Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BUDAPEST1341
2007-08-16 09:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

FROM SIMONYI TO SOMOGYI: CHANGES AT THE HUNGARIAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM ENRG ECON 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUP #1341/01 2280955
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160955Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1755
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 001341 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ENRG ECON
SUBJECT: FROM SIMONYI TO SOMOGYI: CHANGES AT THE HUNGARIAN
EMBASSY AND BEYOND

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 001341 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ENRG ECON SUBJECT: FROM SIMONYI TO SOMOGYI: CHANGES AT THE HUNGARIAN EMBASSY AND BEYOND Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (U) In a brief meeting with Ambassador Foley August 15, Hungarian Ambassador-designate Ferenc Somogyi outlined his priorities for his upcoming tour. Visa Waiver: A Milestone ) Not a Finish Line ¶2. (C) Welcoming recent progress on the Visa Waiver front, Somogyi accentuated the positive while underscoring his commitment to continue working the issue. "There is no quick fix," he concluded, but we have passed "an important milestone" and he will make continued progress a priority. Continued Focus on Cuba ¶3. (C) Similarly, he will continue the focus on Cuba. He affirmed the GoH's political commitment to promote a democratic transition through a "gradual, controlled process" capitalizing on the strong personal ties between Hungary and Cuba. He particularly welcomed the prospect of the upcoming visit by Codel Sires, expressing his intention to contact the members of the delegation upon his arrival in Washington. Finding a Niche ¶4. (C) Turning to the potential meeting between Secretary Rice and FM Goncz in September, Somogyi welcomed the opportunity to reaffirm Hungary's commitment to make an active contribution to the Transatlantic relationship. Even within its current budgetary constraints, he believes Hungary can still "find a valuable niche." ¶5. (C) He believes there is bipartisan support for this "unprecedented" activism, confiding that FIDESZ had gone through the motions of opposing his nomination but privately assured him that there will be "no problems" working together. Despite this entente, Somogyi commented that it is difficult for most outside observers ) and for many Hungarians ) to see through the present "political clashes" or to understand the prevailing attitude that "if I lose the game it must be fixed." A Failure to Communicate? ¶6. (C) Acknowledging concerns re the direction of Hungarian policy, Somogyi affirmed his confidence in PM Gyurcsany's fundamental commitment on issues including transparency and energy security but commented that "our communication has not been equal to the task." By "ignoring what should be obvious," Somogyi concluded, "we have invited misunderstand
ing." (Note: Somogyi has gone further in previous statements, criticizing "Gyurcsany's stupid remarks" on the margins of the PM's July 30 speech on foreign policy. End Note.) Wheels-up ¶6. (C) Somogyi's arrival will be welcome to many in Budapest who have grown increasingly tired with Ambassador Simonyi's bureaucratic brinksmanship. ¶7. (C) It is not that MFA officials are unmindful of Ambassador Simonyi's many successes. They know he has raised Hungary's "Q" well beyond a level commensurate with its strategic importance. They fear, however, that he has also raised USG expectations to a level that they are often unable to meet. After years of what some see as extending their policy to meet Simonyi's promises, there is little patience left in the Ministry. In sum, many in the GoH feel they are getting too much attention from the U.S., too much unsolicited advice from their embassy, and too little understanding from both. ¶8. (C) Simonyi's widely-perceived attempts to inject his name into the debate over high-level personnel decisions - including both the Foreign Minister's position and a key slot in the Prime Minister's Office - have also drained the reservoir of good will. Even those who regard his return to Budapest with some trepidation confess a certain relief in his departure from Washington. ¶9. (C) All our contacts expect a dramatic change with Simonyi's departure and Somogyi's arrival. Following an acrimonious visit to Washington earlier this year, unofficial envoys from the Prime Minister's Office concluded that the Hungarian embassy in Washington had ceased reporting on what one official called "anything but Simonyi's public appearances," leaving the GoH badly exposed as perceptions of Russia shifted (reftel). As Pal Dunai, Director the MFA-affiliated Foreign Policy Institute, observed, "with Somogyi at least we'll be able to trust that our embassy is following its guidance and reporting the truth." In sum, he concluded, "our embassy will begin to live in a fact-based universe." Enough Excitement ¶10. (C) Comment: A former Foreign Minister with broad experience in multilateral affairs, Somogyi is widely regarded as a safe - if unexciting - choice to manage the embassy and the bilateral relationship. Courteous and soft-spoken, he is recalled for his professional stewardship of the MFA more than any particular policy initiatives, but has a reputation for getting things done patiently, persistently, and productively. We understand from sources in the MFA that he is approaching the task of replacing Ambassador Simonyi with some concern given their different personal styles, but he has made clear that he will return the embassy to "reporting the news rather than making the news." End Comment. FOLEY

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