FRIED TO PSC: TIME TO MOVE ON KOSOVO AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003466 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 TAGS: PREL BK GG KV SR EUN SUBJECT: FRIED TO PSC: TIME TO MOVE ON KOSOVO AND STRATEGIZE ON BOSNIA Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d). SUMMARY - - - - - ¶1. (C) EUR A/S Fried told the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors December 6 that the EU must move forward on Kosovo and not be subject to Serbian electoral manipulation. He briefed on his talks in BiH, noted the recent avoidance of a "train-wreck," and emphasized the need to strategize on offering BiH more carrots but also identifying more sticks if needed. A/S Fried stressed how much the U.S. had offered on CFE, in part due to Georgian and Moldovan flexibility. Several PSC ambassadors underscored the need for EU unity on Kosovo, although the Swedish, Hungarian, and Greek ambassadors expressed standard concerns about the regional impact of a Kosovo declaration of independence and the need for UN involvement. A/S Fried's meeting with Council Secretariat PolDir Cooper reported septel. End summary BiH: Avoided Train-Wreck, Time to Strategize - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) A/S Fried briefed on his December 4-5 talks with BiH leaders. He observed that the IC had avoided a "train- wreck" this time, but needed to strategize on providing more carrots and identifying more potential sticks when underlying problems resurface. He noted that Dodik and Silajdzic had stepped back in part because of the EU's creative offer to initial the SAA and their own concern that the IC would move against them. Using more carrots, including specifying what BiH leaders must do to move further on the path to Europe, will help. Likewise, the IC must be prepared to deploy sticks if necessary, e.g., sanctions and targetted visa bans. A/S Fried reported on Dodik's commitment to be helpful on Kosovo, including stating publicly that the RS would not hold a referendum on secession. Dodik also promised to urge Kosovo Serbs to remain in Kosovo. ¶3. (C) The Slovenian Ambassador (incoming Presidency) asked about extending the OHR next year; Fried said he envisioned an extension. The German Ambassador stressed the need to support Lajcak and for the willingness to exert pressure on BiH leaders if necessary. Sweden argued for increased local ownership. Greece expressed appreciation for A/S Fried's report on his talks and noted that "regional stability is the key." Kosovo: United in Action, Not in Paralysis - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) A/S Fried praised the Troika process, particularly Ischinger's role, and noted that we have consulted the Europeans every step of the way. A declaration of independence from Pristina will be neither unilateral nor the result of U.S. action. Rather, it will have been carefully coordinated, including with the EU. A/S Fried stressed that the time for negotiations is over, as agreed by te Secretary and her EU counterparts months ag. An unresolved final status for Kosovo will only deteriorate with time. A/S Fried called for "unity in action, rather than in paralysis," in resolving final status over the coming weeks, not months. While we must recognize that Moscow will make the process as difficult as possible, the EU even more than the U.S. will bear responsibility for any consequences if status is not resolved soon, he added. He cautioned against allowing the time-frame to slip because of Serbian electoral calendar machinations. ¶5. (C) The Irish PSC Ambassador asked how the UNSC debate would proceed. The German PSC Ambassador stressed the need for the EU to remain united (a sentiment echoed by several other ambassadors, with the Hungarian rep noting the need for unity within NATO as well). The Hungarian Ambassador also asked about the chances UNSYG Ban would issue a letter inviting the EU to launch its ESDP Mission in Kosovo; A/S Fried cautioned against expecting miracles (e.g., a UNSCR on Kosovo) in New York and noted that he could not speak on behalf of UN SYG Ban. The Swede stressed the UN process and, reiterating FM Bildt's presentation at the last GAERC, said the EU's responsibility is not just for Kosovo and called for a "broader, regional outlook" on the Western Balkans in order to be prepared for "whatever comes." The Belgian Ambassador noted that several delegations would have a "preventive" role in the UNSC given Russia's stance. He asked how to deal with the OSCE Mission's tasks in Kosovo should it be forced to close. The Portuguese Ambassador/EU Presidency Rep, noted only that the EU is providing "maximum time" to leaders and ministers next week to discuss the way forward on Kosovo. BRUSSELS 00003466 002 OF 002 CFE: U.S. PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE COMPROMISES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) A/S Fried noted appreciation for European support at the OSCE ministerial discussion of CFE. Despite generous offers, Russia insisted on proceeding with ratification of the A/CFE Treaty while simultaneously demanding agreement in advance to its treaty revisions. Moscow wanted flank limits on its own troops lifted while maintaining such limits on others'. A/S Fried said Moscow will almost certainly suspend the treaty December 12 and others need to be prepared to respond accordingly. Turning to next week's MD talks in Budapest, A/S Fried observed that U.S. proposals included cooperation with Russia on an MD architecture which Russia could help design. It is unfortunate that Russia appears unable to take "yes" for an answer. Sweden asked about discussions with Moldova and Georgia; A/S Fried replied that both countries had demonstrated flexibility that would have allowed the adapted treaty to be ratified even while Russian peacekeepers remained for a time. Latvia noted that, on Russia, "not all is doom and gloom," given progress on the Russian-Latvian border demarcation. A/S Fried concluded that the U.S. will continue to consult with its NATO allies on next steps. The West should not act as if a Russian suspension of CFE is a non-event. Post-Kosovo Independence and Abkhazia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) A/S Fried said that Russia was not necessarily going to recognize Abkhazia as independent following Kosovo independence. To do so would be dangerous and would open up the territorial settlement of 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. That said, the IC should be prepared to reject such a recognition should Moscow so move. A strong and united western position would help demonstrate to President Saakashvili that he is not isolated and might help prevent unfortunate moves by Tbilisi. ¶8. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message. GRAY .