U.S.-EU TROIKA MEETING GENERATES WIDE-RANGING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 BRUSSELS 003530 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR INL/FO, INL/PC, EUR/ERA, L/LEI JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; DIR ONDCP FOR OSR; DEA HQS FOR OC, OE, SOD; ROME FOR DCM, POL, DEA; KABUL FOR DCM, POL, NAS, DEA; E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU SUBJECT: U.S.-EU TROIKA MEETING GENERATES WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF DRUG ISSUES REF: BRUSSELS 2415 (NOTAL) BRUSSELS 00003530 001.2 OF 010 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Officials from the United States and the European Union (EU) engaged in a wide-ranging discussion of drug issues at a US-EU Troika Meeting in Brussels on November 14. The U.S. Delegation, led by Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Christy McCampbell of the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Bureau, encouraged greater EU involvement in all aspects of couter-drug and rule of law efforts in Afghanistn. The U.S. also sought clarification of the terms of reference for an EU-funded study on traditional coca use in Bolivia and encouraged interaction with Venezuela to boost efforts against drugs transiting that country. The EU, led by International Political Organizations Head of Division Pedro Monteiro of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed overall agreement with U.S. counter-drug objectives, including greater focus on incentives and disincentives to reduce opium cultivation in Afghanistan. Representatives of the Commission and EU Member States repeated long-standing EU opposition to the use of spray eradication. The Commission remained non-committal on the idea of seeking extradition of selected, high-value drug traffickers from Afghanistan, noting that individual Member States would need to determine whether their national laws permitted such measures. Implementation of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) Ten-Year Review and U.S. Drug Kingpins Act also generated lively discussions. END SUMMARY. -------------- TROIKA MEETING ON DRUG ISSUES -------------- ¶2. (U) U.S. and EU officials met November 14 in Brussels in the informal "troika" format to discuss drug developments and issues of mutual interest. The U.S. Delegation included INL DAS Christy McCampbell, Mission INL Counselor James McAnulty, Mission Justice Counselor Mary Lee Warren, Mission Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Assistant Regional Director Thomas Scarantino, INL Policy Coordination Acting Office Director John Bargeron, INL Asia, Africa, and Europe Foreign Affairs Officer Elizabeth Carroll, and Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Official Richard Baum. The EU Delegation included Head of Division Monteiro, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Counselor Paulo Cunha Alves of the Portuguese Permanent Representation in Brussels, Head of Unit Johannes Vos of the Council Secretariat, Drugs Coordination Head of Unit Carel Edwards of the European Commission, Drugs Coordination Deputy Head of Unit Francisco Bataller of the Commission, Precursor Chemicals Administrator Suzanne Stauffer of the Commission, and representatives from 16 EU Member States, the European Police Office (EUROPOL),and the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). -------------- --- COUNTER-NARCOTICS AND RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN -------------- --- COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY -------------- ¶3. (U) After welcoming remarks and introductions on both sides, DAS McCampbell briefed on the updated U.S. BRUSSELS 00003530 002.2 OF 010 counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan. She expressed U.S. concern over the large increase in cultivation over the past season, noting that cultivation reflected a "north-south" divide in the country based on stronger security and political will in the north. The good news is that the number of poppy-free provinces had increased from six to thirteen. Even so, the processing of opium into heroin and other products permeates the country, even in areas free of cultivation. ¶4. (U) DAS McCampbell encouraged EU partners to become more involved in all aspects of the strategy, including the five pillars which the U.S. supports. Eradication until now has involved negotiations with local leaders to identify fields to be targeted and has experienced only limited success. The U.S. plans to proceed on "non-negotiated" programs that will target wealthy farmers and corrupt officials. Interdiction funding will increase from 137 million dollars last year to 355 million dollars this year, with focus on higher-level targets. DEA officials are working with Afghanistan Sensitive Investigative Units (SIUs) to gather evidence, including through court-ordered wiretaps. ¶5. (SBU) Director Bargeron elaborated by explaining that the U.S. had refined its strategy, based on lessons learned, and wanted to focus on promoting both incentives and disincentives for behavior by farmers. This included increased funding for the Good Performers Fund and greater emphasis on and funding for interdiction operations focused on taking down high-level targets. He invited the Europeans to consider contributing to the Good Performers' Initiative. The U.S. favored a spray eradication program but would only implement one if the Afghan Government