SCENE-SETTER FOR DAS DI CARLO'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000266 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR DAS DICARLO AND EUR/SCE JOSHUA BLACK E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV HU SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR DAS DI CARLO'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST REF: A) BUDAPEST 175 B) BUDAPEST 76 Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI ¶1. (C) The integration of the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic community remains an issue of bipartisan consensus despite Hungary,s fractious domestic political dynamic. All parties supported NATO and EU accession and see the International Community's presence as key to stability in the Balkans and thus to their own long-term security. You should hear a consistent message of support for our engagement from officials in the government and in the opposition, who may agree about little else. ¶2. (C) Translating Hungary,s interest into constructive engagement is the key. Pressing for activism remains an uphill battle in a country where interest in foreign policy is neither broad nor deep, but the former Yugoslavia remains an area of vital national interest. Hungary,s first real foray into Balkan policy in 2005, on behalf of Croatia,s EU accession, ended in a stinging rebuke from London (and from Washington) over ICTY conditionality. Although most of its attention is still very much focused on internal politics, Budapest is beginning to seek a diplomatic role commensurate with its troop deployments in the region. (Note: Hungary has approximately 500 troops throughout the Balkans - half their legally mandated limit - with a commitment made to increase their contribution to EU missions. End note.) ¶3. (C) Kosovo status will be the first real test of their readiness to do so. Though the impact of any settlement on the ethnic Hungarian community in the Vojvodina (a key issue and potential political weapon for the opposition) will remain of paramount importance to Budapest, the GoH recognizes that the costs of inaction outweigh the consequences of a decision now. ¶4. (C) They will want to proceed in a way that integrates rather than isolates Serbia. NATO's decision on PfP was widely hailed here and privately acknowleged as a decision "made in America ... and announced in Riga." We suspect they also see our decision as one influenced by their engagement. We are working hard to identify synergies between the Ohio National Guard's State Partnership Program with Hungary and their new relationship with Serbia. This will help Budapest take on a supportive role and potentially give Serbia ;selective access to more engagement opportunities. As Hungarian officials have pointed out, one potential advantage to this relationship may come in Afghanistan, as Hungary is encouraging neighboring states to contribute to its Provincial Reconstruction Team in Baghlan Province. Croatia is already doing so, and the GoH has also had informal discussions with Belgrade (and we suspect Podgorica) regarding further contributions. ¶5. (C) In a recent letter circulated within the EU, Prime Minister Gyurcsany underscored the importance of Serbia's full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and emphasized Budapest's two redlines re future status (ref a): - That the timing of the decision allow for a "reasonable period" to pass following the Serbian elections (based on FM Goncz's comments to Ambassador Foley, the GoH seems to regard the convention of the Parliament - rather than the formation of a new government - to suffice in this regard); and, - That the IC pursue a Security Council Resolution to endorse status arrangements. Hungarian officials have privately signaled to us their eagerness to serve as a channel of communication to Belgrade and their expressed willingness to underscore our points with the Russians, with whom PM Gyurcsany maintains a close relationship. We have encouraged the GoH to represent its views actively within the EU, and to seek out opportunities to expand its commitment to the EU's civilian efforts on the ground, and your visit can help provide them with specific recommendations. We have also laid down our informal marker re Hungary's occasional expressions of interest in applying any provisions for the protection of the Serbian minority in Kosovo to Hungarian minorities in Serbia proper. Although this suggestion has not reared its head of late, you may need to tamp down any expectations as one variable too many in any already complex equation. ¶6. (C) We are developing your schedule to maximize opportunities to promote Hungary's support for the way forward in Kosovo. We have requested the following meetings: MFA State Secretary Laszlo Szoke: Although division of responsibility for the Balkans is not always precise, and Szoke's responsibility for European Affairs (including International Organizations and Human Rights) make him one of the Ministry's key players on the issue. A former Ambassador to Sweden with prior service in Washington and Baghdad, Szoke will warmly welcome your visit as a chance to hear our latest thinking. MFA officials will likely underscore Hungarian concerns regarding a "perfect storm" that leaves Serbia "without Kosovo and the chance of European integration" and may reiterate concerns re Russia. They may also repeat their private assessment opinion that Ahtisaari missed an opportunity by declining offers of support from Hungary and other new Allies (ref b). The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee: Chaired by opposition MP Zsolt Nemeth, with whom you met in Washington last year, the committee is working to maintain the spirit of bipartisanship as it establishes an independent voice on foreign policy issues. Although Zsolt will be at a political event in Romania, we are putting together a session with other committee members and staff. We have also contacted Parliamentary Speaker Katalin Szili's office about a meeting, given her interest in the region. Szili has also worked to raise her profile in foreign affairs through frequent travel, and has invited Speaker Pelosi to attend a meeting of Balkan parliamentarians in Budapest in June. The Ministry of Defense: Time permitting, we will work to set an appointment with MOD officials interested in our views regarding the long-term international presence in the region. This will also present an opportunity to discuss ways to use the State Partnership Program as a vehicle to promote reform in the Serbian military. Lunch: Ambassador Foley will host a lunch at the residence in your honor, with invitees including MFA and MOD representatives, foreign policy and security experts, and parliamentarians. All will welcome our assessment on Kosovo and also news from your meetings in Brussels. Dinner: DCM Reeker and Political Counselor Gaudiosi would be delighted to arrange an informal dinner, potentially to include opinion leaders for an off-the record discussion. ¶7. (C) We look forward to welcoming you in person. REEKER