ROMANIA ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000978

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE AND EUR NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL EU KV NATO YI RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS

REF: STATE 109526

Classified By: A/DCM Jennifer Bonner for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Romania's Kosovo policy is largely driven
from the top, especially by President Basescu's office which
continues to adhere to the view that no solution can be
imposed on Belgrade and Pristina without damaging the
fundamental OSCE principles of territorial integrity.
Romanians also argue against the implied preeminence of
collective minority rights over the state's responsibility to
protect individual rights in Kosovo. MFA lawyers reportedly
were tasked with conducting a legal review of Basescu's
cautionary position on Kosovo and have concurred his position
was in fact legally correct and sound, including his concerns
about the risk of setting a negative precedent under
international law. The MFA Director General for European
Affairs told us he would like to see direct negotiations
between Belgrade and Pristina, without international
"middlemen" in order to give the two sides a chance to find
common ground. He noted that even with a unilateral Kosovar
declaration of independence, there can be no seat in the UN
without Russia's concurrence. He compared independence
without Russia's concurrence to the situation facing Taiwan,
with Kosovars gaining all of the attributes of statehood, but
without the ultimate legitimacy conferred by UN membership.
End Summary.


2. (C) Charge presented reftel points to MFA State Secretary
(Deputy Foreign Minister equivalent) Adrian Verita on August
9, and Poloffs followed up with MFA Director General for
European Affairs Razvan Rusu on August 23. Verita confirmed
that President Basescu drove the policy on Kosovo. Vierita
noted that he had commissioned the MFA's legal department to
review Basescu's cautionary position on Kosovo, especially in
terms of its potential to set a negative precedent under
international law with regards to the principle of
territorial integrity and self-determination. MFA lawyers
had concluded that Basescu's position was legally correct and
sound. Vierita also reported that he had heard that the
Italians were playing with some new recipes for "improving"
Ahtisaari's recommendations (NFI).


3. (C) In a follow-up meeting with Poloffs, MFA DG for
Europe Razvan Rusu said that Belgrade has complained that the
Contact Group has been discouraging face-to-face negotiations
between Belgrade and Pristina. He said that the MFA's
assessment is that the Kosovar Albanians might be willing to
show more flexibility if they could simply engage directly
with Belgrade and discuss the range of options for
substantial autonomy or even confederation along the same
lines as Serbia and Montenegro. He mused that these half-way
steps might be palatable to the Kosovar Albanians if they
were seen as irreversible. Referencing the fundamental OSCE
principles of territorial integrity, Rusu argued that
collective minority rights could not take precedence over a
state's obligation to protect individual rights in Kosovo.


4. (C) Rusu noted that even if Kosovo were to declare
independence unilaterally -- and with most of Europe
recognizing Kosovo -- it is unlikely that Moscow would be
willing to agree to UN membership for Kosovo. This would
leave Kosovo in a situation akin to Taiwan, where it would
have all of the attributes of nationhood minus the legitimacy
conferred by UN membership. He questioned whether Pristina
would be willing to go the "Taiwan route." In closing, Rusu
agreed that there would be little likelihood of any
substantive change by December. He added that NATO and EU
Allies will need to be attentive to coordinating their
responses to the situation at that time, and stressed that
Alliance (and EU) solidarity was paramount in order to deny
Moscow the opportunity to exploit any fissures.
TAPLIN