AMBASSADOR SCHWEICH DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN RULE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 003501 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR INL/FO, INL/AP, INL/PC, EUR/ERA, L/LEI; DIR ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR (JOHN WALTERS),OSR (JAMES O'GARA); JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016 TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SCHWEICH DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN RULE OF LAW AND COUNTER-DRUG ISSUES WITH EUROPEAN UNION COUNTERPARTS Classified By: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS COUNSELOR JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS IN SECTIONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The U.S. Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan, Ambassador Thomas Schweich, discussed police training and counter-drug issues with several European Union (EU) officials at a November 28 meeting in Brussels. Officials on both sides agreed on virtually all policies related to rule of law and counter-drug efforts in Afghanistan, with the notable exception of the potential role of aerial eradication. Schweich explained that the U.S. did not plan to push for aerial eradication this year, given the opposition of the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and lack of consensus by governments of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for this measure. Political will is the key -- and often missing factor -- for success in Afghanistan. Unfortunately some Afghan leaders use perceived disunity wihin the international community as an excuse for inaction. Participants agreed that progress on stemming opium cultivation in the relatively secure northern provinces of Afghanistan has been more than offset by dramatically increased production in the south. Ambassador Schweich pledged to seek appropriate U.S. support for the European Police Training Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) after his return to Washington. END SUMMARY. -------------- STATUS OF EUPOL MISSION -------------- ¶2. (C) U.S. Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan Schweich, accompanied by Mission INL Counselor James McAnulty, Justice Counselor Mary Lee Warren, and INL Special Assistant Daniel Weisfield, met with Political Advisor Olivia Holdsworth of the Council Secretariat's Civilian Crisis Management Office, Pakistan, SIPDIS Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Maldives Head of Unit Helen Campbell of the European Commission, Policy Advisor Tim Eestermans of the Council Secretariat, and Afghanistan Desk Officer Bettina Muscheidt of the Commission at a November 28 luncheon hosted at the Mission by INL Counselor to discuss police training and counter-drug issues in Afghanistan. Holdsworth asserted that "significant progress" had occurred during the previous six weeks in establishing the EUPOL Mission. She described the new EUPOL Commander, General Jorgen Sholtz of Germany, as "less introspective" than his predecessor and reaching out more widely to colleagues in Kabul. She characterized relations with the U.S. military and Police Reform Director David Dobrotka of the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) as "very good," while admitting that EUPOL elicited greater skepticism among U.S. officials at the Embassy in Kabul. That said, EUPOL wanted to gain the trust of others and to be seen as a credible partner in complementing U.S. police reform efforts in Afghanistan. ¶3. (C) Political Advisor Holdsworth noted that, at the strategic level, EUPOL has begun to conduct assessments and design training programs to meet the needs of Afghanistan police units. EUPOL personnel were working closely with the international coordinating body for police reform efforts and hoped to station up to 20 police officials at Kunduz. To date, the U.S. side had agreed to accommodate 12 persons. She acknowledged that EUPOL was under "intense pressure" to deploy to the provinces and regions. EU Member States would only provide additional "boots on the ground" for the mission, if they viewed EUPOL as providing "value added" in Afghanistan. The planned presence of EUPOL personnel in the provinces and regions, however, would depend upon cooperation from international colleagues at Provincial Reconstruction Teams, regional commands, and regional training centers. Holdsworth indicated that EUPOL wanted to sign "technical arrangements" for support of EUPOL personnel in the provinces and regions, including at the Regional Training Center in Kandahar. -------------- SIGNING OF TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS BRUSSELS 00003501 002 OF 004 -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador Schweich indicated that the technical arrangement with the Regional Training Center at Kandahar could be signed -- after addressing a technical issue involving development of cost estimates for support services, against which EUPOL would provide reimbursements to INL. He understood that the Regional Training Center at Kandahar had agreed in principle to accommodate 10 to 12 EUPOL personnel. Schweich acknowledged that negotiation of support to EUPOL at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams would be more "problematic," reiterating the U.S. position which stipulated that negotiation of such agreements would occur only through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He planned to discuss this policy with colleagues upon his return to Washington to try to arrive at "practical possibilities" for provision of support to EUPOL. Ambassador Schweich noted that he had read the draft technical arrangements proposed by EUPOL, which stipulated in most cases that support be provided "within available means." He remarked that, as a lawyer, he viewed such language as reasonable. He remained optimistic that officials could address most support issues once they resolved the overall policy issue. Holdsworth expressed appreciation for whatever help Ambassador Schweich could provide. ¶5. (C) Holdsworth noted that EUPOL had already signed technical arrangements with other countries, including Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Lithuania. Most reportedly involved "in-kind" contributions, and she understood that the UK would host EUPOL without cost. Ambassador Schweich understood that, for the agreement with INL, direct costs would have to be calculated and credited to a particular account. Commission Official Campbell