SMALL SACRIFICES: THE PLIGHT OF THE SMALL PARTIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 001794

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2012
TAGS: PGOV KDEM HU
SUBJECT: SMALL SACRIFICES: THE PLIGHT OF THE SMALL PARTIES
... AND THE DILEMMA OF THE LARGE ONES

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Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: As the MSzP and FIDESZ remained locked in
their long-standing competition, the junior coalition partner
SzDSz and independent opposition party MDF are searching for
traction as all parties begin the long road to the 2010
elections. The SzDSz continues to lose altitude, and the MDF
is very cautiously signaling its openness to cooperation with
FIDESZ. The parties will continue to make careful
calculations regarding the risks of alienating their
traditional supporters as they compete for centrist voters.
End Summary.

REQUIEM FOR A HEAVYWEIGHT?


2. (C) Its days as a major party an increasingly distant
memory, the SzDSz continues to wrestle with what MDF leader
Ibolya David terms "schizophrenia." She sees the SzDSz
struggling to assert its independence but reluctant to leave
the coalition, unable to "build popularity and retain
credibility." She shares the assessment of many insiders,
who see the SzDSz as deeply divided between party president
Janos Koka and Environment Minister Gabor Fodor, a former
FIDESZ member whom she referred to as "Viktor Fodor" in a
Freudian slip.

MDF: ON A PEDESTAL ( AND A PLATEAU


3. (C) Though her own party continues to poll above the five
percent threshold required for representation in Parliament,
Dr. David still has hard work ahead to reach her target of 10
- 15 percent in the 2010 elections. She believes this will
allow her to make ) or break ) any coalition government.


4. (C) Despite long-standing bad blood with Viktor Orban,
David has cautiously opened the door to cooperation with
FIDESZ in the past weeks. She has publicly expressed support
for Orban's condemnation of violence during the recent
October 23 celebrations, and has denounced an ongoing
investigation into his finances by the Tax Authority as
politically-motivated. These are small steps, but even these
statements would have been difficult to imagine months ago.
Even so, she remains extremely wary, citing FIDESZ's
inability to "control its own people." At a private meeting
with Ambassador Foley on October 30, David ruled out any
pre-election coalition, explaining that FIDESZ could "expect
some coordination behind the curtain but no open embrace."
After an electoral victory in 2010, however, she believes
that FIDESZ "might need a coalition partner to blame" once in
power.


5. (C) She also denies any consideration of a coalition with
the MSzP, which officials in the Prime Minister's Office had
raised as a possibility. David commented that both the MDF
and the SzDSz are largely used as pawns by the larger
parties, minimizing talk around town of an SzDSz move from
the coalition into opposition and an MSzP overture to replace
them with the MDF.

THE SOUGHT-AFTER CENTER


6. (C) The MDF and SzDSz are also likely to compete for
centrist voters in the run-up to 2010. Current polling
indicates a strong lead (typically two-to-one) for FIDESZ
among decided voters. But a large pool of uncommitted voters
) sufficient to determine the results ) remains. David
believes her consistent and principled stand will attract
those disillusioned with the MSzP but not prepared to support
FIDESZ, and has positioned herself between the two. The MDF
has made steady progress, attracting "several hundred
thousand" supporters in the past year according to her
estimation, but has been unable to make a dramatic
breakthrough. For its part, the SzDSz has been losing
ground.


7. (C) The large parties are also looking toward the center.
As the MSzP hopes to hold the crucial swing voters it
attracted in 2006, FIDESZ will have to balance its efforts to
attract moderates while not alienating the party's right
wing. David believes a "wiser Orban" has tacked toward the
center, and observers across the political spectrum agree
that "only the moderate right can defeat the extreme right."
However, she still believes FIDESZ is reluctant to risk
fracturing Orban's vision of a united right wing by
alienating the far end of the spectrum.


8. (C) Former FIDESZ Cabinet Minister Istvan Stumpf agrees,
telling representatives from the Diplomatic Corps October 30
that the far right constitutes ten percent of the Hungarian
electorate. He believes that the far-right Jobbik party,

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which received less than two percent of the vote in 2006,
will surpass five percent and thus gain a foothold in
Parliment in 2010. Their votes, he concludes, will come at
FIDESZ's expense. Although he underscores that Jobbik is
still "tiny," political scientist Zoltan Kiszelly also
believes that they will attract votes from FIDESZ. He
believes some in the FIDESZ leadership are afraid "the
iceberg will melt under their feet" as they try to move
toward the center.

MODERATION IN ALL THINGS?


9. (C) Comment: As David acknowledged, the opening moves of
the 2010 election are already underway. FIDESZ is
positioning itself toward the center, and she is both
recognizing that and reacting to it as the MDF works to make
itself essential to any coalition government. The early
indicators for the SzDSz are grave, and both small parties
could be hurt if any of the current talk of "new parties"
comes to fruition. The MSzP and FIDESZ each have a much
larger voter base on which to rely, but their very strength
magnifies the importance of the uncommitted center. As a
result, both of the larger parties will calculate carefully
before they risk alienating their traditional supporters by
moving "too far" to the center. End Comment.

FOLEY