agrees. The U.S. is aware that Taliban insurgents could exploit a spray program if not implemented properly. Noting that some allies oppose aerial spraying, he said the U.S. seeks EU help in identifying new ideas for "non-negotiated" eradication. He also stressed the importance of doing a better job in coordinating public information campaigns by counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency forces and asked for EU help on this. RULE OF LAW EFFORTS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Justice Counselor Warren cited progress on rule of law efforts in Afghanistan as a "good news" story for Afghanistan. With the help of the U.S. and other partners, particularly the UK. and Norway, the Afghanistan Government has established fledgling criminal justice institutions to promote rule of law in the country. Progress has occurred in the capital, but officials must extend their reach out to the provinces. The Attorney General has embarked on an anti-corruption campaign, including announcing a "jihad" against corruption. Investigators, prosecutors, and judges operate through the Criminal Justice Task Force and Central Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul with exclusive jurisdiction over handling drug offenses. More than 500 successful prosecutions occurred in past year for crimes involving drug trafficking and corruption. . ¶7. (SBU) As a complement to these efforts, Afghanistan extradited one major drug trafficker to the United States under provisions of the 1988 Vienna Convention against Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Another three individuals surrendered voluntarily in lieu of formal extradition proceedings and continued incarceration in Afghan prisons. Warren encouraged colleagues from EU Member States to seek BRUSSELS 00003530 003.2 OF 010 the extradition of traffickers in appropriate cases who have caused major harm to their societies. The primary U.S. objective remained capacity building but selected extraditions could promote justice in those cases that the Afghanistan criminal justice system could not yet handle. PARIS PACT -------------- ¶8. (U) INL Foreign Affairs Officer Carroll provided a read-out from a recent Paris Pact meeting in Kabul. She encouraged greater focus on China as a source of precursor chemicals for Afghanistan, noting the lack of seizures of acetic anhydride from that country. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has proposed five pilot projects for countries east of the Black Sea that merit international support. EU: SUPPORT FOR OVERALL APPROACH, OPPOSE SPRAY ERADICATION -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Commission Deputy Head of Unit Bataller expressed overall EU agreement with "many" ideas from the U.S., adding that some proposals required further discussion He reiterated long-standing EU opposition to the use of spray eradication, expressing the desire to develop alternatives that would make "non-negotiated" manual eradication more effective. Nonetheless, he agreed that greater focus should be devoted towards interdiction. Commission officials always remained concerned about the negative impact of eradication, particularly in the short term. Eradication should target large farmers controlled by warlords. Bataller described extradition as an "interesting idea," but noted that individual Member States would need to determine whether their national laws permitted such measures. He agreed on the need for greater coordination between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency efforts, acknowledging the existence of a close "alliance" among insurgents, warlords, and drug traffickers. He stated EU broad support for the overall counter-narcotics strategy, adding that much work and many challenges remained ahead to promote greater Afghanistan capabilities in a difficult environment. . ¶10. (SBU) Bataller said he viewed Paris Pact efforts in a "less positive" way than his colleagues from Member States. He acknowledged the need for greater coordination among countries in the region, particularly among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. UK Representative Leslie Pallet expressed support for the "reinforced approach" of the U.S. in Afghanistan, including a better balance between "sticks and carrots," which included more funding for interdiction and the Good Performers Fund. The international community must reward good behavior and punish bad behavior. Developing an effective criminal justice system would be key -- there was no point in developing good policing, if authorities could not effectively prosecute and punish criminals. The German Representative described many elements f the new strategy as "very promising," especialy the Good Performers initiative. He lamentd reports of increased cultivation of cannabi in poppy-free provinces and advocated zero tlerance of any drug cultivation. Otherwise, critics would label the program as the "Good Poppy Initiative." The main difficulty with eradication was that it targeted opium farmers rather than going after those who converted opium into heroin and supplied precursor chemicals. He understood that processing of opium into heroin had declined lately in Afghanistan, which he attributed to lesser availability of precursor chemicals. Efforts should target interdiction of BRUSSELS 00003530 004.2 OF 010 precursors and destruction of drug laboratories. Another representative asked for clarification