Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRUSSELS822
2007-03-12 17:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:
EU DEBATES NEXT STEPS ON GEORGIA
VZCZCXRO2916 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBS #0822/01 0711756 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 121756Z MAR 07 FM USEU BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000822
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EUR FOR DAS BRYZA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID GG EUN
SUBJECT: EU DEBATES NEXT STEPS ON GEORGIA
Classified By: Polmincouns Laurence Wohlers for reasons 1.5 (D) and (E)
.
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000822
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EUR FOR DAS BRYZA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID GG EUN
SUBJECT: EU DEBATES NEXT STEPS ON GEORGIA
Classified By: Polmincouns Laurence Wohlers for reasons 1.5 (D) and (E)
.
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------
1. (C) On March 6, the European Council's Political and
Security Committee (PSC) debated the recommendations of a
joint Commission/Council Expert Team to Georgia led by EU
Special Representative to the Caucasus Peter Semneby.
Nordic, Central and East European Member States strongly
supported the team's recommendations for strengthening and
expanding EU technical support in Georgia and the conflict
areas, but faced stiff opposition from Mediterranean
countries led by Greece. NCE states also mustered little
support from "old" Europe and the Germany Presidency. After
a lengthy debate, PSC Ambassadors delegated further
consideration of specific recommendations to lower-level
expert working groups. End Given the lack of strong support
from a major EU player (e.g, UK, France, or Germany) it looks
as though debate over a beefed up EU presence in Georgia drag
out indefinitely in various Council deliberative bodies.
Consequently, one option is for the Commission to simply move
forward independently with enhanced programming consistent
with its existing mandate. Considerable senior staff
turnover in DG RELEX and lack of strong champion elsewhere in
the Commission institutions will make this problematic.
Discussions here next week with DAS Bryza will be
particularly in timely in this regard. End Summary and
Comment.
2. (C/NF) The Political and Security Committee of the
European Council met on March 6 to hear a formal presentation
of the summary report of the EU Expert Team Mission to
Georgia. Led by European Union Special Representative Peter
Semneby (Sweden),the joint mission of Commission and Council
policy experts traveled to Georgia in
mandate to explore ways contribute to
securisis and repage
summary of sensitivutates underlined the needre
carefully. In generQ agreed on the
imporQlict
Resolution Ministry;
-- Keeping Russia inforQed;
-- Enhancing the protection of the rights of all minorities
in Georgia;
-- Ensuring that contacts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia
should go via Tbilisi;
-- Pursuing demining activities; and
-- Pursing measures related to economic rehabilitation,
including of the railway through Abkhazia.
NCE Countries Seek Action
--------------
4. (C) According to one contact who attended the debate,
several member states, including Latvia, Poland, Lithuania,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia, stated that they
could endorse, in general terms, all of the recommendations
contained in the report. The Netherlands agreed in general
terms with the options proposed but underlined the need for
further consideration of some of the ideas. Lithuania's PSC
Ambassador emphasized that the credibility of the EU was at
stake in this exercise and that Georgia expected some action
from the EU.
BRUSSELS 00000822 002 OF 003
But the Med Pushes Back
--------------
5. (C) Whereas Sweden and the UK expressed support for some
of the recommendations in the report, they agreed with
Denmark, on the need to study some of the recommendations in
further detail. Mediterranean countries either raised
concerns or opposed any concrete decisions outright.
Representatives from Greece and Cyprus said they could not
agree to the PSC undertaking any operational conclusions or
concrete taskings. Two contacts who participated in the
debate separately commented to us that Greek positions and
rhetoric on Georgia were eerily similar to those of Russia.
France counseled "prudence" and Portugal and Spain asked for
"further study" with respect to nearly every recommendation
of the expert team. According to a Council Secretariat
source, the German Presidency did not attempt to steer the
debate in any particular direction. A Baltic PSC Ambassador
speculated that the unhelpful Cypriot stance was payback for
the Lithuanian positions at the recent EU Defense Ministerial
in Wiesebaden. Lithuania reportedly irritated Cyprus with
its forward-leaning views on EU-NATO cooperation and negative
views on establishing a permanent EU military headquarters.
For Georgia "proper": A Truth Commission?
--------------
6. (C) Under the rubric of strengthening the Georgian
conflict resolution ministry, establishing a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Poland agreed to this
proposal. Sweden was open to the issue. Cyprus and Portugal
expressed skepticism. Denmark asserted a TRC was
"premature", and Greece was "very hesitant."
