AMBASSADOR FINLEY DISCUSSES OSCE AND COE WITH EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002402 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MARR PARM OSCE EUN XH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR FINLEY DISCUSSES OSCE AND COE WITH EU Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. On June 27, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Julie Finley led the U.S. delegation to the COSCE (the EU's OSCE working party) troika. During the four hour consultations, the EU declared its hope for reforms in Kazakhstan in light of its CiO bid and agreement to downsize the OSCE mission in Croatia. The United States and EU concurred on the utility of pursuing a declaration for the November 2007 Madrid Ministerial as well as separate statements on selected regional and thematic issues. EU interlocutors expressed concerns about the feasibility of an OSCE Mission training mission in Afghanistan, preferring to focus on their own training programs, and raised the possibility of adapting a regional border management program. Discussions reaffirmed the mutual desire to resolve the frozen conflicts in Georgia and Moldova and the need to involve Russia in the solution. Sequencing of a political settlement and internationalization of a PKO in Moldova remained a question of debate. As discussions regarding Russia continued, the EU stressed its commitment to the CFE and raised the question of Russia's true intentions regarding the OSCE and ODIHR. Although the United States and the EU differed in their tactical approaches to issues as disparate as Afghanistan and Croatia, the troika reaffirmed the overall complementarity of U.S.-EU objectives in the OSCE. END SUMMARY Participants -------------- ¶2. Ambassador Finley was joined by Gary Robbins, Director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs and Samuel Laeuchli, USOSCE Political Counselor, and USEU POLOFFs. German EU Presidency's Federal Foreign Office OSCE Division Head Margit Hellwig- Btte led the EU Troika. German MFA participants included CoE Division Head Johann-Adolf Cohausz, and OSCE Division Desk Officer Jan-Thede Domeyer. Representing the Council Secretariat was the Director of the Policy Unit, Helga Schmid, and the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Unit's OSCE and CoE Desk Officer, Leo Schulte Nordholdt. OSCE and CoE Head of Unit Gilbert Dubois and Desk Officers Bertrand Rochard and Alenka Zajc were present from the European Commission's DG RELEX. Representatives from the Portuguese Presidency Unit were Incoming Chair of the COSCE Paulo Rufino and OSCE Desk Officer Ana Coelho. Madrid Ministerial Preparations -------------- ¶3. Ambassador Finley previewed U.S. objectives for the November 2007 OSCE Ministerial in Madrid, including a Ministerial Declaration that contained strong language on fulfillment of Istanbul commitments and decisions on possible assistance to Afghanistan, border security in Central Asia, closure of the Croatia mission, selection of a new Chair in Office (CiO) for 2009, and support for the Kosovo final status settlement. In addition, Finley highlighted our interest in separate resolutions in support of human rights defenders, promotion of tolerance, and the situations in Moldova and Georgia respectively. The German EU Presidency agreed to aim for a ministerial declaration, including, in particular, language on regional conflicts. Kazakhstan CiO Bid -------------- ¶4. On Kazakhstan's CiO bid, both sides reaffirmed their support in principle for the Kazakh bid, but agreed that the GOK had not demonstrated a commitment to certain democratic reforms. The EU Troika expressed hope for signs of reform, citing the country's August 18 elections as a possible opportunity to give positive impetus for progress. Paulo Rufino, the incoming Portuguese Chair of the COSCE working group reiterated that there was no EU common position on Kazakhstan's bid and noted that the Spanish CiO was "open" to consultations on the issue. Ambassador Finley also expressed her desire to see Kazakhstan fulfill its commitments but questioned how long we could wait to see action before a decision must be made. She pointed out that the CiO must be able to represent all three aspects of the OSCE- the political-military, economic and environmental, and the human dimension. EU officials conceded that the GOK had not enacted any of the reforms that External Relations Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner had identified as important to the CiO bid. BRUSSELS 00002402 002 OF 004 Afghanistan -------------- ¶5. An exchange of views on the possibility of an OSCE mission to Afghanistan was inconclusive. EU showed little enthusiasm for exploring the concept of an OSCE mission in Afghanistan. The German Presidency insisted on looking into the conditions and a potential U.S. proposal before committing to any possible action. Hellwig-Botte and Rufino asserted that the EU could consider adjusting OSCE border management programming in Central Asian countries that would indirectly benefit Afghanistan, but that it was not inclined to support projects in country. The Germans expressed concern that a direct involvement would be too security and cost intensive. Hellwig-Botte further argued that the EU was already heavily involved in Afghanistan with a police training mission and that to launch another mission would possibly duplicate efforts and complicate existing structures. ¶6. Ambassador Finley emphasized that the U.S. wanted to determine the interest in the concept of OSCE involvement before considering concrete action proposals. She pointed out that 21 non-EU and non-NATO countries, including Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors, had expressed interest in seeing stability in Afghanistan through the OSCE. The OSCE could provide a vehicle through which these same