ALL THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEN: WHO'S WHERE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 001582 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV ECON KDEM PINR HU SUBJECT: ALL THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEN: WHO'S WHERE ON EFORM BUDAPEST 00001582 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (SBU) As reform continues to dominate the political landscape, clearer divisions are emerging within the governing coalition and among the party leaders. ¶2. (C) Within the government, Prime Minister Gyurcsany remains most visibly associated with the package of reforms that commonly bear his name. As his critics charge, his background of prominence in the Communist Youth League (KIS) and profit in early days of privatization makes him a curious reformer. Whatever the depth of his commitment, his present political straits have limited his freedom of action to a range far less ambitious than his rhetoric would suggest. ¶3. (C) After a long period of relative quiet, that rhetoric is now ramping up. Even as the PM is pledging "no new taxes" in public appearances, his Chief of Staff, Zoltan Gal, tells us that the government remains committed to reforming health care, reining in the gray economy, and taking on pension reform (which many regard as the third rail of Hungarian politics). THE INSIDE MEN ¶4. (C) Gyurcsany has relied on a close coterie of advisors in developing his reform agenda, foremost among them Minister without Portfolio Tibor Draskovics. Originally head of the now-disbanded Government Reform Committee, Draskovics has been consistently outspoken on reform. A former Minister of Finance, he has recommended controversial measures to reduce and reshape Hungary's bloated public sector. The government has avoided these measures in large part with its focus on raising taxes and reducing subsidies, but Draskovics has continued to call for systemic changes in his new position. Opposition sources believe that Gyurcsany was prepared to retain a number of political rivals in his cabinet during the most recent cabinet reshuffle in order to keep Draskovics. Chief of Staff Gal described Draskovics as the one who puts the cabinet's decisions into action. Corporate sources, however, minimize the impact of Draskovics' efforts. ¶5. (C) Gordon Bajnai is another member of Gyurcsany's inner circle on reform. As Minister of Development and head of the National Development Agency, Bajnai oversees the National Development Plan, the practical roadmap for the use of European Union co-financing to continue on its path of development and economic convergence. MPs in other parties believe Bajnai may also be a future MSzP Prime Ministerial candidate, but he, too, is regarded as limited in his ability to affect change. ¶6. (C) Once a star among accession countries for its ability to &absorb,8 or spend its assistance funds within the European Union framework, Hungary is not faring as well with the current, larger round of EU co-financing. With absorption rates hovering around sixty percent, Bajnai heads an organization that is struggling to process the twenty-four billion euros the European Union has allocated for the next 5 years. They are proceeding in a way that maximizes the political impact of the disbursements, with announcements spaced out to keep the good news coming, but critics charge that the Agency is putting too much EU funding into selected and politically-motivated projects, including Budapest's troubled mass transit expansion. Gal believes reforms to date have been grudgingly accepted as part of everyday life, but candidly describes the government's approach as a calculated gamble that the visible influx of EU aid will offset the political costs of reform. "What we want," he remarked, "is for people to see a construction crane in every community in Hungary." THE ENFORCER ¶7. (C) After a successful year of imposing budgetary discipline over his own ) and other ) ministries, Finance Minister Veres is assuming a more prominent public role. Veres has overseen, mandated, or coordinated most of the GoH's increased enforcement actions that have resulted in increased tax compliance and enhanced revenues from enforcement, including the new requirements to control access to health care. A common question among economic analysts is whether Veres will venture too far beyond the MSzP mainstream in his efforts to impose fiscal discipline in a system that has always binged on spending prior to elections. THE USUAL SUSPECTS ¶8. (C) When it comes to reform, many within the MSzP are less enthusiastic ( or largely opposed. Corporate sources BUDAPEST 00001582 002.2 OF 002 tell us that old-line party leaders including Speaker Katalin Szili, Parliamentary Faction Leader Ildiko Lendvai, and Minister for Cabinet Affairs Peter Kiss are at best resistant to reform and at worst inextricably tied to "business as usual." As one corporate rep warned, "they don,t speak our language ) English or transparency." All three have distanced themselves from Gyurcsany over the course of the past year. Szili has openly challenged Gyurcsany's leadership. Kiss' trademarks have been more subtle actions and statements, even as he has taken on responsibility for coordination between the coalition parties as a member of the select "government cabinet," where issues are usually decided. ¶9. (C) We sense on the part of Szili, Lamperth, and Kiss no particular commitment to reform, contrasted with clear concern over the impact of the austerity measures on the party's political fortunes. We also sense that this watchful waiting is the posture of a majority within the MSzP. THE CONTENDER ¶10. (C) Defense Minister Imre Szekeres may bridge the gap between the two factions. A long-time MSzP insider and surprise choice as Minister of Defense, Szekeres has been an enthusiastic reformer at the MOD (despite allegations of involvement in corrupt practices within the MSzP),focusing in particular on long over-due reductions in the officer corps. As a vocal advocate of Hungary's presence in Afghanistan and its bid to host the NATO Strategic Airlift Consortium's base at Papa, Szekeres has raised his own profile to the point of open press speculation regarding his Prime Ministerial ambitions. A traditional Socialist now with a proven record on reform at the MOD, Szekeres is a cagy politician and might have broad appeal, but some question whether his Jewish faith would be a disadvantage with Hungary's voters. THE OUTSIDER ¶11. (C) Minister of Economy and SzDSz President Koka continues to press for reforms within the coalition, particularly on health care (septel) and party finance reform. His critics ) inside the party and out - argue that his often highly-publicized efforts have been more about getting attention than getting results. They also cast doubts on the transparency of Koka-administered projects such as the privatization of cargo operations for the Hungarian railroad (MAV). For our part, we see a tendency to take credit early and often. We also suspect that Koka will continue to battle a credibility gap among the SzDSz's liberal base and considerable personal enmity among many in the MSzP. His attempts to wear the mantle of reform may well be damaged by the failure of his lawsuit against a publication which alleged his involvement with the diversion of government funds to off-shore corporations. WE'RE NO ANGELS ¶12. (C) Comment: The government's success to date has owed as much to Veres' careful accounting as to Koka's sweeping rhetoric. Hungary will need both ) along with a great deal of EU assistance and even more luck ) to see its reform agenda through to conclusion. Although Gal argues that the Gyurcsany government "has no alternative but to follow through," if you listen long enough in Hungary you will hear allegations of corruption about everyone ... including many who are involved in the current reforms. Moreover, Gal's conclusion may not extend to a party that needs good political news more than good policy decisions. End Comment. FOLEY