EU RESPONSE TO KEEPING PRESSURE ON THE BURMESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003052 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS AARON COPE AND EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM BM EUN SUBJECT: EU RESPONSE TO KEEPING PRESSURE ON THE BURMESE REGIME REF: SECSTATE 137644 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Laurence Wohlers for reason s 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: EU Council and Commission contacts expressed their agreement with reftel points and explained that intense EU discussions are continuing on internal and external measures designed to keep pressure on the Burmese regime in response to the recent violent crackdown on protesters. Member states are discussing reinforced and new sanctions, and will likely send HR Solana's Personal Representative on Human Rights to Burma soon. The EU is also delivering demarches to ASEAN and other neighboring states to emphasize the importance of pushing the regime on reform and restraint. Burma has been put on the agenda for discussion at the October 16 GAERC meeting, and Council and Commission interlocutors expressed their eagerness to continue to coordinate on these issues. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In separate meetings, Council Secretariat Deputy Head of Asia Unit Antonio Tanca, Council Burma desk officer Friederike Tschampa, and Commission Southeast Asia Unit Head Seamus Gillespie said that member states are considering both reinforced and new sanctions on the regime. Tightening existing measures is the most practical and efficient way the EU can respond since the legal groundwork for new sanctions will take a minimum of ten days, according to Tschampa. She said that the EU would need to be creative in constructing the sanctions regime, as well as cautious about the possibility of regional actors replacing any subsequent Burmese regime financial losses resulting from the sanctions. Gillespie elaborated that RELEX counselors are currently examining the technical aspects of levying new sanctions, including how new measures might affect the population vice the regime, as well as compatibility with WTO laws. He shared his personal view that while the focus on immediate measures is necessary, what will be more effective in the long term is examining the full spectrum of the regime's financial flows, including banks in neighboring countries. Member states are showing some hesitancy in considering more comprehensive, longer term programs, however. ¶3. (C) Our interlocutors confirmed that the EU continues to discuss sending an EU envoy or delegation to the region, but the time frame is not yet certain. Riina Kionka, HR Solana's Personal Representative on Human Rights, will be the likely candidate, although it remains undecided whether she would travel as part of a EU troika delegation or in her own capacity as Solana's envoy. Tschampa said that the option of sending a higher-level, possibly ministerial troika delegation was also still on the table, but a delegation of that nature was a less-immediate prospect, and if such travel took place, it would likely only happen after Kionka's trip. Tanca and Tschampa emphasized that the regime would have to exhibit a greater willingness to engage in real dialogue before the EU would send its ministers. In response, Poloff reiterated the need for caution to ensure that the regime did not twist any potential direct engagement to enhance its credibility. Efforts are also underway to secure access to Burma for EU ambassadors posted to Thailand. ¶4. (C) Tschampa and Gillespie noted that the EU is also delivering its own demarches to ASEAN members and other states in the region to underscore the importance of maintaining pressure on the regime, as well as need for a peaceful transition to a democratic government in Burma. Gillespie described the Commission's concern that if the situation in soon stabilizes, Burma's neighbors will consider themselves off the hook to try to influence the regime in a positive direction. It will therefore be important to remind those countries that provide a "comfort zone" for Burma of BRUSSELS 00003052 002 OF 002 their responsibilities. Gillespie went on to speculate that a deterioration of the situation could negatively impact EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations as well as the late November EU-ASEAN commemorative summit meeting. GRAY .