FRIED AND EU POLDIR ON BOSNIA, KOSOVO, IRAN, OTHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003465 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 TAGS: PREL BK IR KV SR EP EUN SUBJECT: FRIED AND EU POLDIR ON BOSNIA, KOSOVO, IRAN, OTHER ISSUES Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d). SUMMARY - - - - ¶1. (C) EUR A/S Dan Fried briefed EU Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs Robert Cooper December 6 on his talks with leaders in BiH, noting that we must continue to support HR Lajcak, and build on the recent progress (the Mostar Agreement and SAA initialing),but also prepare strategy, including more carrots and sticks, for addressing underlying problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Fried stressed the need to move forward quickly on Kosovo, noting the need for unity in action rather than paralysis. Cooper noted that the Dutch are a "surprise problem" on Kosovo. A/S Fried and Cooper also discussed Iran, Georgia, Ukraine, and the need to strategize on energy. End summary. BiH: Bought Time - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) A/S Fried briefed Cooper on his Dec. 4-5 talks in Sarajevo. He noted improvement in the situation given Dodik's and Silajdzic's backing down, in part because of the threat of sanctions and the atmosphere of public panic. Simultaneous crises over BiH and Kosovo may have been averted, but fundamental problems in BiH remain and will resurface. A/S Fried reported that Dodik committed to behave, including publicly stating that the RS would not secede. He also undertook to tell Kosovo Serbs to remain in Kosovo and avoid provocations. Cooper said Dodik's brinkmanship might have worked -- "there was not much we could have done about it and it would have paralyzed Bosnian institutions." Fried reiterated that Dodik and Silajdzic had backed down in part because of the threat of sanctions and underscored the need for a strategy on BiH to address key problems that will resurface. Cooper observed that the Commission, when finalizing negotiations over police reform and the initialing of the SAA, found the BiH leaders "palpably relieved" that a crisis had been averted. He noted that Dodik should understand that the EU is an answer to his problem; A/S Fried called for the EU to specify what the EU accession process requires of Dodik and other leaders. Cooper also questioned the timing of Lacjak's initial decision in October. Kosovo: Unity in Action, not Paralysis - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - �0A;¶3. (C) Turning to Kosovo, Cooper noted that PM Prodi and President Sarkozy had apparently agreed to shift the Kosovo timetable to take Serbia's presidential elections into account. A/S Fried emphasized that the Troika process had provided a 120-day delay as requested by Europeans and that Kostunica would manipulate the electoral calendar for his own purposes. While the U.S. might be able to consider the issue if the first-round truly were held on January 20 and the second-round two weeks thereafter, any subsequent calls for delay would risk splitting the U.S. and the EU. ¶4. (C) Cooper listed some of the usual suspects who remain unenthusiastic about recognition: Romania (Cooper said the U.S. "could help us here with the Bucharest Summit coming"), Cyprus ("whose foreign policy is often made in Moscow"), Slovakia (given its parliamentary resolution),and "the surprise problem" -- The Netherlands (due to enlargement phobia, its history in the Balkans, and its legalistic tradition). A/S Fried underlined that the U.S. has no more patience for further hand-wringing by the Europeans; Kosovo is not going to get better with time; rather, it will only get worse. Pressed by A/S Fried if Solana would be helpful, Cooper replied yes, but at his own moment, and when the gap among member states has further narrowed, to preserve his credibility within the EU. Fried noted that the EU will bear responsibility if Kosovo is not resolved quickly. Cooper said no one in the EU is asking for more time for negotiations. A/S Fried repeated that now is the time for unity in action, not unity in paralysis. ¶5. (C) Cooper said the U.S. and the EU should determine timing and procedures to appoint the International Civilian Representative (ICR) in Kosovo. The ICR should be appointed within a day of a declaration of independence. The ICR would need the backing of as much of the international community (IC) as possible. Cooper said he viewed recognition of Kosovo independence as a prerequisite for possible Steering Board membership. A/S Fried agreed to consult very soon on this. BRUSSELS 00003465 002 OF 002 Georgia: Need to Isolate Russia on Abkhazia if Necessary - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Asked about Georgia, A/S Fried noted the need to maintain pressure on Tbilisi to respect democratic norms. A sharp IC reaction should Russia recognize Abkhazia as independent would help prevent Georgia from taking imprudent measures. Iran and NEI; Solana felt "blindsided" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C/NF) Stressing that he was speaking "off the record," Cooper noted that HR Solana had felt "blindsided" by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, particularly given his talks November 30 with Jalili. Cooper characterized the recent PSC discussion of the NIE "rather sensible," with several member states concluding that it reflected what the EU had believed. He asked if the U.S. could share more of the NIE with the EU and noted that Iran has "suspended" weaponization, but not given up this goal. Solana's Non-Proliferation Envoy Giannella added it is key for the EU to understand where the Iranians had left off as well as what they had achieved. A/S Fried said we would consider a briefing, either in Brussels or in Washington. Ukraine: Remember its place in the world - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) On Ukraine, A/S Fried noted the free and fair elections and stressed the need to reach out to Ukrainian leaders and remember Kiev's potential place in the world. Cooper agreed, noting that the leadership needs to focus more on issues and less on making money. Need to Strategize on Energy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) A/S Fried raised energy and the need for the U.S. and the EU to engage in strategic thinking, including on Caspian pipelines. Comment - - - - ¶10. (C/NF) The main surprise in Cooper's remarks was his concern over the Dutch position on Kosovo. While we look to the Quint's EU members to take the lead on moving the EU toward action, we should consider engaging The Hague bilaterally as well on this. While our local contacts have noted that only the Cypriots remain the sole hold-out (while the "usual suspects," including Romania, remain unenthusiastic but unwilling to block EU consensus),a problem from the Dutch will only encourage further wobbliness from key countries such as Italy. Cooper's questioning of Lajcak's timing may indicate what another Council Secretariat source working on BiH has told us -- that Solana's confidence in Lajcak is a finite commodity. End comment. ¶11. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message. GRAY .