.S. demarches to the governments in this region would be useful. -- RUSSIA AND CIS: Gonzalez said that the GOA is concerned about how Russia, and by extension some of its former republics, would vote given its position in the current showdown on Iranian nuclear proliferation. He noted, however, that Russia votes responsibly on terrorism issues in BUENOS AIR 00002060 004 OF 004 international fora. Gonzalez relayed that Russian Vice Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov will be in Buenos Aires October 23, providing the MFA an opportunity to lobby the GOR for support. Gonzalez opined that he did not expect us to be able to influence Moscow on this Iran-related issue. -- BRAZIL/CHILE: Brazil, in particular, and Chile are the key in region, Gonzalez said. Both hold EC seats and Brazil has influence in Africa, especially with Lusophone states. Gonzalez explained that Itamaraty has been very positive with them, but some of the Brazilian police contacts had been more circumspect. GOA said they would appreciate us "not overdoing it with the Brazilians," but perhaps reinforcing to them that "this is a serious effort with U.S. support, not another screwed-up Argentine misadventure." He continued that the U.S could also ask whether Brazil was willing to intercede with Lusophone Africa on the Argentines' behalf. Chile, he noted, was strongly supportive of Argentina's position and is being particularly helpful. -- THE BOLIVARIAN BLOC: Gonzalez said they would not ask the USG to approach Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, or Ecuador. He stated that the GOA had no information that Venezuela was advocating on Iran's behalf, and noted that the BRV "was doing the GOA the favor of staying out of this issue," much to the GOA's relief. Gonzalez noted that Venezuela often did not attend GA meetings and hoped that that Bolivia would not attend either, but was concerned on this score given Ahmadinajad's recent visit to Bolivia. -- REST OF LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN: The rest of Latin America, Gonzalez said, "should vote the right way," and stated the U.S. likely did not need to demarche. Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago will likely attend Marrakech, stated Gonzalez, and vote with Argentina. He said he was worried that smaller Caribbean states receiving oil from Venezuela may be asked to travel to Marrakech and vote for Iran, but said he had no evidence that this would actually happen. He said the GOA would not mind the U.S. approaching these countries if we determined it would be helpful. -- ASIA: Gonzalez said he had no clue about who might attend Marrakech from Asia or how the Asian countries might vote. Gonzalez asked us for assistance in determining which Asian countries are going to Marrakech and how they might vote. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) DCM told Gonzalez that, with the GOA's go-ahead, Washington will instruct U.S. missions, in countries it is deemed beneficial, to approach host governments and/or appropriate agencies. DCM also noted that the annual conference of U.S. Legal Attaches was taking place this week in Washington, providing an opportunity for them to be briefed on the issue, compare notes, and decide how to lobby host governments on AMIA before Marrakech. Gonzalez expressed the GOA's deep appreciation for USG support and efforts, and agreed that this was the best approach. Comment -------------- ¶11. We come away from this meeting with the sense that the GOA's MFA is trying as best it knows how to prevail. At the same time, Gonzales's lack of precision in counting votes made it more clear than ever that to prevail against Iran on AMIA, Argentina will need help from sympathetic governments, starting with us. WAYNE