countries could make a contribution and, in doing so, create a multiplier - and not a duplicative -- effect for EU and NATO efforts. Finley observed that the EU's new police training mission would still leave critical gaps at lower levels and left unanswered President Karzai's request for OSCE assistance. An OSCE effort could add value by filling that gap. The EU representatives reiterated skepticism for the concept and alluded to policy fatigue, noting that they are already involved in two projects within the country and were reluctant to begin another. Hellwig-Botte suggested that the Afghans needed to clarify their request to the OSCE. Russia - CFE -------------- ¶7. Council Secretariat Policy Planning Director Helga Schmid, reaffirmed the EU's belief in the value of the CFE and the need for an adapted CFE "in the light of global security changes." She was reassured by the U.S. commitment to an adapted CFE, but asked for clarification of the USG's position on ratification of the treaty in light of recent remarks by Senator Lugar that advice and consent to the adapted treaty would be conditioned on Russia fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments in Georgia and Moldova. At the May 18 EU-Russia summit, EU leaders pressed Putin on implementation issues. PSC Troika Ambassadors had placed the issue on the agenda of their June 27 meeting with Russian Permrep Chizov as well. Schmid asked for U.S. views on the Russian threat of a moratorium, prospects that Azerbaijan and Armenia would join it, and whether the OSCE was the appropriate forum to discuss it. ¶8. Robbins affirmed U.S. commitment to the CFE and said ratification of A/CFE remained linked to Russian fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments, as noted by Sen. Lugar. He confirmed that the U.S. would use established channels for CFE discussions, but is also willing to reach out to partners in other settings. U.S. participation in the OSCE's Extraordinary Conference on CFE showed our commitment to engage. Robbins informed Schmid of our intent to seek clarification of the Russian cancellation of three planned CFE inspections due to "force majeure." The United States was, of course, opposed to a Russian moratorium. On Istanbul commitments, there was also the question of who decides when these criteria are met. The countries involved (i.e., Georgia and Moldova) should definitely be included in this determination. OSCE Charter and Russian Reform Proposals -------------- ¶9. EU and U.S. delegations confirmed Transatlantic opposition to the OSCE Charter, and agreed that it was necessary to gain a clearer understanding of Russian intentions for pursuing one. EU Policy Unit Director Schmid stated that refusing flat-out to discuss the charter will cause problems with Russia. Ambassador Finley suggested that partners should consider whether and how we could address other Russian interests in the OSCE in order to hold the line against a charter. Hellwig-Botte (German Presidency) agreed that it is a question of finding out the Russian plan and what they really want. USOSCE Polmincouns pointed out that Russian insistence on the charter was perhaps part of a larger Russian effort to be aggressive against the OSCE. Commission Russia Unit Deputy Tibbels doubted that Russia had any overarching strategy behind its rhetoric and actions other than to BRUSSELS 00002402 003 OF 004 demonstrate that Russia was back on the world stage and that nothing can be solved without their involvement. Russian domestic succession politics informed the tactics of Russian diplomats who were increasingly reluctant to concede anything in international fora. Parliamentary Assembly, Election monitoring & ODIHR -------------- -------------- ¶10. The German Presidency and the Commission assessed that Russia would invite ODIHR to monitor the Duma elections in December, but anticipated problems that could have broader repercussions for the OSCE. Helwig-Botte expressed concern that Russia might try to constrain ODIHRs operations in an effort to create a precedent for future OSCE election observation missions. Helwig-Botte repeatedly stressed that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's quarrel with ODIHR was interlinked with ODHIR monitoring in Russia. The German EU Presidency urged careful preparation for the likely discussion in Madrid on the Russian election monitoring mission. Helwig-Botte urged like-minded partners to caution MPs critical of ODIHR not to play into the hands of Russia in its efforts to destroy ODHIR. Finley added that we could undercut Russian's efforts by quietly nudging ODIHR to use softer language in reports without surrendering the principles. Georgia and South Ossetia -------------- ¶11. EUR/RPM Director Robbins provided an overview of the situation in South Ossetia, noting that the water dispute threatened to impede summer reconstruction plans, including the building of schools. The terms of the closure of the Russian base at Gudauta was also a point of contention. USDEL urged the EU to support expansion of the OSCE monitors at the checkpoints. Schmid provided a more upbeat picture based on her visit to Georgia in March to meet with the JCC. She observed that CBMs as well as security, and customs and border management measures had begun to be implemented. Although the Russians were not particularly enthusiastic about OSCE involvement in these measures, these concerns were not big obstacles to progress. She stressed the need to get the Russia on board with any new measures. Schmid conceded that the Georgian-backed South Ossetian leader Sanakoyev supported the OSCE's economic rehabilitation program for the breakaway republic as well as the initial confidence building measures, but rejected the idea of EU meetings with Sanakoyev as it would undermine EU credibility with all the parties. (NOTE: During his