of U.S, views on ISAF support of counter-drug efforts. ¶11. (SBU) DAS McCampbell agreed on the need to eliminate all drug crops, including both opium poppy and marijuana. Bargeron noted that, under its operations plan, ISAF forces could provide certain types of support to counter-drug operations, including provision of intelligence information. Law enforcement personnel would do the actual seizures and destruction of laboratories. Soldiers should not get involved directly. Scarantino added that the U.S. side was not asking for anything more than what already existed in the ISAF operations plan. Strong links existed between insurgents and drug trafficking. Counter-drug efforts promoted counterinsurgency objectives. Bargeron agreed on the need to tackle the drug issue from all angles, including control of precursor chemicals. Eradication had a disproportionate impact on farmers, and the U.S. promoted alternative development as a way to allow farmers to grow licit crops. Considerable opium production now occurred in Helmand province, where, ironically, eradication could have the greatest impact on wealthy farmers and Taliban insurgents. The Dutch representative asked for reasons behind the U.S. change in policy regarding negotiated eradication. The Dutch effort in Oruzgan involved close coordination with the governors, because, without local support, longer-term results would not be possible. Bargeron explained that negotiated eradication worked well in the north, but not in the south, which lacked political will. INL experiences in other countries indicated that successful elimination of drug crops only occurred after a period of time using a multi-pronged approach that included forced eradication. -------------- WESTERN HEMISPHERE -------------- EU COUNTER-DRUG ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶12. (U) Bataller noted that, as of December 2005, the Commission had allocated 235 million euros (note: over 330 million U.S. dollars at current exchange rates) in funding for projects in Latin America, primarily involving alternative development projects. Some funding went towards law enforcement, border cooperation, and control of precursor chemicals as well. Most projects involved bilateral ones between the Commission and individual nations. The Andean region received the lion's share of the funding -- some 220 million euros. The Commission also supported three regional projects -- (1) promoting intelligence sharing via a network of liaison officers (led by the UK),(2) encouraging intelligence sharing between South America and six African nations (implemented by UNODC),and (3) promoting demand reduction (implemented by CICAD). Bataller acknowledged that intelligence sharing between South America and Africa remained a work in progress, given limited intelligence-gathering capacity in Africa. EU-FUNDED STUDY ON USES OF COCA LEAF IN BOLIVIA -------------- -- ¶13. (SBU) Commission Desk Officer Murray provided an update on the status of the EU-funded study in Bolivia on traditional demand for coca leaf. She provided some of the history, noting that, in 2004, the then Bolivian Government BRUSSELS 00003530 005.2 OF 010 had reached agreement with coca growers on the idea of such a study. The EU had also consulted with international partners, including the U.S., which encouraged funding for a study on traditional uses. A long interlude occurred without final agreement on the terms of reference (TORs). After the election of Evo Morales, the Bolivian Government asked to review the TORs. Finally, in June 2007, the Commission and the Bolivian Government agreed on the TORs for the project, which would include a group of eight studies or analyses within an integrated framework. Overall funding would amount to one million Euros. She cautioned that the project should not be seen as an "EU study" or a "Commission study" but rather as a "Bolivian Government study" to be funded by the Commission. The project would involve a mix of quantitative and qualitative analyses, including some case studies. Analyses would examine household demand, economic costs, existing markets, and new consumers within the internal market of Bolivia. A nine-person Committee, including a UNODC representative, would oversee implementation of the study. Delays had occurred, initially owing to internal divisions within Bolivia and then to the change in government. She anticipated that the signing of the financing agreement would occur by the end of the month. ¶14. (SBU) DAS McCampbell expressed strong U.S. concern over the possible scope of the study, which may go beyond analysis of the traditional uses of coca leaf. The U.S. Embassy in La Paz had received and translated a document that seemed to include many aspects of commercialization and industrialization, including analysis of the structure of the current and future markets and potential demand generated by new consumers. Such language would seem to support Bolivian efforts to legalize use of the coca leaf beyond current traditional uses. Such actions would run counter to provisions of the 1988 UN Convention Against Drugs. The U.S. side heard that the Commission may be paying for certain aspects, while the Bolivian Government would pay for others. DAS McCampbell suggested a separate meeting or conference call soon to clarify the issue. ¶15. (SBU) Murray noted that she had not seen the document to which DAS McCampbell referred. So, she could not comment