A/S FRIED MEETS GEORGIAN PRIME MINISTER GURGENIDZE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003477 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS EUN SUBJECT: A/S FRIED MEETS GEORGIAN PRIME MINISTER GURGENIDZE Classified By: Polmincouns Laurence Wohlers for reasons 1.4 (D) and (E) . SUMMARY -------------- 1.(C) During a December 6 meeting on the margins of the NATO Council meetings, EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried pressed Georgian Prime Minister Lado GURGENIDZE on the importance of clean and fair presidential elections, the restoration of media freedom, and respectful treatment of the political opposition. Fried also urged Georgia to maintain a clear-headed and measured response to anticipated Russian provocations. The Prime Minister reiterated several times that he understood U.S. expectations. However, he expressed grave concerns about Georgia's ability to handle any large-scale civil or military crisis instigated by the Russians in order to disrupt the January 5 election. A/S Fried acknowledged that there was precedence for Russian provocations, but urged preparation of Georgian governmental institutions to manage any such contingencies appropriately. At the same time, Fried warned against the abuse of public institutions for the benefit of the incumbent government during the electoral season. End Summary. U.S. Expectations -------------- 2.(C) In a frank but friendly 45 minute meeting with new Georgian Prime Minister Gurgenidze, EUR A/S Fried stated that Tbilisi's mishandling of the Imedi TV affair had shaken Western confidence in Georgian democracy, but that the loss of legitimacy was not irretrievable. The conduct of its coming election season would provide a critical opportunity for Georgia to restore legitimacy and come out in an even stronger political position with the Allies than before the crisis. Key steps included getting Imedi back on the air immediately, running squeaky clean Presidential and Parliamentary elections, and maintaining a measured response to inevitable Russian provocations. There would need to be a stark contrast between the conduct of Georgia and Russian elections. The election process itself, and not just the day of the vote, needed to be free and fair. Moreover, Fried warned that Saakashvili and his supporters should not wield the power of government institutions against political opponents. The United States would regard such abuses as breaking our understanding for Georgia's integration into the West and lead to a fundamental and negative change in our relations. Georgian Actions -------------- 3.(C) Gurgenidze reiterated several times that he understood what was required to restore credibility in the eyes of the West. Tbilisi had already taken the steps necessary to restore Imedi to the airwaves. The court injunction against Imedi had been lifted earlier in the day and its licenses returned. He said he expected Imedi to be back on the air by the weekend. Gurgenidze also reviewed actions taken to reform the electoral code, including the lowering of the percentage of the vote threshold (from seven to five per cent) and the switch to a system of proportionality from first past the post. Worried that some in the opposition would still "cry wolf," the PM said Georgia would ask partners to observe the elections. Georgia had already invited OSCE ODIHR observation and wanted the USG to signal to Allies that Georgia would welcome a large number of Western observers ) "the more the merrier." Treatment of the Opposition -------------- 4.(C) In response to Gurgenidze's concern that the Russians could manipulate elements of the local political opposition, Fried suggested that the GOG should anticipate this eventuality and make overtures to the opposition in the weeks ahead of the balloting. On the shutdown of Imedi, the Georgians insisted that the GOG had not been concerned with Imedi's editorial content, but with its efforts to "radicalize Georgian citizens in real time." On this point, Fried noted that Polish editor and former dissident Adam Michnik (invited to Georgia to establish a media ombudsman) had the credibility to work with Georgian independent media to address such problems. The GOG needed to do its part as well, by creating a democratic culture. Georgia had nothing to gain by becoming a mirror image of Russia. It should not cast domestic opposition and Russia as "enemies" the way the Kremlin had done to the United States and Russian political opposition. Gurgenidze acknowledged the culture gap, but pointed out the need for more time for institution-building beyond the current elections period. He called for greater assistance from friends and partners in this regard. US Counsels Contingency Planning, Not Paranoia -------------- - BRUSSELS 00003477 002 OF 002 5.(C) PM Gurgenidze confessed that he and "his colleagues" were "deeply paranoid" about the possibility of a Russian efforts to disrupt the Georgian elections. "Russia can cause a meltdown of the Georgian state," he averred. They could, for example, orchestrate a debilitating string of small crises in the next few weeks, including a military provocation in the Kodori Gorge designed to trigger a Georgian escalation in Gari. Russia might also try to trigger a panic in the Georgian banking or pensions service sectors or seriously disrupt public utilities services such as water. A/S Fried noted that we had not/not detected evidence of a military buildup by the Russians in the breakaway regions, but Russian provocations had occurred in any case. Recalling past incidents in which Moscow's role was suspected, Fried counseled Georgia to be prepared but take care in its response so as not to play into Russian hands or damage Georgian public trust. Georgian leadership's success in rallying the nation in response to the Russian economic embargo was a model to emulate in any future situations. Kosovo and Abhkazia -------------- 6.(C) In the context of imminent Kosovar independence, the Georgian Prime Minister solicited USG views on the feasibility of a U.S.-EU preemptive statement of non-recognition of Abkhazia. Fried's responded that we might consider either a public or private message of this kind in response to Russian moves. Both sides concurred that recent unhelpful remarks by Russian Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov about Abhkazia's future were probably staged by the Kremlin at the highest level. Fried assured the PM that non-linkage of Abhkazia and Kosovo was a part of the USG's Kosovo package and that we would stay in close touch over the days and weeks ahead. The United States was intensifying its diplomatic efforts with key EU member states on how to respond to any Russian actions to advance an independent Abhkazia in the context of coming Kosovar independence. The international community's strong support for Georgia was inextricably linked to the good standing and conduct of the country's leadership. Fried also recounted briefly to the PM his recent discussion with Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili on the status of U.S.-Russia CFE talks. Fried noted that Georgian and Moldovan support for U.S. proposals had surprised the Russians, who were now clearly on the defensive. Participants -------------- 7.(U) A/S Fried was accompanied by USEU Polmincouns and Poloff notetaker. Georgian PM Gurgenidze was joined by Salome Samadashvili, Georgia's Ambassador to the EU, and Daniel Kunin, Special Advisor to the Government of Georgia. 8.(U) Assistant Secretary Fried has cleared this message. MURRAY .