ARGENTINA: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000171 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON REF: BUENOS AIRES 00084 Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4(b)and(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy in Buenos Aires and I warmly welcome you and your delegation to Argentina February 8-9. While not always seeing eye to eye with the USG, the Kirchner administration continues to be an important partner on a wide range of security issues, from non-proliferation and military to military cooperation, to counterterrorism and counternarcotics. Argentina serves as a stabilizing force in the region, but from our point of view could be doing more. The GOA seeks more U.S. investment and trade; we need to encourage more legal certainty and transparency for our firms to invest more. ¶2. (C) Your visit is an opportunity to push forward our improving bilateral relationship, and to highlight U.S. policy priorities in the region: consolidating democracy, promoting prosperity, investing in people, and enhancing security. Your presence alone is a strong sign that we take the GOA seriously and will help us tackle the very high anti-Americanism evident in the polls. You can encourage the GOA,s active support in encouraging Latin American governments to respect human rights and democratic norms, particularly in Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba. Working-level cooperation is strong in counterterrorism, law enforcement, and non-proliferation, but populist, anti-U.S. public discourse by senior Argentine officials, including President Kirchner, has taken its toll on the relationship over the past several years. Argentina's closer ties with Venezuela have also raised concerns, though the relationship seems to be motivated more by economic opportunism than any real ideological affinity with Chavez. In fact, Kirchner has made clear that Venezuela is not a model for Argentina. During the past several months, we have seen a greater interest by senior-level GOA officials in engaging in dialogue with us and in identifying areas where we can strengthen cooperation as well as attract U.S. investment. This does not mean that we can expect significant or immediate changes in foreign policy or public statements in support of the U.S. from President Kirchner. Nor does it mean we will easily overcome the interventionist economic policies that hinder further large U.S. investments. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that the GOA wishes to engage us positively and is looking for ways to do so. END SUMMARY. -------------- Political Landscape -------------- ¶3. (U) Argentina was once one of the richest countries of the hemisphere, achieving a GNP per capita that was among the top ten in the world in the early 20th century. However, the history of Argentina over the last 70 years has been one of economic decline and political instability. Many Argentines are at a loss to explain how their country, blessed with rich natural resources, a fertile land and a talented and well-educated population, could have fallen so far. Some blame the military dictatorships, which predominated between 1930-1983; many blame Peron and "Peronism;" and a significant number blame external factors: the IMF, the U.S., and, to a lesser extent, Europe, especially following the 2001-2002 economic crisis. ¶4. (U) The election of left-of-center Peronist Nestor Kirchner in 2003 marked a significant shift in Argentine foreign policy, aligning the country more closely with its MERCOSUR partners and less closely to the U.S. That said, Kirchner has cooperated closely with the U.S. on a number of issues, including counterterrorism and narcotics, and regional problems like Haiti. Kirchner is widely perceived to be the strongest Argentine president since the return to democracy in 1983, and he faces a weak and divided opposition. Argentines give Kirchner much of the credit for the country's phoenix-like economic recovery. ¶5. (U) Political interest is focusing increasingly on this year's October presidential elections. If he chooses to run, Kirchner is expected to win reelection easily. There has been much speculation, including from President Kirchner himself, that his wife, Senator Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, will stand in his place. Declared or potential opposition candidates include former Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna, businessman and president of the famed Boca Juniors soccer team Mauricio Macri, center-left national congresswoman Elisa Carrio, Governor of Neuquen province Jorge Sobisch, and former President Carlos Menem. However, the opposition is very divided and both Kirchners have commanding leads in the polls. -------------- Bilateral Relations: Key Issues -------------- ¶6. (C) During the past several months, we have seen a greater interest by senior-level GOA officials in engaging in dialogue with us and in identifying areas where we can strengthen cooperation as well as attract greater U.S. investment. -------------- Counterterrorism -------------- ¶7. (U) The Kirchner administration has strongly supported counterterrorism policies, as Argentina has itself twice been a victim of international terrorist attacks in the early 1990s. The GOA has ratified all of the 12 international counterterrorism conventions. Argentina is a participant in the Three-Plus-One regional mechanism, which focuses on possible terrorist-related activity in the Tri-border region between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. On December 20, 2006, President Kirchner sent the GOA's long-anticipated draft antiterrorism and counterterrorism finance bill to Congress (in good part to comply with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) requirements). The draft criminalizes terrorism and terrorism financing and empowers law enforcement agencies to fight such crimes. ¶8. (C) The release of the AMIA special prosecutors' report in October 2006 and the issuance the following month of arrest warrants for the eight former Iranian government officials are of major international import. While Kirchner's official position has been not to interfere in judicial affairs, without Kirchner's behind the scenes support, AMIA Special Prosecutor Nisman's report never would have seen the light of day, nor would the GOA have sent a strong delegation to the January 22 meeting at Interpol to seek support for issuing international arrest warrants or, "red notices." ¶9. (C) Some in the press have interpreted Kirchner's AMIA policy as a way of seeking rapprochement with the U.S. (while also trying to avoid a frontal conflict with Iran or Venezuela). Whatever the truth, we continue working closely but quietly with the GOA to support bringing the perpetrators to justice, including intense behind the scenes work with the AMIA prosecutors in strengthening their Interpol submissions. Continued close coordination will be necessary in the coming weeks before the expected March meeting of the Interpol Executive Committee