authoritatively. She remarked that some language, including references to potential demand generated by new consumers, sounded similar to language in the EU-funded study. Certainly, she insisted, the Commission would not finance anything to do with commercialization and industrialization. That said, the Commission could not control other studies funded by the Bolivian Government itself, but the UNODC would be among the Committee members overseeing the study. She expressed hope that the Commission could alleviate U.S. concerns. DAS McCampbell promised to forward a copy of the document obtained by the U.S. Embassy to Murray for comparison. Bargeon noted that the document that they had received was only a portion of a larger paper and lacked a title. So, it was unclear how it fit into the overall terms of reference. Murray reviewed the earlier consultation that her Commission colleagues had with U.S. officials on funding the study. DAS McCampbell said she understood, but she did not want to play into the hands of the current Bolivian Government, which seemed intent on building an economy based on coca leaf and did not seem concerned about transformation of coca leaf into cocaine. The U.S. remained greatly concerned about coca leaf leaving Bolivia in the form of cocaine. THE "MERIDA INITIATIVE" -------------- BRUSSELS 00003530 006.2 OF 010 ¶16. (U) DAS McCampbell provided an overview of the recently announced "Merida Initiative that would involve expenditure of 1.4 billion U.S. dollars on counter-drug, security, and anti-gang projects. She described the program as an "unprecedented" step resulting from a meeting between the U.S. and Mexican Presidents in Merida last March. Both Presidents agreed to work as partners against drug trafficking and transnational crimes. In the first year, assuming Congressional approval, 500 million would go towards projects in Mexico and 50 million towards projects in Central America. The USG sent a team to Mexico to examine upgrades to existing programs on border security, detection and monitoring of drug movements, provision of equipment, and training of police and prosecutors, and support for non-gvernmental organizations involved in demand redution initiatives. Commodities to be provided to Mexican authorities will include aircraft, helicopters, computer and communications equipment, and non-intrusive inspection equipment. Central American programs will focus on drug trafficking and community action programs against gangs. DAS McCampbell emphasized that the "Merida Initiative" is not a repeat of Plan Colombia and certainly will not involve deployment of U.S. troops to Mexico. ¶17. (U) Justice Counselor noted that Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora and his Central American colleagues had specifically requested a regional approach in fighting drug trafficking. Otherwise, traffickers would continue to circumvent measures put into place. She also recalled a "watershed" moment in the U.S.-Mexican relations when Mexican President Felipe Calderon had agreed to extradite 19 major fugitives, including four or five drug kingpins, to the United States. ONDCP Analyst Baum added that the United States and Mexico had enjoyed a long, close partnership on fighting drugs. Interdiction efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border appeared to have transformed the U.S. cocaine market, at least temporarily, with cocaine prices rising 44 percent and supply dropping 15 percent. U.S. authorities also observed "sporadic shortages" of cocaine in 37 U.S. cities. INL Officer Carroll observed that these figures seemed to indicate that counter-drug efforts had produced a "disturbance" in the U.S. drug market, but the situation merited further monitoring. COCAINE FLOWS TO EUROPE FROM SOUTH AMERICA -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Mission DEA Representative Scarantino said the movement of an estimated 220 metric tons of cocaine via Venezuela exerted a major impact on Europe and West Africa. Colombian drug traffickers had become involved in smuggling cocaine through Venezuela and Brazil to West Africa, particularly to Mauritania and Senegal. Traffickers relied not only on maritime conveyances, but use of aircraft modified to carry large loads over long distances. Citing figures from Joint Inter-Agency Task Force - South (JIATF-South),DAS McCampbell emphasized the increasing amounts of cocaine smuggled from Venezuela to Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican Republic) since 2003. Currently, formal counter-narcotics cooperation by Venezuela with both the U.S. and Colombia remained limited, and did not include sharing of drug-related intelligence. She appealed to EU countries with better relations with Venezuela to work towards greater cooperation on stemming the flow of drugs. Monteiro, while noting that Portugal had a Drug Liaison Officer in Caracas, remarked that he did not foresee any improvement soon of counter-drug efforts or the quality of police in Venezuela. BRUSSELS 00003530 007.2 OF 010 The Spanish representative acknowledged the problem of drugs entering his country via the south from Africa. The UK Representative shared U.S. analysis of the situation, including use of larger aircraft to transport drugs. While the UK enjoyed a slightly better relationship with Venezuela, she cautioned that any counter-drug cooperation would need to proceed cautiously, perhaps with involvement of