EU DYNAMICS IN ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 15-16 FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003139 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ETTC IR XF EUN BM CD ZL SUBJECT: EU DYNAMICS IN ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 15-16 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC) REF: A. STATE 141316 ¶B. STATE 143223 Classified By: LAURENCE WOHLERS, USEU POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR REASONS 1.5 (D) AND (E) SUMMARY -------------- 1.(C) According to the Portuguese Presidency (protect),the EU Foreign Ministers meeting General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) will start on Monday, October 15 with a presentation by the Greek delegation of proposed means of reinforcing the EU disaster response arrangements. In the External Relations session to follow, ministers will resume their debate on the tone and focus of Russia policy in the lead up to the EU-Russia Summit in Mafra on October 26. They will also confirm that the EU will conduct a bridging military operation in Chad/CAR, review developments in the DRC and roll-out new sanctions on Burma. Ministers may be forced to confront the issue of funding shortfalls. Ministers will also seek to bridge differences (esp. Germany and the Netherlands) on the retention of Uzbekistan sanctions. The French are expected to lead the call for a new political mandate to pursue further economic and financial sanctions against Iran. The Western Balkans and Zimbabwe's participation in the EU-Africa Summit will also be discussed. The ministers will be joined by Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte, who will present her latest evaluation of Serbia's cooperation with her tribunal. On October 16, the EU will hold joint Cooperation Council meetings with Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. USEU attended an off-the-record preview of the GAERC by the Portuguese Presidency on October 12. A summary of that meeting has been forwarded to EUR/ERA via unclassified e-mail. This message contains additional information on internal EU debate leading up to the GAERC on Burma, Chad, Iran, Kosovo, and the Middle East. End Summary IRAN -------------- 2.(C) Per ref B instruction, on October 11, Ambassador and visiting Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmit engaged at length senior EU official, including two of High Rep Solana's senior policy advisors (Robert Cooper and Pierre Morel) and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson on the importance of imposing new EU autonomous sanctions in support of multilateral diplomatic efforts. EU interlocutors took on board U.S. views. On October 12, the EU Political and Security Committee reached consensus on Iran sanctions language for the October 15 GAERC (see October 11 USEU Today). Various contacts have told us that the debate was long and difficult. The anti-new sanctions group was led by the Italian, who apparently made a long and passionate plea against further sanctions, terming it a "huge historic mistake". The Austrians were equally vociferous in their opposition, albeit less passionate. The Greeks, Cypriots, and Spanish also remained in the opposition camp whereas the Dutch, Danes, and eastern EU member states expressed strong support for new sanctions. UK and Dutch contacts in the room told us that sanctions opponents represented roughly the southern tier, with Germany clearly uncomfortable with a leg in each camp. One UK contact, however, discounted the idea that the anti-sanctions group was primarily trying to protect commercial interests. Instead, he surmised, they were motivated by three factors: a) a lingering belief (and resentment) that the EU was being "pushed" into confrontational policies by the U.S. (and to a lesser degree by the EU-3),b) genuine concern that Iran could not be brought around by a sanctions-led approach and worry about losing all influence there, and c) concern that the U.S. and the EU were pushing Russia too hard on too many issues right now. 3.(C) It appears that the member states resisting further sanctions is roughly the same as those who argue for a more accommodating approach to Russian concerns on Kosovo and Georgia. Some EU Permrep sources also believe that Italy continues to nurse a bruised ego after being passed over for EU-3 membership. During the PSC debate, the Council Secretariat representative helpfully signaled that strong SIPDIS conclusions would be useful to High Rep Solana in his next round of talks with his Iranian counterpart Ali Larijani. According to Council Secretariat contacts, the Solana-Larijani meeting is likely to be held on October 23 at a venue yet to be determined. KOSOVO -------------- BRUSSELS 00003139 002 OF 002 4.(C) According to the German Mission, the EU has agreed to "truly good" conclusions on Kosovo that focus on supporting the troika process. According to our contact, discussions over the past few days were less contentious than expected, with Romania agreeing to language that "notes that the (troika) process will conclude" with the report to the UNSYG. Conclusions are not yet finalized on Bosnia-Herzegovina, but reportedly focus on supporting HR Lajcak's efforts. Our German contact said that some member states want them strengthened in light of the continued impasse on police reform. On the FMs' coffee with ICTY Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte, the Council Secretariat Desk Officer for Serbia told us not to expect an announcement at the GAERC that the EU will sign an SAA with Belgrade. Rather, an announcement will likely come only several days later, and the SAA likely will be initiated in late October or early November. All of our contacts have stressed that several member states continue to oppose the signing of an SAA with Belgrade absent full cooperation with ICTY but have acquiesced to initialing the SAA as one way of reinforcing EU ties with Serbia before the "unrelated" December 10 deadline for the Troika's report to the UNSYG on Kosovo. CHAD -------------- 5.(C) Although the Portuguese have said publicly that the GAERC will approve an ESDP mission for Chad, the Poles told us that funding is still being debated by EU Permreps. The Pole felt that any future compromise would likely include the following three elements: a) agreement on common costs of $100 million, b) language to ask the Athena management committee to consider taking on "some additional costs", c) exclusion of any transportation costs from common costs. When we pointed out that this was a murky financial way to start a mission, he did not seem too concerned. BURMA -------------- 6.(C) According to the Swedish PSC Ambassador, Sweden is pushing for tougher sanctions on Burma than what the EU had originally envisioned. The EU's original focus on sanctions involved teakwood, precious gems, and some mining. The Swedes, however, assesed that the EU member states had only marginal trade in these items and, as a result, sanctions there would not hurt the regime. FM Bildt feels strongly that sanctions need to hurt and that this should mean going after gas and oil interests. Therefore, the Swedish position on Monday will be that although they will accept the original sanctions package, they will insist that it also be accompanied by a strong statement that the EU will be looking at further sanctions. The Swedes added that Stockholm was pleased with the UNSC statement yesterday and thought it would be helpful in the GAERC discussion. MIDDLE EAST -------------- ¶7. (C) The draft GAERC conclusions on the Middle East reiterate the EU commitment to the peace process and welcome the upcoming international meeting. According to a Council source the Germans suggested the development of an EU action plan to further support the parties in their ongoing negotiations and the subsequent implementation period, which is referred to in the draft conclusions. The draft conclusions also call on Israel to provide accreditation to the EUPOL COPPS mission without delay. GRAY .