DAS DI CARLO'S CONSULTATIONS IN HUNGARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000350 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING AND BERT BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS HU SUBJECT: DAS DI CARLO'S CONSULTATIONS IN HUNGARY REF: BUDAPEST 266 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI ¶1. (C) Summary: DAS Di Carlo's visit to Budapest March 1 - 2 updated key GoH decision-makers and opinion-leaders on our Balkan agenda, highlighted by our commitment to moving forward on final status for Kosovo to promote the entire region's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Hungarian officials expressed concerns regarding potential regional destabilization tempered by the fundamental recognition that the International Community is moving toward a decision in the near-term. We will keep a close eye on daylight between members of the MFA's senior leadership. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Throughout DAS Di Carlo's meetings, Hungarian parliamentarians, senior MFA officials, and political analysts across the political spectrum expressed broad support for ongoing efforts to reach a final status settlement in Kosovo. All echoed the themes laid out in PM Gyurcsany's recent letter to the EU underscoring the "indispensability" of securing a UNSCR to enshrine new status arrangements and the importance of promoting Serbia's integration. CONCERN WITHOUT INFLUENCE ¶3. (C) Hungarian concerns over regional stability featured prominently in discussion. MFA State Secretary Laszlo Szoke echoed the concerns of many here regarding a prospective exodus of Serbs from Kosovo to the Vojvodina, noting the danger of depriving them of "everything but their grievances and their guns." MP Agnes Vadai also saw prospects for a "domino effect" of ethnic conflict, noting that the International Community must focus on the economic and social as well as the political arrangements in order to prevent Kosovo from becoming a failed state. ¶4. (C) The GoH is quietly urging ethnic Hungarian communities "not to cry wolf" in the months ahead but sees little influence on neighboring governments. Responding to DAS Di Carlo's strong press for EU unity in moving forward, MFA State Secretary Szoke expressed concern over Slovak and - to a lesser extent - Romanian attitudes. He described recent Slovak statements as driven by domestic political considerations, adding that Hungary will remain in close contact with MFA counterparts but predicting that they would have little impact on "childish hysteria" in Bratislava or on "eerily similar positions" in Bucharest. "WE WANT SERBIA TO NEGOTIATE" BUT "WE WON'T HELP THEM PROCRASTINATE" ¶5. (C) Following recent discussions between PM Gyurcsany and Serbian President Tadic, MFA officials believe Tadic has "his eyes on a European future" ... but fear he should keep an eye on his back given the "fragile dynamic" in Belgrade. Tadic had lamented that he is trapped in a "tragic" situation, with "only the Russians defending Serbia" as he tried to move toward EU accession. Gyurcsany urged Tadic to "represent Serbia's interests" by participating constructively in the negotiation process, also reinforcing the importance of ICTY cooperation. Although the MFA is hopeful that Tadic will engage to find "the least bad solution," they "will not help Belgrade procrastinate." Many suspect that "Tadic knows what is coming," but believe Belgrade will ultimately find an imposed solution easier to accept for domestic political consumption. ¶6. (C) Budapest is actively pressing other EU member-states for integration incentives for Belgrade. As MFA State Secretary Ivan Udvardi commented, "the EU must do what NATO SIPDIS did with its decision on PfP" despite significant enlargement fatigue. MOD DAS-equivalent Peter Siklosi agreed, commenting that "the EU needs to be a pain-killer for Serbia and a steroid for Kosovo." At a minimum, Udvardi would like to see a strong statement from the German EU Presidency affirming Serbia's future within the Union to offset the impact of the Ahtisaari plan. ¶7. (C) Both Parliamentary Speaker Katalin Szili and Parliamentary European Affairs Committe Chair Matyas Eorsi specifically endorsed broader contacts with the Serbian public, including a more flexible visa regime. MFA State Secretary Udvardi indicated that the GoH will quietly SIPDIS coordinate with the new government on these issues. State Secretary Szoke conceded that Hungary remains at the leading SIPDIS edge of the EU re outreach to Serbia, commenting that "our position differs ... but then again so does our geography." BUDAPEST 00000350 002 OF 002 Both political scientist Tamas Magyarics and our diplomatic colleagues here believe that geography is driving the GoH's insistence on an UNSCR, so that it will be able to avoid any difficult decisions re recognition of Kosovo and "hide behind the United Nations." WILLING TO DO MORE ... ¶8. (C) Hungarian officials regard a continued American presence in the region as essential. The MOD's Siklosi pledged that Hungary will be "the penultimate country to leave" the international security force, and MFA State Secretary Udvardi emphasized that Hungary would increase its SIPDIS troop presence in Kosovo if necessary despite the strain of deployments elsewhere. Interestingly, there was no offer to carry a message to Moscow, and officials in and out of government had more questions than answers regarding Moscow's ultimate intentions. BUT FIRST DO NO HARM ¶9. (C) Comment: Although Hungarian officials clearly recognize both the depth of our commitment to a settlement in the near-term as well as the limits on their own influence, there is still a degree of dissonance at senior levels of the MFA. A critic of Ahtisaari, State Secretary Udvardi expressed far more sympathy for a protracted (and even potentially alternative) process than did State Secretary Szoke. Although Udvardi's bureaucratic maneuvering within the Ministry may explain his divergent views, we will watch this space closely as we keep GoH officials fully briefed in order to keep them fully on board. DAS Di Carlo's visit helped these efforts enormously, and we have encouraged Hungarian officials to view the issue in a strategic and not just an ethnic context. End Comment. ¶10. (U) DAS Di Carlo has cleared on this message. FOLEY