Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST883
2007-06-01 08:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUP #0883 1520854 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 010854Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1353 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0599
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000883
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RUS AND EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR
ADAM STERLING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL RU HU
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S HUNGARIAN OFFENSIVE
Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000883
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RUS AND EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR
ADAM STERLING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL RU HU
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S HUNGARIAN OFFENSIVE
Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (U) This is an action message. Please see para 6 for
guidance request.
2. (C) In a May 25 interview with the Hungarian publication
Magyar Hirlap May 25, former Russian PM and current Chamber
of Trade and Industry President Yevgevni Primakov disavowed
any Russian intention to interfere in the internal affairs of
its neighbors but levelled strong criticism of the United
States on issues ranging from Missile Defense to Human
Rights. Primakov's remarks received prominent coverage, and
his meetings with both FM Goncz and Finance Minister Veres
send yet another in a series of mixed messages on Russia from
Budapest.
3. (C) Although Primakov's present position gives him a
degree of deniability, we find his public remarks at odds
with recent high-level discussion of the importance of toning
down the rhetoric in our relationship with Russia.
4. (C) We can see why Hungary would serve as a suitable
venue for Moscow's purposes. Inclined to give Russia the
benefit of every doubt, Hungarian officials persist in their
belief that deeper commercial ties with Moscow will somehow
grant them leverage over Russia's actions through "dual
dependency." A psychologist by training, FM Goncz in
particular has resisted a harder line with Russia. Whether
born of conviction or confusion, the end result in practice
is often that Hungary risks becoming a "neutral ally."
5. (C) We note that neither Goncz nor Veres advised us of
the Primakov trip in advance, and no GoH representative has
publicly - or privately - distanced themselves from his harsh
criticism of the US. With Hungarian National Security
Advisor Valki due to return from discussions in Washington
this week, we are prepared to engage with GoH officials to
make clear our disappointment with the Primakov visit as yet
another example of how Hungary's actions - and inaction - are
calling into question its views on Russia ... and on the
issues of vital importance to us in which Russia has now
engaged. We are prepared to do so because this problem will
not resolve itself absent our engagement.
6. (C) Embassy Budapest welcomes Department's guidance for
such an approach to GoH officials. Briefing them on the
Secretary's recent meetings would provide us with an
SIPDIS
excellent opportunity to outline our commitment to dialogue
with Russia, and to underscore our conviction that Primakov's
remarks deviate from our understanding with Moscow and our
expectations from Budapest.
FOLEY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RUS AND EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR
ADAM STERLING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL RU HU
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S HUNGARIAN OFFENSIVE
Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (U) This is an action message. Please see para 6 for
guidance request.
2. (C) In a May 25 interview with the Hungarian publication
Magyar Hirlap May 25, former Russian PM and current Chamber
of Trade and Industry President Yevgevni Primakov disavowed
any Russian intention to interfere in the internal affairs of
its neighbors but levelled strong criticism of the United
States on issues ranging from Missile Defense to Human
Rights. Primakov's remarks received prominent coverage, and
his meetings with both FM Goncz and Finance Minister Veres
send yet another in a series of mixed messages on Russia from
Budapest.
3. (C) Although Primakov's present position gives him a
degree of deniability, we find his public remarks at odds
with recent high-level discussion of the importance of toning
down the rhetoric in our relationship with Russia.
4. (C) We can see why Hungary would serve as a suitable
venue for Moscow's purposes. Inclined to give Russia the
benefit of every doubt, Hungarian officials persist in their
belief that deeper commercial ties with Moscow will somehow
grant them leverage over Russia's actions through "dual
dependency." A psychologist by training, FM Goncz in
particular has resisted a harder line with Russia. Whether
born of conviction or confusion, the end result in practice
is often that Hungary risks becoming a "neutral ally."
5. (C) We note that neither Goncz nor Veres advised us of
the Primakov trip in advance, and no GoH representative has
publicly - or privately - distanced themselves from his harsh
criticism of the US. With Hungarian National Security
Advisor Valki due to return from discussions in Washington
this week, we are prepared to engage with GoH officials to
make clear our disappointment with the Primakov visit as yet
another example of how Hungary's actions - and inaction - are
calling into question its views on Russia ... and on the
issues of vital importance to us in which Russia has now
engaged. We are prepared to do so because this problem will
not resolve itself absent our engagement.
6. (C) Embassy Budapest welcomes Department's guidance for
such an approach to GoH officials. Briefing them on the
Secretary's recent meetings would provide us with an
SIPDIS
excellent opportunity to outline our commitment to dialogue
with Russia, and to underscore our conviction that Primakov's
remarks deviate from our understanding with Moscow and our
expectations from Budapest.
FOLEY