CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR CALLS ARGENTINE ECONOMIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001517 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR DAN PRICE, DAN FISK PASS FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR KROSZNER, ROBITAILLE PASS EXIM BANK FOR MICHELE WILKINS PASS OPIC FOR JOHN SIMON, GEORGE SCHULTZ, RUTH ANN NICASTRI USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/OLAC/PEACHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2027 TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD AR SUBJECT: CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR CALLS ARGENTINE ECONOMIC POLICIES UNSUSTAINABLE AND AGREES TO WORK TO MODERATE GOA'S DOHA NEGOTIATING POSITION REF: BUENOS AIRES 1496 Classified By: Ambassador E.A. Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The GoA's "fiscal policies are not sustainable past this year," Central Bank (BCRA) President Martin Redrado (PROTECT) told Ambassador during their July 31 meeting. He warned of increasing problems if Argentina maintained its domestic demand-driven growth policies (he noted the BCRA estimates inflation at 13%, vs. the 8% official rate). Nevertheless, he expressed optimism for change during the first 100 days of a likely Cristina Kirchner administration. Redrado said the BCRA had passed a "stress test" during the recent turmoil in world markets, demonstrating that it could calm markets and also justified the BCRA's reserve accumulation policy. He acknowledged, however, that the worldwide repricing of risk (and "flight to quality") over the last week had significantly increased Argentina's financing costs. Redrado said WTO Director General Pascal Lamy had urged him to engage personally on trade issues within the GoA, and he welcomed USG suggestions on ways to moderate Argentina's Doha negotiating stance. End Summary. Time to Move Past Post-Crisis, Keynesian Growth Policies -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) During a July 31 meeting with Ambassador, BCRA President Redrado (STRICTLY PROTECT) stated that the time was overdue for the GoA to move past the post-crisis phase, where the GoA had pursued a number of unorthodox economic policies to stimulate domestic demand and achieve high growth rates. He argued that Argentina needed to enter a new phase of pursuing sustainable growth, and this would require substantial GoA policy changes. Current fiscal policies -- expenditures growing more rapidly than revenues, increasing subsidies to both agriculture and manufacturing, election-year tax cuts -- are unsustainable past 2007, in his opinion. He foresees worsening problems for the economy, particularly higher inflation, further energy shortages, rising interest rates, and difficulty in attracting investment if the GoA insisted on maintaining the current focus on domestic demand driven growth. ¶3. (C) While admitting that he had not received any specific indication that Presidential-front-runner Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner would, as President, undertake major economic reforms, he was optimistic with regards to "Cristina's first 100 days." In particular, he noted that Cristina's recently proposed "social accord" between government, the private sector, and unions offered a possible means to realign GoA policies to engender a "soft landing" to a more sustainable growth rate. He thought that the GoA could use such a broad dialogue to manage expectations on issues such as wages, inflation, taxes, and spending. Including labor would be the key, he thought, as he thought reigning in wage increases (in the 15-20% per year since 2002) was a key component to rationalizing macroeconomic policies and controlling inflation. Redrado estimated current inflation at 13%, annualized, versus the headline rate of about 8% reported by the government statistics agency, INDEC (see reftel). ¶4. (C) Redrado acknowledged that micro-reforms were also needed if Argentina were to increase investment flows, particularly the rationalization of utility sector prices that are limiting investment in the energy sector. He agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that the GoA has not internally figured out the role it wants to play in the energy sector, i.e., whether to just have an unofficial bias in favor of local investors or to continue GoA accumulation of direct ownership stakes in energy sector assets via state-owned ENARSA. Redrado noted that the recently popular idea of creating a national development bank (similar to Brazil's BNDES) had lost steam, but argued that the same could be accomplished by redefining the role of state-owned Banco Nacion. He claimed Banco Nacion had in the range of 26 billion pesos (over $8 billion) in liquid assets, mostly deposits from GoA agencies, including the social security agency (ANSES). Redrado argued that the GoA could use some portion of these funds for infrastructure investments, and actually increase the return on the funds. ¶5. (C) Redrado noted that Cristina's only economic advisor at the moment was her husband, President Nestor Kirchner, and the Ambassador was left with the impression that Redrado may see this as an opportunity to position himself as the go-to advisor on the economy. He is already widely considered to be on the short list for Economy Minister in a Cristina government (reftel). High Reserves Help BCRA Pass "Stress Test" -------------- ¶6. (C) Redrado claimed that the BCRA had passed a "stress test" in the last week during the turmoil in world financial markets, and had shown that it could use its abundant foreign exchange reserves to attenuate exchange rate volatility. Redrado said the BCRA's actions had validated his reserve accumulation policy, as the BCRA had intervened in FX markets, selling reserves to control the sharp depreciation of the Peso (caused