agreed with the need for strict accountability, noting that the European Court of Auditors and the European Parliament expected as much from the EU side. -------------- USE OF PERSONAL SECURITY DETAILS -------------- ¶6. (C) Schweich inquired about security arrangements, including the possible use of Personal Security Details. Campbell noted that EU personnel could not call upon military support in every situation. So, they had no choice but to arrange for private contractors to provide security, but overall force protection must nevertheless come from the national contingents of the ISAF. -------------- JUSTICE REFORM PROGRAMS -------------- ¶7. (C) Campbell noted the Commission's involvement in justice reform programs in Afghanistan. To date, the Commission has allocated 40 million Euros for this project. The Commission had become involved in institutional reforms including the proper grading of justice-sector positions and selection of personnel for such positions. -------------- BLEAK PICTURE FOR ANTI-DRUG SECTOR? -------------- ¶8. (C) Policy Unit official Eestermans painted a bleak picture regarding counter-drug efforts, for which the UK served as the de-facto lead nation within the international community. He saw no prospect for improvement in Kandahar this spring, and noted that the insurgency had become even more linked to the drug trade, which has caused considerable concern. In addition to the insurgency, drug proceeds fueled "normal" criminal activities -- creating an even greater sense of insecurity among local populations. Muscheidt noted that even Nangarhar Province, which officials had viewed earlier as a success story, had slipped backwards on anti-drug efforts, with the insurgency gaining more footholds there. -------------- POLITICAL WILL IS KEY TO SUCCESS -------------- BRUSSELS 00003501 003 OF 004 ¶9. (C) Ambassador Schweich emphasized political will as the key -- and often missing -- factor for success. Poorer Tajik and Uzbek regions in the north have largely halted poppy cultivation, while wealthier Pashtun regions in the south continue to grown increasing amounts of poppy. UNODC officials have asserted that opium cultivation can no longer be associated with poverty. Rather, it is associated with insecurity and insurgency. Campbell added that Afghan leaders needed more credibility. Schweich agreed, and noted that the international community could not wait for the GOA to take action against drugs until after the upcoming presidential elections. We must continue to raise our concerns with the Afghan leadership and speak with a unified voice on the need to interdict high-value targets and eradicate poppy crops through non-negotiated means. -------------- -------------- U.S. WILL NOT PURSUE AERIAL ERADICATION AS OPTION THIS YEAR -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Schweich stressed that Afghanistan needs to take tougher action against opium farmers who have licit alternatives. Interdiction is not enough, capturing only one percent of production within the country and thirty percent in countries beyond Afghanistan's borders. Authorities must interject a "down side" to opium cultivation by going after those who grow drugs. The U.S. inter-agency recently came to a consensus in favor of aerial eradication, but the U.S. Government has agreed to forego this option for one year, given the lack of support from President Karzai and ISAF allies. Nonetheless, Ambassador Schweich warned burgeoning opium cultivation in Afghanistan threatens to undermine all our other efforts there, and the U.S. decision to take aerial spray off the table this season should be accompanied by a strong allied push for force-protected manual eradication. . ¶11. (C) Campbell agreed that the international community had complete agreement on rule of law and counter-narcotics policies, except for one area -- the means by which to eradicate. She lamented that Afghan leaders have used this one point of difference as an excuse for inaction. -------------- RESOLUTION ON USE OF OPIUM FOR MEDICAL USES -------------- ¶12. (C) Eestemans also noted approval earlier this year by the European Parliament of an unhelpful resolution calling on the international community to buy up Afghanistan's opium poppy to convert it into medical uses to alleviate pain and suffering in developing countries. According to Eestemans, Commissioner for Foreign Relations and European Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferraro-Waldner intervened personally with Parliamentarians to try to beat back this idea promoted by the Senlis Council. Muscheidt noted, nonetheless, that it gained approval largely for domestic political reasons in various Member States, including Italy, where the idea seemed to resonate well with the public. INL Counselor remarked that the idea kept popping up in public circles. He noted the resolution's non-binding nature, but acknowledged that its approval had caused damage to public attitudes on drug cultivation in Afghanistan. Muscheidt even noted that Afghan Parliamentarians visiting Brussels about the same time had opposed the idea. -------------- HELMAND IS MAJOR RECIPIENT OF AID -------------- ¶13. (C) Near the end of the meeting, INL Counselor re-emphasized U.S. support for promotion of alternative development in Afghanistan. He recalled a speech by the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan in which the Ambassador had pointed out that, if Helmand Province were considered a separate entity from the rest of Afghanistan, it would be the sixth largest recipient of U.S. foreign development assistance. Yet, farmers there abused such help, even using irrigation systems built by the international community to boost illicit production. Justice Counselor also noted international road building efforts intended to allow farmers there to transport their agricultural products more easily to markets. BRUSSELS 00003501 004 OF 004 -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) This meeting by Ambassador Schweich with EU officials proved valuable in clarifying U.S. and EU views on counter-drug and rule of law issues in Afghanistan. U.S. and EU officials agreed on virtually all policies in these important sectors, with the notable exception of the means by which to eradicate. Ambassador Schweich pledged as well to do what he could to gain appropriate U.S. support for deployments of EUPOL personnel to provinces and regions outside Kabul. END COMMENT. ¶15. (U) Ambassador Schweich has cleared on this telegram. MURRAY .