ARGENTINE PLANS TO DEVELOP A SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001793



SIPDIS



SENSITIVE

SIPDIS



ISN FOR D. MAHLEY AND PAM DURHAM

OES/SAT FOR B. FORD

WHA/BSC FOR BRUCE FRIEDMAN

CIA/WINPAC FOR J. CASKER



E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017

TAGS: MTCR, KSCA, PARM, PREL, MNUC, ETTC, TSPL, AR

SUBJECT: ARGENTINE PLANS TO DEVELOP A SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE



REF: A. KELLY/MAHLEY TELCON 8/30

B. FM TAIANA OP ED LA NACION 08/23

C. 00 BUENOS AIRES 1211 AND PREVIOUS



Classified By: AMBASSADOR EARL ANTHONY WAYNE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)



1. (U) This is an action request for ISN/MTR. Please see

paragraph 11.



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Summary

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2. (C) Argentine space agency head Dr. Conrad Varotto said

that the development of a space launch vehicle is essential

to Argentina's space program, and that Argentina has been

transparently pursuing the development of such a capability

for years. Varotto stressed Argentina's commitment to

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, and

expressed a personal willingness to meet with U.S. officials

to explain Argentina's position, address U.S. concerns about

the direction of Argentina's space program, and work toward a

mutually acceptable solution. End Summary.



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A Tangled History

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3. (U) Emboff visited Argentine space agency (CONAE) head Dr.

Conrad Varotto September 5 to informally present the U.S.

position with regard to Argentina's development of a space

launch vehicle (Ref A). That effort made some headway

recently with the May test of a liquid-fuel rocket motor and

an August public acknowledgement by Foreign Minister Taiana

of the importance to Argentina of developing its own capacity

to reach space (Ref B).



4. (C) Varotto appeared agitated when Emboff raised

Argentina's series of assurances since 1992 that it had no

plans to pursue an indigenous space launch vehicle (SLV)

capability, and countered that Argentina has long -- and

transparently -- sought such a capability. Varotto stated

that the first such steps occurred in 1994, when he said he

approached an embassy staffer ("the science adviser") with a

draft chapter of Argentina's official space planning document

that clearly articulated Argentina's desire to develop a SLV

capability. The embassy official checked with superiors in

Washington and later said that the USG had no problem with

the document, according to Varotto. He asserted that that

"assurance" led to a GOA presidential decree in 1997

specifying that Argentina should have access to space, which

in turn led to abortive GOA partnerships with Lockheed and

with Brazil and Ukraine.



5. (C) Varotto also pointed out that when Argentina's

then-Foreign Minister Di Tella accepted the dismantling of

the Condor missile program in the early 1990's and promised

to eschew SLV development, that commitment was only "for the

foreseeable future." Varotto argued that anything beyond 5-7

years could not be considered "foreseeable." When Emboff

reminded Varotto that the GOA reaffirmed that commitment in

2000, Varotto said that the GOA had argued then that it

needed to develop a SLV capability, and that it hasn't

changed its view.



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A National Need

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6. (C) Varotto made clear his view of the importance of an

indigenous SLV capability, saying Argentina "cannot maintain

a space program without it." Although he characterized

U.S.-Argentina (and specifically NASA-CONAE) space

cooperation as "excellent," Varotto went through a litany of

reasons why Argentina will not be able to continue relying on

the U.S. or others to get its satellites into space.

Specifically, he cited the high launch costs of "acceptable"

providers, and the GOA's unwillingness to run afoul of the

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) by dealing

with lower-cost providers of launch services such as China or

India. Developing its own SLV capability is the least costly

alternative for Argentina, Varotto said.



7. (C) Costs and trade controls on sensitive technologies are

not the only factors pushing Argentina to develop its own SLV

capability, Varotto said. There is also a question of

control, with Argentina as a junior partner unable to

guarantee that it will be able to place the instruments it

needs into space. Extant and earlier partnerships have shown

that to be an acute problem, according to Varotto. Citing

those factors, Varotto said "Argentina cannot maintain a

space program with such constraints."



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A Plea for Talks

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8. (C) Varotto stressed Argentina's non-proliferation

credentials, saying that Argentina is a MTCR partner because

it believes in the Regime's guidelines. He took pains to

express a willingness to answer any of our questions about

the Argentine SLV program, saying "I'll get on a plane

tonight to talk to anyone who will listen to me." Varotto

said that he has been "a friend of the U.S." all his life,

and is hoping to work with the U.S. toward a mutually

acceptable solution. He said that if the U.S. is able to

formulate a plan that solves Argentina's launch problems,

Argentina would "stop its SLV program immediately." Varotto

suggested an arrangement whereby the U.S. could somehow

monitor Argentina's progress and certify that Argentina "was

doing nothing wrong," saying he would willingly comply with

such a system. He added: "If there is no solution to our

launch problems, we will have to shut down our space program."



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Comment: A Way Forward

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9. (C) Varotto expressed his desire that the U.S. and

Argentina continue an informal dialogue on this issue. He

pointed out that this is not a particularly time-sensitive

issue, noting in response to a question from Emboff that

Argentina hopes -- in a best-case scenario -- to have a

viable launch vehicle in "under a decade."



10. (C) Post agrees that publicly articulating our

unhappiness with Argentina's SLV development would not be a

good idea at the time. We are at the peak of the Argentine

election cycle, and a public expression of U.S. concern

offers the unattractive possibility of giving pre-election

fodder to a nationalistic government that has shown a

willingness to bait the U.S. for its own political ends. If

the issue of Argentina's development of a SLV were to become

politicized, the chances of Argentina agreeing to a

resolution aceptable to the U.S. would diminish

considerably. The prospect of initiating quiet, expert-level

talks with Varotto is therefore appealing. While the Foreign

Minister's recent editorial underlining the importance to

Argentina of development of a launch vehicle likely

circumscribes Varotto's options, it is the Embassy's view

that we should take Varotto up on his offer to discuss

Argentina's plans with our experts in Washington, and proceed

from there.



11. (U) Action request for ISN/MTR: Dr. Varotto will be in

Washington D.C. the week of September 10 for meetings related

to the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS),

and has indicated that he will be available for meetings on

Friday, September 14. Please advise whether ISN/MTR or any

other interested USG entity wishes to meet with Dr. Varotto

at that time.

WAYNE