by local and international investors' sudden rush to sell peso-denominated bonds in order to buy dollars). As a result, after bottoming at about 3.21 Pesos/USD, the Peso has appreciated to about 3.16 and stabilized. ¶7. (C) At its most volatile point on July 26, the BCRA intervened with up to $150-250 million. In Redrado's opinion, this demonstrated the need for liquid reserves and undermined the argument put forward by some in the Kirchner administration that official reserves should be used to fund investment projects (or pay back Paris Club debt). (Note: Local analysts argue that last week's gyrations have established a new 3.12 - 3.20 trading range for the Peso and have added a degree of volatility into market calculations that serve BCRA interests in limiting speculative hard currency short-term capital inflows. End Note). Argentina: Victim of Worldwide "Flight to Quality" -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite the BCRA's success in calming local markets, Redrado pointed out that the ongoing worldwide reappraisal of risk had resulted in significantly higher financing costs for the GoA and BCRA. As investors abandoned Argentina's relatively risky financial instruments, Argentine bond spreads increased significantly and above Latin American comparables: -- Argentina's short to medium-term peso-denominated bonds saw their yields increase about 200 basis points (bps) since mid-July, while short/medium-term, dollar-denominated bond yields widened about 150 bps. -- Argentina's country risk, as measured on the JPMorgan EMBI plus, widened from 320 bps on July 16 to 480 bps on July 27 (versus the historical low of 180 bps in late January). -- The Argentine 5-year Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spread widened by 200 bps at one point, and ended last week up 150 bps (versus only a 45 bps increase for Brazil). -- As a result of the heavy BCRA peso purchases last week, short-term market liquidity dried up and interbank interest rates climbed to unprecedented levels of about 28%. Although subsequent BCRA injections of pesos into the market (through purchases of short-term BCRA instruments and reverse repo operations) stabilized the rate at between 12 and 13%, that is still substantially higher than the 8% interbank rate at the beginning of July. -- The BCRA canceled this week's auction of LEBACs and NOBACs (short-term Central Bank letters and notes),partly to maintain peso liquidity and control rates, but also to let the market cool down before issuing new debt. (Note: LEBAC and NOBAC rates were also in the 7-8% range in early July, but it is likely that the BCRA would now have to offer rates approaching the current interbank rate to attract sufficient bids. End Note) ¶9. (C) In order to mitigate the adverse impact of the now much steeper yield curve on GoA finances, Redrado said he had reversed his campaign to convince the Economy Ministry to issue longer-term debt, and was now advocating issuance of shorter-term (3-5 year maturity) debt until the dust settled. ¶10. (C) Redrado also acknowledged news reports that Argentina and Venezuela were planning to issue another tranche of the so-called "Bono del Sur," but denied knowing details. (Note: septel provides more information about this apparently imminent deliverable from visiting Venezuelan President Chavez. End Note) Perception of Argentina as Obstructing WTO Talks -------------- --- ¶11. (C) Redrado said WTO Director General Pascal Lamy had called him to complain that Argentina had not played a constructive role during recent Doha round discussions. Lamy had urged him to engage within the GoA to moderate Argentina's negotiating stance. (Note: Prior to his appointment to the BCRA in late 2004, Redrado was the GoA's lead Foreign Ministry trade negotiator; he also played a key role in selecting the Foreign Ministry official who succeeded him in that position: Alfredo Chiaradia, through whom Redrado claims to have some influence on trade issues. End Note) Redrado said he had agreed to engage, and also noted that he was open to U.S. suggestions for new ways to present the case. However, his preliminary analysis was that manufacturing sector losses would more than offset Argentina's gains in agriculture, at least in the short-run. As an example, he noted that Argentine auto tariffs were 35% for both applied and bounded rates, and the Argentine auto manufacturers -- including the U.S. companies -- were adamant in rejecting the almost 50% proposed cut. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador responded that the impression in Washington was that Argentina, particularly in contrast to Brazil, had aligned itself with the most extreme positions on NAMA (non-agricultural market access) talks. The Ambassador speculated that there was likely some position that would come across as less extreme, but would continue to meet Argentina's perceived needs to protect certain sectors in the near-term. He recommended that Redrado consider longer-term arguments of the benefits of agricultural liberalization and a gradual lowering of industrial tariffs, especially peak rates. Redrado said he would welcome any facts, figures, and arguments from the U.S. to help make a case for a more flexible GoA position on NAMA. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) The GoA has little incentive this year to alter its tough negotiating stance in Doha's NAMA talks. The industrial sector remains vocal in calling for higher protection, the President just named an openly protectionist economist as the new Economy Minister (reftel),and this is an election year. Furthermore, with agricultural commodity prices so high, the Argentine agricultural sector has less incentive to advocate for a Doha deal that would include subsidy cuts. Embassy would welcome detailed arguments to share with Redrado. End Comment. WAYNE