the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center. The Dutch representative agreed, adding that getting drug information from Venezuelan officials, even with the assignment of a DLO in Caracas since November, remained difficult. EUROPOL agreed with the observation on the increase in suspicious flights from Venezuela to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, noting that many drug seizures in Europe could be linked to Venezuela. Monteiro cited some cooperation on screening cargo containers, given Venezuela's large volume of trade with Portugal. DAS McCampbell said the U.S. had invested in inspection equipment at one of Venezuela's ports, but authorities there did not use the equipment. -------------- WEST AFRICA -------------- MAOC NOW OPERATIONAL -------------- ¶19. (U) Monteiro briefed on operations at the MAOC, which now included seven EU Member States -- France, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Portugal. To date, MAOC had already conducted 27 operations, including 8 maritime events, that resulted in the seizure of some 20 tons of cocaine. He compared MAOC's role to that of JIATF South, while noting differences in composition. He described MAOC as primarily a law enforcement center with some military support. Monteiro said MAOC enjoyed good cooperation with JIATF-South, whose officials played an "instrumental" role in the establishment of this organization. The Center itself serves mainly as a fusion center for intelligence and has no significant costs. It remains open to membership from additional EU nations. Currently, MAOC focuses primarily on the Atlantic and West Africa. DAS McCampbell noted that she had met with the prospective MAOC Director after attending the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Madrid earlier this year. Monteiro noted that MAOC was now fully operational and inquired how it might interact with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). INL Officer Carroll noted that AFRICOM was in the process of establishing its structure and for the moment remained based out of Stuttgart. She noted that the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI) Center and Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center (CARICC) could also become valuable partners for MAOC. Monteiro said MAOC could expand its focus into the Mediterranean, Head of Unit Edwards declared that, with MAOC up and running, the new entity represented a success for the EU, which had a lengthy coastline to patrol. Along with MAOC, the Baltic Sea Task Force, European Maritime Security Task Force, and Black Sea Cooperation Forum served as building blocks for a security "ring" around the EU based on intelligence-sharing. CONFERENCES FOCUSING ON AFRICA -------------- ¶20. (U) DEA Representative Scarantino noted that IDEC participants had expressed concern over the lack of capabilities and infrastructure in most African nations to curb drug trafficking. The international community needed to BRUSSELS 00003530 008.2 OF 010 address this issue with a multilateral, unified approach. The European Command and INL planned to organize a conference in early 2008. Monteiro invited U.S. support for transforming general conferences into operational ones. DAS McCampbell expressed support for this idea. Monteiro promised to forward contact information on a future EU-sponsored conference through the INL Counselor. -------------- PRECURSOR CHEMICALS -------------- 21, (U) DAS McCampbell characterized the U.S.-EU partnership on control of precursor chemicals as "extremely productive." Operational Crystal Flow had a real impact, with seizures of 53 tons of precursor chemicals in 65 countries. Such efforts have had a significant impact on methamphetamine price and purity in the U.S., resulting in an increase in price of 73 percent and a drop in purity of 31 percent. Moreover, the Mexican Government had pledged to ban the import of all ephedrine and pseudo-ephedrine soon. Bargeron described the role of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) as very important in controlling precursors. Even so, 80 countries, including three EU member states, had not yet reported their estimated needs and production of such substances. Diversion could occur through these non-reporting states, especially given the large amount of transshipment occurring through countries not considered to be major producers or importers. He said the U.S. was considering conducting demarches with the countries that had not yet reported and suggested that the EU consider doing the same. Perhaps, the U.S. and the EU could coordinate on the timing of these demarches or even consider joint demarches where appropriate. ¶22. (U) Bargeron also described reporting requirements instituted by the U.S. Congress under the Combat Methamphetamine Act to identify the top five foreign countries that produced and imported pseudo-ephedrine and ephedrine, respectively, and to certify compliance with precursor control controls. He assured EU colleagues that the Act was not intended as a "punitive" measure for countries on the lists that implemented effective controls. He added that the U.S. had increased its funding for the INCB to help in carrying out its new mission. ¶23. (U) Commission Administrator Stauffer asserted that the EU had experienced "less pronounced" problems than the U.S. with methamphetamine use, but that the situation merited continued vigilance. She expressed agreement