EU CHAD MISSION ON RAZOR'S EDGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003482 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM (BTURNER), PRM/AFR(MMCKELVEY),AF/FO (JSWAN),AF/RSA (MBITTRICK) JOINT STAFF FOR ENP (MSHIELDS,JHIRST,JSEAMON),AF (ROSBOURN,SKELLY),WEB (KBRENTON) OSD FOR RFABRYCKY E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 TAGS: MOPS EUN CD CT PHUM SUBJECT: EU CHAD MISSION ON RAZOR'S EDGE REF: A. PARIS 4661 B. BRUSSELS 03258 C. BRUSSELS 03018 Classified By: USEU Joint Staff Liaison officer Major Maria Metcalf for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Director General of the EU Military Staff (DGEUMS),LtGen Leakey told U.S. Ambassador to Chad Nigro on December 5 that the 8EU is on a razor's edge regarding the military mission in Chad," clarifying that due to severe force generation shortfalls, EU credibility "may be at stake." He said that French efforts to get EU Member States to agree to common funding for the mission are being blocked by the UK and Germany and seem likely to hold-up the force generation process. DGEUMS added that the mission faces the significant challenges regarding national caveats, rules of engagement and detention. Leakey opined that despite the problems, it is likely that the EU will find a way to deploy the military mission eventually, because most Member States recognize that the EU will appear militarily impotent if the mission falls through. End Summary. ¶2. (C/NF) In a December 5 meeting, U.S. Ambassador to Chad Louis Nigro and the EU Director General of the EU Military Staff (DGEUMS),UK LtGen David Leakey, Ambassador Nigro asked Leakey for an update on the EU's planning for its military mission in Chad. DGEUMS explained that "the EU is on a razor's edge regarding the military mission in Chad," due to severe force generation shortfalls. LtGen Leakey specified that helicopters are the most critical force requirement yet to be filled by Member States. The mission requires at least 18 helos (11 transport, four reconnaissance and three casualty evacuation). Currently no helicopters have been pledged by any Member State. -------------- Sharing the Burden -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) According to Leakey, no one in the EU is sure what will become of the mission, but he believes that it will go ahead in the end - the question really is when - and that question depends on money. Some EU Member States, the UK and Germany in particular, have an allergy to common funding. Leakey emphasized that the UK military is maxed out regarding critical assets in NATO and multi-national operations. Therefore the UK is against common funding because in this case it would only serve to offset the reality that most Member States do not spend enough on defense. The real answer is for the others to carry their share of the burden, in NATO and in ESDP. He noted that the UK currently has 13,500 soldiers deployed (5,500 in Iraq and 8,000 in Afghanistan),with Afghanistan alone costing over $1 billion in additional costs every six months. -------------- Significant Challenges -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) According to LtGen Leaky, if/when the EUFOR Chad mission is launched there will be three significant challenges for the Member States to the mission's credibility and effectiveness: national caveats, rules of engagement and detention. ¶5. (C/NF) National Caveats: It is likely that many contributing countries will impose national caveats that will limit the effectiveness of the contributions. Unfortunately, countries don't like to make these caveats known until immediately before or after deployment, which makes it difficult for planners to work around them. However, DGEUMS speculated that it is possible that there is a growing resentment, both in the EU and NATO, regarding caveats. Perhaps, he speculated, this will lead to limited caveats. ¶6. (C/NF) Rules of Engagement (RoE): The RoE will not be written to cover every possible circumstance and it will be BRUSSELS 00003482 002 OF 003 up to the Force Commander (French Brigadier General Jean-Phillippe Ganascia) to interpret them on the ground. The issue of RoE will be difficult because there is no "peace to keep," but rather a complicated political and military situation that EUFOR will have to navigate while maintaining neutrality and impartiality. At what point would the use of force be authorized? This challenge will require constant, fluid discussions up and down the chain of command on-the-ground. (Comment. This issue becomes even riskier, considering that there has been fighting 20 miles away from the EUFOR Force Headquarters in Chad for the past 10 days. Although LtGen Leakey emphasized that the on the ground assessments indicate EUFOR will not be a target for violence, it could be difficult to keep from being in the center of a violent situation if the fighting spreads. End comment.) ¶7. (C/NF) Detention: Conditions in Chadian prisons and lack of capacity in the judicial system pose a unique problem for EUFOR. If EU troops detain those caught in nefarious acts in the EU areas of authority, what will they do with them? It would not be in accordance with European standards to hand-over the arrested to the local authorities. Should they even arrest those caught in illegal acts, and if not, then what credibility will the EU have on the ground?, asked Leakey. -------------- -------------- Meeting with ESDP Director for Defense Aspects of ESDP -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) In a separate meeting on the same day with Claude-France Arnould, Director for Defense Aspects of ESDP, Ambassador Nigro said the refugee and migration issues in Eastern Chad are the most compelling from the U.S. perspective. The U.S. hopes that the EU Chad mission will affect the protection of refugees and change the political-military equation in the East. The U.S. is also looking for ways to support the UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) and to work with other international players in N'Djamena. ¶9. (C/NF) Arnould said that Chadian President Deby is sensitive regarding any U.S. participation in the EU mission. She also mentioned that there are also still "some issues" with the exit strategy for the EU military mission, but did not specify what they are. EUFOR Chad/CAR mission has encouraged regular meetings between the Council and the Commission to ensure coordination toward common objectives, to include development projects relevant to the short-term military mission and the long-term Commission goals. ¶10. (U) Ambassador Nigro suggested to Arnould the idea of having regular video tele-conferences among the pertinent departments in Brussels, Washington and N'Djamena, to ensure the alignment of efforts of all involved. Arnould welcomed the idea. -------------- Relevance -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) The day following Ambassador Nigro's meetings, French media reported that Italy will contribute a small mobile medical facility. A contact at the Italian Delegation expressed frustration at the way the French are setting-up this mission, saying that the French pre-identified the medical unit before asking the Italians if they would be willing to contribute it, and then French newspapers published the contribution before Italy officially made its decision. The Italian contact commented that it seemed likely that French intentionally leaked the possible Italian contribution to the press in order to increase the pressure on Italy to commit. Several Member States have the impression that the French are pursuing every possibility with other Member States to ensure that this mission will go forward. What is unclear is how much the French will damage BRUSSELS 00003482 003 OF 003 their relationships with other Member States in the process, and to what degree this could limit the effectiveness of French leadership in pushing future EU military missions. ¶12. (U) Ambassador Nigro has not had the opportunity to clear this message. Murray .