Nervousness over new measures in the breakaway regions
-------------- --------------
7. (C) JCC: Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and Denmark
supported the proposal for a Joint Control Commission for
South Ossetia, possibly in Brussels. Portugal supported the
idea so long as all parties in the JCC agreed.
8: (C) Police experts: Estonia, Lithuania and Poland were
supportive of the team's proposal to co-locate a police
expert with the OSCE in South Ossetia and another one with
UNOMIG police component in Zugdidi. The Netherlands,
Portugal, and Denmark were hesitant, France cautioned
"prudence" (NFI); the UK and Sweden agreed, but pointed out
the need for close cooperation with the OSCE and UN. Greece
and Cyprus opposed the proposal; Cyprus called it a
"mini-ESDP mission."
9. (C) Customs: Poland, the UK, Estonia, Sweden and
Lithuania supported the expert team's proposals to detail a
customs expert to Georgia in order to develop a customs
project to promote capacity building and legal trade across
the administrative borders of Georgia, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. France expressed interest and agreed with the
report's analysis of the problem of certification of origin
of products, but warned against any attempt to transform such
a project into an EU Border Assistance Mission for Georgia.
Cyprus was reticent. Greece cautioned against any kind of
involvement in issues related to Russia-Georgia talks on
Russian accession to the WTO.
10. (C) Border management: Several NCE countries supported
the team's proposals to revise the mandate of the EUSR in
order for the EUSR Border Support Team to deal with issues
related to Georgia's conflict areas. Again, France cautioned
"prudence."
11. (C) Opening of new EU information centers in Soukhumi
and Tskinvali: Latvia agreed, but Greece raised concerns.
12. (C) Greece also asserted that some of the measures
proposed were not short term but actually long-term measures
or even a "strategy towards Georgia." As such, Greece argued
that the EU should be extremely careful in this respect.
Greece also alerted to the need not to engage in activities
that could be perceived as "an attempt to change the existing
negotiating formats."
Follow up Action
--------------
13. (C) Cyprus and Greece were also opposed to any kind of
tasking to the Civilian Crisis Response Committee (CIVCOM).
Eventually the PSC agreed to "invite" CIVCOM to "look into
relevant parts of the report." The PSC also tasked COEST
working-level experts to consider the long version of the
report in more detail and respond to the PSC "as soon as
possible." (Note: COEST capitals-based experts are planning
to devote their April 25 meeting to the Caucasus/Black Sea
BRUSSELS 00000822 003 OF 003
issues.)
GRAY
.
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EUR FOR DAS BRYZA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID GG EUN
SUBJECT: EU DEBATES NEXT STEPS ON GEORGIA
Classified By: Polmincouns Laurence Wohlers for reasons 1.5 (D) and (E)
.
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------
1. (C) On March 6, the European Council's Political and
Security Committee (PSC) debated the recommendations of a
joint Commission/Council Expert Team to Georgia led by EU
Special Representative to the Caucasus Peter Semneby.
Nordic, Central and East European Member States strongly
supported the team's recommendations for strengthening and
expanding EU technical support in Georgia and the conflict
areas, but faced stiff opposition from Mediterranean
countries led by Greece. NCE states also mustered little
support from "old" Europe and the Germany Presidency. After
a lengthy debate, PSC Ambassadors delegated further
consideration of specific recommendations to lower-level
expert working groups. End Given the lack of strong support
from a major EU player (e.g, UK, France, or Germany) it looks
as though debate over a beefed up EU presence in Georgia drag
out indefinitely in various Council deliberative bodies.
Consequently, one option is for the Commission to simply move
forward independently with enhanced programming consistent
with its existing mandate. Considerable senior staff
turnover in DG RELEX and lack of strong champion elsewhere in
the Commission institutions will make this problematic.
Discussions here next week with DAS Bryza will be
particularly in timely in this regard. End Summary and
Comment.
2. (C/NF) The Political and Security Committee of the
European Council met on March 6 to hear a formal presentation
of the summary report of the EU Expert Team Mission to
Georgia. Led by European Union Special Representative Peter
Semneby (Sweden),the joint mission of Commission and Council
policy experts traveled to Georgia in
mandate to explore ways contribute to
securisis and repage
summary of sensitivutates underlined the needre
carefully. In generQ agreed on the
imporQlict
Resolution Ministry;
-- Keeping Russia inforQed;
-- Enhancing the protection of the rights of all minorities
in Georgia;
-- Ensuring that contacts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia
should go via Tbilisi;
-- Pursuing demining activities; and
-- Pursing measures related to economic rehabilitation,
including of the railway through Abkhazia.