where consideration will be given of Iran's demand that the GOA requests for "Red Notices" on the AMIA suspects be disregarded by Interpol. Failure of Interpol to uphold the GOA request for Red Notices would be a serious blow to the GOA and a win for Iran. -------------- Human Rights -------------- ¶10. (U) The Kirchner administration has made human rights an important domestic policy priority by successfully encouraging the Supreme Court to rule as unconstitutional the immunity laws that prevented prosecution of human rights abuses during the military dictatorship. The resulting flood of human rights trials of former police and military officials is part of a larger debate within Argentine society over reexamining their past. The brief detention this month of Isabel Peron in Spain and the judicial investigation into the right-wing death squad Triple A -- both for alleged involvement in human rights abuses in the 1970s -- have led some to criticize the government's seemingly one-sided approach to the investigations and trials. For now, judicial investigations remain limited to military, police, and other former government officials and neglect crimes committed by members of leftist guerrilla groups, some former members of which hold senior positions under Kirchner. ¶11. (U) Argentina has played a positive role in promoting human rights and democratic institutions in the hemisphere, particularly in Haiti. Argentina currently has 575 peacekeeping troops in Haiti in support of MINUSTAH. Although the GOA has avoided general criticism of human rights violations in Cuba, Kirchner has regularly raised with Castro an Argentine-related human rights case where Cuba has refused a domestic human rights activist the right to travel to Argentina to visit her son and grandchildren. -------------- -------------- Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Regional Stability -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Kirchner's close relations with Chavez remain at the top of the list of Embassy concerns. Despite rising criticism of Chavez' new policies, Argentina's relations with Venezuela remain strong, especially when financial and commercial gain is evident. At the same time, Kirchner has made very clear publicly that he does not see Venezuela's increasing socialist model as an example for Argentina to follow. Argentina could do more in pressing Chavez to respect democratic norms. Kirchner's interest in a stable Bolivia in order to ensure gas supplies, limit drug trafficking, and control immigration provides a basis for expanded policy coordination. His strong feelings on democracy and human rights give us an additional base for seeing if we can expand engagement and cooperation on Bolivia and Ecuador, as well as perhaps even have some useful dialogue on Venezuela and Cuba. It is worth testing Argentine willingness to work more actively in support of democracy, rule of law and human rights. -------------- Arms Control -------------- ¶13. (C) The GOA has been a strong international voice on arms control and nonproliferation issues for decades. It has played an active role in many non-proliferation regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The GOA has also endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),and participates in the PSI Operational Experts Group, although its participation has progressively waned. The GOA is also one of the two countries in South America that participates in the Container Security Initiative (CSI). On Iran, the GOA voted to refer Iran's noncompliance to the UNSC at the September 24, 2006 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. The GOA, however, has in the past been critical of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal claiming that it rewards India for bad behavior and sets a bad precedent. Finally, despite Argentina's leadership in the area of non-proliferation, it has yet to sign on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Additional Protocol, in large part, we are told, because it has committed only to go forward with a still reluctant Brazil. -------------- The Economy, Trade and Investment -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Deputy U.S. Trade Representative John Veroneau visited Argentina on January 26 to discuss progress in WTO negotiations and review the bilateral trade relationship (see septel). The January 26 talks were friendly and constructive overall, especially with the Foreign and Economy Ministers. However, the MFA's Trade Secretary took an unexpectedly confrontational approach on Doha WTO negotiations, which precluded much progress. This highlighted the mixed signals the GoA sends on economic policy matters and international economic relations. ¶15. (SBU) Through a combination of good local policies and favorable external conditions outside of the government's control, Argentina has had an impressive recovery since suffering the worst economic crisis in its history in 2001-02. This crisis culminated in the largest sovereign default in world history and a 70% nominal devaluation of Argentina's currency. A surge in domestic demand, facilitated by GoA fiscal, monetary and wage policies, has resulted in real GDP growth in the 8-9% range in each of the past four years. The high economic growth rates have led to improvements in key socio-economic indicators. Unemployment has dropped from 21.5% during the height of the crisis in 2002 to 10.2% during the third quarter of 2006. Poverty has also fallen from the post-crisis level of 60%, but remains stubbornly high, with an estimated 31% of the population living below the poverty line. ¶16. (SBU) In addition to the GoA's expansionary monetary, fiscal, and wage policies, Argentina's impressive recovery can be attributed to high commodity prices and low interest rates since 2003, as well as to the decade of market reforms in the 1990s and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime in early 2002. Argentina should continue to perform well in 2007 with real GDP growth projected at about 7%. Nevertheless, the GoA's unorthodox macroeconomic policies, frequent interventions in the market, price controls, and often erratic and arbitrary regulatory decisions, are deterring the foreign investment necessary to sustain the current high rate of economic growth. ¶17. (SBU) President Kirchner and his cabinet Ministers frequently state their desire to see more foreign, specifically U.S., investment in Argentina. We have over 400 U.S. businesses in Argentina and many of them benefiting from economic growth. There is great interest in investing more in Argentina but that interest is mitigated by concerns over uncertainties with the GOA's legal and regulatory approaches. Ambassador has responded in direct meetings with GoA officials and emphasized in public statements that a transparent, fair, consistent and non-discriminatory legal and regulatory regime is essential to attracting both domestic and international investment. Your visit is a good opportunity to reiterate and drive home these themes. WAYNE