June 26 visit to Brussels, Sanakoyev met with Caucasus policy experts at the Commission, but not with Council Secretariat officials. End Note.) Both the EU and USDel agreed on the need for more CBMs between Georgians and South Ossetians. Transnistria -------------- ¶12. USDEL reviewed for EU counterparts the benefits of and objectives for internationalizing the current peacekeeping force in Moldova, noting that DAS Kramer had recently circulated a proposal to NATO Allies. Robbins pointed out that Moldova supported this effort, and that Russia could contribute to such a force. The concept would allow Russia to fulfill a key Istanbul commitment and open the way for the ratification of the adapted CFE treaty. Robbins and EU counterparts confirmed that the "5 2" negotiating format was important in reaching a final political settlement. The U.S. also supported the creation of an informal contact group on Moldova at the OSCE, similar to one created to discuss Georgia. ¶13. Schmid acknowledged that the unraveling of the CFE could bring about new impetus for negotiations of a multilateral PKF for Transnistria. However, in several of its discussions on changing the PKO composition, the Council's Political and Security Committee continued to oppose such a move in the absence of a political settlement first. That being said, Transnistria was perhaps the easiest frozen conflict to solve. Russia has been sending mixed signals regarding its cooperation. Moscow had not pushed the Transnistrian side to participate in the 5 2 discussions, and at the same time had reduced financial support to the breakaway region. Schmid further reported that Ukrainian leaders believed that Russia would abandon Smirnoff by the end of the year. In any case, she urged that there be "no surprises" from the United States on the issue. (Comment: Given the large format of the US -EU Troika and the sensitivity of many member states to the idea, we were not surprised that Schmid failed to mention the Council Secretariat's interest in pursuing Transnistria as a test case for EU ESDP cooperation with Russia.) BRUSSELS 00002402 004 OF 004 Nagorno-Karabakh -------------- ¶14. The EU Troika asked for U.S. views on Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. and EU delegations shared concerns about the deterioration of media freedom in Azerbaijan as well as the widening income gap between Azeris in N-K and Azerbaijan. Ambassador Finley agreed with the German EU Presidency that the situation deserves to be closely watched. Central Asia -------------- ¶15. Both sides agreed that Central Asia was perhaps the most important region for OSCE work. EU Troika participants believed that the OSCE could "add value" to the EU's new Central Asia strategy, particularly in the area of border management. The USDEL rebutted the EU's assertion that the OSCE should adapt to the EU's strategy and not the other way around. If the OSCE were only used as a secondary player, it would become marginalized and ineffective when it was most needed. Croatia -------------- ¶16. The USDel and EU Troika agreed that Croatia had made good progress on meeting commitments. While there was not yet an EU position on the closure of the OSCE's Croatia Mission, the U.S. was ready to take that step. If others felt strongly otherwise, however, the U.S. could consider closing the Mission and opening a small office in Zagreb or Vienna as a penultimate step. The German EU Presidency noted that most of the EU member states were in favor of downsizing, but want to be sure that Croatia completely fulfilled its commitments before closing the mission completely. Commission representatives (who are the fiercest opponents of Mission closure) noted outstanding implementation and monitoring issues associated with war crimes trials and the return of refugees. Commission representatives remained largely silent during the discussion, but the German Presidency was careful to highlight their concerns which are related to Croatia's bid for EU membership. The USOSCE Polmincouns reiterated that we could consider a different and smaller type of OSCE presence to address the remaining concerns, but not merely downsizing the current mission. With regard to the budget issue, Ambassador Finley stated the U.S. would bring no money to the mission. Hellwig-Botte promised to look into the issue with USOSCE in a future meeting in Vienna. Kosovo -------------- ¶17. Robbins stated that the U.S. favors maintaining a mission in Kosovo at its current level. After its final status is decided, it is very important to consolidate and focus efforts on local reform, human rights, and the welfare of immigrants and minorities. Council of Europe -------------- ¶18. According to German MFA COE Director Cohausz, the main outcome of the EU-Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg in May 2007 was a political commitment to create more synergy between the two institutions. Cohausz briefed on the creation of the European Fundamental Rights Agency in March 2007, replacing the European Monitoring Center on Xenophobia. It will help to improve cooperation on human rights policy in Europe. They want to avoid the possibility of developing different standards and are in the process of creating a formal agreement due this autumn. The EU highlighted its disappointment with Russia's unwillingness to ratify Protocol 14. They felt this was deplorable since Russia had helped to create it in the first place. If it is not ratified by June 29, they will have to use the old procedure to elect judges to the court. This will have severe budgetary implications. The CoE delegate felt that Russia is just trying to make it clear that they will not accept rules above the sovereignty of the Russian state. ¶20. This message has been cleared by U.S. Head of Delegation Ambassador Finley and the Bureau of European Affairs. GRAY .