SENIOR PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DISCUSSES IMPENDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001102

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL RO
SUBJECT: SENIOR PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DISCUSSES IMPENDING
NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE


Classified By: Polcouns Theodore Tanoue for 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: A senior Presidential Office insider said
that the outlook for the no-confidence motion introduced in
Parliament was uncertain, with results likely hinging on
whether parliament opts for a secret ballot or a more
transparent process. While the PNL continues to refuse
entreaties from the PSD for a face-saving cohabitation
agreement, there was concern that a PSD offer to join ranks
in delaying local elections until 2008 might prove
irresistible to the PNL. He added that the PD was itself
looking to create a new government with ministers drawn from
PD and PLD ranks, with support from the PNL and UDMR. First
choice for Prime Minister was former Interior Minister (and
Basescu confidante) Vasile Blaga, with a more "technocratic"
choice such as former PNL Foreign Minister Ungureanu being a
fall-back option. While the PD had rejected joining the PSD
in an immediate post-Tariceanu coalition, Basescu had
reportedly held out to GEOANA an offer to bring the PSD into
governance after the 2008 parliamentary election, but only if
Geoana cleaned house and expelled old-guard PSD leaders. End
Summary.


2. (C) At a meeting with Polcouns 9/24, Senior Presidential
Office Advisor Sebastian Lazaroiu opined that the outlook of
the no-confidence motion against the Tariceanu administration
was uncertain. While it might mean the end of the Tariceanu
era, there was also the possibility many PSD parliamentarians
would fail to support the motion if it came to a secret
ballot. (Note: in an aside, Lazaroiu described as "stupid" a
motion from PD President Emil Boc to change the voting rules
in Parliament to institute an open vote, noting that it was
far simpler for the PD and PLD leadership to compel their
members to cast their votes openly, thus revealing through a
process of elimination how the PSD bloc voted.) Lazaroiu
said that PSD Chamber of Deputies Whip Viorel Hrebenciuc was
still working actively behind the scenes to get the PNL to
accept a face-saving cohabitation agreement to stave off the
vote. Asked whether the PD and PNL were talking as well,
Lazaroiu responded blankly, "we have offered them a continued
political life". He explained that the PD had offered a
mutual "non-aggression" pact guaranteeing that the PD would
not accept defecting politicians from the PNL. He predicted
that otherwise, PNL members would abandon the party in droves
once the party lost the government.


3. (C) Asked why the PNL had not responded to PSD entreaties,
Lazaroiu responded that he had heard that the PNL had
conducted an internal survey of party members on the way
ahead, and that a majority--57 percent--had rejected any deal
with the PSD. Lazaroiu added that any partnership with the
current PSD--even a tacit one--was tantamount to "political
suicide" as the PSD was still seen as tainted by corruption
in the eyes of the voters. For the same reason, the PD was
disinclined towards any alliance with the PSD as currently
constituted. The preference was for a government headed by
former Interior Minister Vasile Blaga, with ministers drawn
from PD and PLD ranks. Such a government would also need the
support of the PNL and UDMR. He said that a second--far less
likely--option was a government headed by a "technocratic"
PNLer, such as former Foreign Minister Ungureanu. He opined
that the bottom line for the PD was that it would accept
either a PD or PNL government for a one-year period.
Lazaroiu dismissed the option of cobbling together a PD-led
coalition with smaller parties, and specifically rejected
bringing the right-extremist PNG into governance after future
parliamentary elections.


4. (C) Lazaroiu said that during his recent meeting with PSD
head Mirecea Geoana, President Basescu had reminded GEOANA of
his earlier offer (reportedly made during negotiations prior
to Basescu's suspension last spring) that "you can join the
government after 2008, but only after you finish cleaning up
your own party." Lazaroiu noted that even if the
no-confidence motion succeeded and GEOANA managed to oust the
Tariceanu government, GEOANA would never get the nod from
Basescu to form a new government. Better, he said, that
Geoana lose the no-confidence motion, since it would provide
him with a pretext for accusing his rivals in the PSD
(including Iliescu and Nastase) of sabotaging the vote,
giving him an opening to finally "clean out" the PSD.


5. (C) Lazaroiu commented that the PLD remained the weakest
link. It was a small party and was vulnerable to having many
of its members' votes "bought off". Moreover, the party had
until recently been demoralized and depressed about its
future prospects, with many PLD members reportedly
contemplating re-defecting back to the PNL. He said that
this was worrisome since it could bring the opprobrium for a
failed no-confidence vote on the President's erstwhile allies

BUCHAREST 00001102 002 OF 002


rather than on the PSD. Lazaroiu confided that another
concern was the danger that the PNL and PSD would agree to
postpone local elections to coincide with the 2008
parliamentary elections. He noted that PSD legislative whip
Hrebenciuc had floated the idea quietly in the press in
recent days, and that such a move could easily be
accomplished if the PSD and PNL agreed to amending the
election law to extend the mandate of local governments by
nine months or so if the PNL and PSD agreed to such a move.
This would neutralize any benefits from a PD victory in the
November. Finally, Lazaroiu also acknowledged that the
Senate would be problematic for any PD-led cabinet, since no
matter how one sliced and diced the current lineup, there
would be no PD-led majority possible in the Senate, meaning
that legislative priorities would likely face rough going.


6. (C) Comment: As Lazaroiu himself acknowledged, President
Basescu and his allies now hold many--but not all--of the
cards. A challenge for the Presidential palace is in
creating an incentive for GEOANA to finally push through with
expelling the old guard from the PSD, including Iliescu,
Nastase, and Hrebenciuc. In Lazaroiu's view, this would
allow Basescu to carry out plans for wide-ranging
constitutional reforms that would require a substantial
parliamentary majority comprised of elements from the old PD,
PNL, PSD, and PLD. This strategy harkens back to Basescu's
ambitions earlier last year to forge a "Presidential" party
out of the current political lineup. However, the prospect
of a decidedly junior partnership with Basescu only after
elections in 2008 may not be appealing enough for Geoana. In
the meantime, the no-confidence motion was introduced by the
PSD 9/24 and will be read in plenary session this coming
Thursday, with a vote expected by Wednesday next week. End
Comment.

TAUBMAN