EU FMS AND KOSOVO: GETTING TO A "GENUINE" DEBATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003382 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017 TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN SUBJECT: EU FMS AND KOSOVO: GETTING TO A "GENUINE" DEBATE REF: BRUSSELS 3120 Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (B/D). SUMMARY - - - - - ¶1. (C) EU FMs discusse Kosovo at their November 19 GAERC. According to several contacts, various FMs want a "genuine internal EU debate" on Kosovo, sometime after December 10, before taking key decisions on recognition and the ESDP mission. Some reportedly do not want to be seen as simply rubber-stamping a Quint decision. Our contacts believe a "critical mass" of member-states will recognize Kosovo independence and see no member-state blocking the launch of an ESDP mission; the question of timing, however, remains. Greece proposed accelerating the accession process for all countries in the region; Rehn's office apparently had not been consulted on this beforehand. All 27 FMs are scheduled to meet next at the December 10 GAERC and are expected to meet on the margins of the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon December 13 and the European Council December 14. Slovenia may be preparing an "early" January special GAERC to focus on Kosovo, but the Council Secretariat believes it will happen one or two days after a UDI. Germany reportedly continues to support conditioning recognition by member-states on the promulgation of a Kosovo constitution enshrining the Ahtisaari Plan. End summary DESIRE FOR GENUINE, COMPREHENSIVE DEBATE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Several contacts have told us that some foreign ministers want a "genuine" internal EU debate on Kosovo before deliberating on the critical questions of recognition and launching an ESDP mission. German PSC ambassador told POL M/C Nov 21 that GAERC discussion had demonstrated that, for all the notes of caution, most of the foreign ministers now saw Kosovo as an EU responsibility, not "a problem for the Quint". He credited this new attitude in large part to the Troika process, especially Ishinger's frequent briefings in Brussels, where he invariably described himself as the "EU's representative." However, there was no question but that the member states would want to be full participants in subsequent EU decisions on Kosovo. This echoes what we have heard from other contacts that some ministers want to ensure that they not simply "rubber-stamp" a Quint proposal. UK Mission Balkans watcher (protect) told us November 21 that the GAERC demonstrated that FMs are finally starting to acknowledge the need for detailed contingency planning. While some member states are unenthusiastic about Kosovo independence, they accept the need to make "tough" decisions, our UK contact added. BILDT: NEED TO TALK ABOUT REGION, NOT KOSOVO IN ISOLATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) According to the Council Secretariat and the British, Swedish FM Bildt urged further discussion of Kosovo in a wider context. While apparently not referring to his "soft landing" line, Bildt stressed that Kosovo should not be seen in isolation. Two contacts characterized Bildt's intervention as "realistic." Council Secretariat Director for the W. Balkans Stefan Lehne (protect) told us November 21 that a Swedish delegation had told him earlier that day that there should be some "accompanying measures" included in the discussion, but that they had remained extremely vague over specifics. The Portuguese Mission told us that planned reactions to the possible expulsion of EU ambassadors from Belgrade and a potential UDI from Banja Luka likely would be included in such a discussion. Lehne stressed that Bildt could prove important in moving the EU quickly on Kosovo and urged that all consider engaging him more on how to achieve this. ¶4. (C) Another Council Secretariat contact noted that Solana is very concerned about both BiH and the Serbian presidential elections, and the effect that Kosovo independence will have on them. UK Mission noted that some FMs mentioned the Serbian elections at the GAERC, but only to emphasize that Belgrade would continue to change the election date to ensure that it falls after a UDI from Pristina. Lehne told us that there was "nothing new" in Solana's one-on-one meeting with Tadic; Solana also met with Kostunica and the Serbian delegation (there was no one-on-one),with Kostunica predictably reiterating the need to respect international law and Solana calling for flexibility. ROMANIA AND CYPRUS THE HOLDOUTS BRUSSELS 00003382 002 OF 003 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Although misgivings may abound, the hard-core opposition continues to shrink. Most contacts ascribe only Romania and Cyprus to this hard-core. At the Monday GAERC, the Romanian FM even submitted a written statement urging that, if needed, more time after December 10 should be devoted to negotiations. Nevertheless, our contacts do seem sanguine that the opposition of just these two countries can be managed. The Spanish and Slovaks reportedly did not voice any concerns over Kosovo. GREEKS PROPOSING ACCELERATED ACCESSION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) The UK Mission confirmed that Greece had proposed accelerating the accession process for all countries in the region, with the intention of providing Serbia some degree of a softer landing. The Slovenian Mission Balkans expert (protect) told us November 21 that the Greeks proposed immediate signing of the SAAs with Belgrade and Sarajevo, with candidate status for Serbia by the end of 2008. The Commission would be tasked with front-loading financial assistance. Our UK contact noted that the Greek proposal goes too far for London and several other capitals. Our Slovenian contact, however, said that no member state appeared opposed in principle to the Greek proposal. ¶7. (C) The proposal (the first to be formally tabled but not the first to be floated, as the Slovenes have been making similar noises in Brussels) apparently was not "pre-cooked" well in advance -- Commissioner Rehn's Serbia/Kosovo advisor had not even read it as of November 21. Lehne told us he thought that the proposal was good "in principle," but unlikely to gain much traction; rather, it demonstrates that Greece will no longer seek to slow down the process regarding Kosovo. He noted that Athens might also be demonstrating greater flexibility in order to earn allies in its "name dispute" with Macedonia in the run-up to the Bucharest Summit. HUNGARIAN ADVICE: AVOID THE "I" WORD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The Hungarian PSC ambassador told us November 20 that several delegations, in corridor conversations, noted that the U.S. and Kosovars should refrain from talking about UDI and rather focus on Kosovo's implementation of the Ahtisaari plan in coordination with the EU and U.S. (Comment: These corridor discussions likely were fueled by Thaci's post-election statements about declaring independence very quickly after December 10; a Council Secretariat contact told us that Thaci had assured Solana that he would coordinate closely with the EU and the U.S. before declaring independence.) COMMENT - - - - ¶9. (C/NF) Two of our contacts noted that this GAERC was neither as productive as it could have been on Kosovo, nor as bad as some might have feared. The very size of this massive ministerial (81 ministers, including those covering defense and development) made it hard to have substantive discussions. On the plus side, there seems to be more cautious optimism about the state of EU unity. The challenge is that the troika process has given the member states the sense of participation in the process, but without the responsibility of having to make any difficult decisions. If another extended discussion is indeed necessary to ensure EU unity after Dec 10, logistics will be difficult, given the packed agendas for the December 10 GAERC and the Dec 14 EU Summit. Brussels' minds are clearly grappling with this problem right now, but we haven't seen any answers, and we do not exclude the possibility of pressure for slippage of the January time frame (A number of Council and permrep contacts have told us that Kosovars will need to have flexibility, given that the EU may need time to keep the 27 together). We also continue to hear much appreciation for the low public profile of the US over the past weeks -- our contacts credit this with helping to bring states in the region along. That said, it may be useful to reach out to non-Quint member states who share our views on Kosovo independence to help focus their counterparts in the EU on a timeline for further deliberations -- one that does not go beyond mid-January. We should also use the presence of EU FMs at the Annapolis meeting and at the NATO ministerial to underscore privately that any further delays will only increase instability on the ground and will not provide softer landings. BRUSSELS 00003382 003 OF 003 GRAY .