NCE Countries Seek Action
--------------
4. (C) According to one contact who attended the debate,
several member states, including Latvia, Poland, Lithuania,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia, stated that they
could endorse, in general terms, all of the recommendations
contained in the report. The Netherlands agreed in general
terms with the options proposed but underlined the need for
further consideration of some of the ideas. Lithuania's PSC
Ambassador emphasized that the credibility of the EU was at
stake in this exercise and that Georgia expected some action
from the EU.
BRUSSELS 00000822 002 OF 003
But the Med Pushes Back
--------------
5. (C) Whereas Sweden and the UK expressed support for some
of the recommendations in the report, they agreed with
Denmark, on the need to study some of the recommendations in
further detail. Mediterranean countries either raised
concerns or opposed any concrete decisions outright.
Representatives from Greece and Cyprus said they could not
agree to the PSC undertaking any operational conclusions or
concrete taskings. Two contacts who participated in the
debate separately commented to us that Greek positions and
rhetoric on Georgia were eerily similar to those of Russia.
France counseled "prudence" and Portugal and Spain asked for
"further study" with respect to nearly every recommendation
of the expert team. According to a Council Secretariat
source, the German Presidency did not attempt to steer the
debate in any particular direction. A Baltic PSC Ambassador
speculated that the unhelpful Cypriot stance was payback for
the Lithuanian positions at the recent EU Defense Ministerial
in Wiesebaden. Lithuania reportedly irritated Cyprus with
its forward-leaning views on EU-NATO cooperation and negative
views on establishing a permanent EU military headquarters.
For Georgia "proper": A Truth Commission?
--------------
6. (C) Under the rubric of strengthening the Georgian
conflict resolution ministry, establishing a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Poland agreed to this
proposal. Sweden was open to the issue. Cyprus and Portugal
expressed skepticism. Denmark asserted a TRC was
"premature", and Greece was "very hesitant."
Nervousness over new measures in the breakaway regions
-------------- --------------
7. (C) JCC: Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and Denmark
supported the proposal for a Joint Control Commission for
South Ossetia, possibly in Brussels. Portugal supported the
idea so long as all parties in the JCC agreed.
8: (C) Police experts: Estonia, Lithuania and Poland were
supportive of the team's proposal to co-locate a police
expert with the OSCE in South Ossetia and another one with
UNOMIG police component in Zugdidi. The Netherlands,
Portugal, and Denmark were hesitant, France cautioned
"prudence" (NFI); the UK and Sweden agreed, but pointed out
the need for close cooperation with the OSCE and UN. Greece
and Cyprus opposed the proposal; Cyprus called it a
"mini-ESDP mission."
9. (C) Customs: Poland, the UK, Estonia, Sweden and
Lithuania supported the expert team's proposals to detail a
customs expert to Georgia in order to develop a customs
project to promote capacity building and legal trade across
the administrative borders of Georgia, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. France expressed interest and agreed with the
report's analysis of the problem of certification of origin
of products, but warned against any attempt to transform such
a project into an EU Border Assistance Mission for Georgia.
Cyprus was reticent. Greece cautioned against any kind of
involvement in issues related to Russia-Georgia talks on
Russian accession to the WTO.
10. (C) Border management: Several NCE countries supported
the team's proposals to revise the mandate of the EUSR in
order for the EUSR Border Support Team to deal with issues
related to Georgia's conflict areas. Again, France cautioned
"prudence."
11. (C) Opening of new EU information centers in Soukhumi
and Tskinvali: Latvia agreed, but Greece raised concerns.
12. (C) Greece also asserted that some of the measures
proposed were not short term but actually long-term measures
or even a "strategy towards Georgia." As such, Greece argued
that the EU should be extremely careful in this respect.
Greece also alerted to the need not to engage in activities
that could be perceived as "an attempt to change the existing
negotiating formats."
Follow up Action
--------------
13. (C) Cyprus and Greece were also opposed to any kind of
tasking to the Civilian Crisis Response Committee (CIVCOM).
Eventually the PSC agreed to "invite" CIVCOM to "look into
relevant parts of the report." The PSC also tasked COEST
working-level experts to consider the long version of the
report in more detail and respond to the PSC "as soon as
possible." (Note: COEST capitals-based experts are planning
to devote their April 25 meeting to the Caucasus/Black Sea
BRUSSELS 00000822 003 OF 003
issues.)
GRAY
.