with U.S. views on the important role played by INCB and on the requirement for countries to estimate legitimate needs. Stauffer expressed some concern, however, about the "certification" requirement under the Combat Meth Act, given the presence of two EU member states on the lists. Bargeron noted that no country had ben decertified, and he could not envision a siuation where an EU Member State would be decertified. Moreover, the U.S. identified itself in the text of the report to Congress as the largest importer of such substances. Stauffer also urged continued attention to non-controlled substances. An experts meeting in December would examine private sector cooperation as well. -------------- -------------- UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION REVIEW -------------- -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Referring to the upcoming UNGASS Ten-Year review, BRUSSELS 00003530 009.2 OF 010 Monteiro said the thematic debate at the March 2008 Commission on Narcotics Drugs (CND) would examine the issue of when to stop collecting data and to start negotiating the text of the report. He said that all EU Member States supported the principles of a balanced approach and shared responsibility. DAS McCampbell cautioned against getting overly focused on the collection of data for the report's findings. INL Counselor noted that a three-way digital video conference (DVC) in early 2007 had proven quite useful in coordinating actions before the last CND session; he suggested consideration of another DVC before the March CND. INL Officer Bargeron noted that focus on implementation of the three Drug Conventions would be critical. He suggested that the U.S. and EU share concepts or ideas that may later form the basis of the UNGASS review report. ONDCP Officer Baum noted that the U.S. would likely propose a resolution at the upcoming CND session that would outline six measures that have proven useful in U.S. demand reduction efforts and could prove instructive to other nation's efforts. Monteiro said the EU took the UNGASS Review exercise seriously and had no interest in changing the global Drug Conventions. He agreed with the suggestion to review ideas before preparing the formal resolutions. -------------- U.S. DRUG SCREENING PROGRAM -------------- ¶25. (U) During the working luncheon, ONDCP Official Baum briefed on use of a screening mechanism used in the U.S. health care system to identify abusers of drugs who would benefit from counseling and treatment. Monteiro described the idea as "interesting," given the generally lengthy interval that occurred between the start of drug use and the abuser's request for voluntary treatment. The EMCDDA Representative inquired about the scope of the program and safeguards to protect personal freedoms. Baum explained that screening programs in the military and schools had mechanisms to protect privacy rights. Drug courts also used incentives in sentencing guidelines to encourage drug abusers to undergo treatment. -------------- U.S. DRUG KINGPIN ACT -------------- ¶26. (U) DAS McCampbell, Counselor Warren, and DEA Official Scarantino explained the great utility of the U.S. Drug Kingpin Act in preventing access by drug kingpins and their families to the U.S. financial system. Such measures not only resulted in forfeiture of over 2.1 billion dollars in assets since the Act's inception in 1999, but in undercutting the ability of drug traffickers to conduct their illicit operations, including money laundering and arranging of transport services. DAS McCampbell invited the EU to provide names for the U.S. to consider in its system of designations. Head of Unit Edwards inquired whether such designations resulted from court convictions for from mere suspicions Warren explained that names of kingpins, associates, and relatives added to the designation lists have undergone thorough vetting within the U.S. executive branch. INL Counselor, noting EU concerns over safeguards, inquired whether any persons had successfully challenged their designations. Counselor Warren cited one case in which a person (a step-child to a kingpin) had successfully gained removal of her name. Head of Unit Edwards explained that the EU legal system worked differently and that any seizure of assets would require a court order. He added, however, that BRUSSELS 00003530 010.2 OF 010 the name of anyone charged in the court of an EU Member State with a serious drug offense would become a matter of public record. Counselor Warren clarified that the U.S. Kingpin Act permitted the designation of individuals who could no longer gain access to the U.S. financial system, but that the actual taking of property would require a court decision in the U.S. as well. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶27. (SBU) The latest meeting of the U.S.-EU Troika on Drug Issues again provided a valuable opportunity for senior U.S. and EU officials to engage on drug issues and trends of mutual interest. Lively, wide-ranging discussions confirmed transatlantic convergence on many drug issues, with the notable exception of spray eradication in Afghanistan. The EU remained largely non-committal on the idea of extradition, leaving this initiative to the discretion of individual Member States. The Commission promised to examine more closely the terms of reference for the EU-funded study in Bolivia. END COMMENT. ¶28. (U) The INL Bureau cleared on this telegram. MURRAY .