BELGIAN ELECTIONS: FAR RIGHT VLAAMS BELANG SAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 001672 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL BE SUBJECT: BELGIAN ELECTIONS: FAR RIGHT VLAAMS BELANG SAYS BEING NUMBER TWO IS ITS NUMBER ONE GOAL REF: A. BRUSSELS 1576 ¶B. BRUSSELS 1558 ¶C. BRUSSELS 438 Classified By: POLCOUNS TED ANDREWS. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). -------------- The Premier Opposition Party? -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Fresh off a disappointing showing in the October 8, 2006, local Belgian elections, where it failed to achieve a much sought after breakthrough in the larger cities of Flanders, the far right, ultra-nationalist Vlaams Belang (VB) finds itself pondering observations by political observers that it may have peaked. The failure to capture the mayor's seat in Antwerp last October, or to achieve a breakthrough on the city council, combined with lost council seats in Ghent and the failure to gain control of a single local governing council, prompted some members to turn on the party leadership and provoked anxiety and self-perusal within party ranks. VB insiders insist these glitches were temporary, however, and that the party is anticipating a strong enough showing in the federal elections to emerge as Belgium's premiere opposition party. ¶2. (C) VB insiders have sought to downplay the party's internal conflict, where newer members especially seem to have turned on the party leadership, whom they blame for recruiting lackluster candidates in 2006 and internal disorganization. A VB parliamentarian with whom embassy maintains discreet contact told poloff the conflict was not ideological, i.e., hardliners were not pitted against moderates. Rather, he laid the blame on newer, less disciplined members who lacked the traditions and loyalties of those who had been with VB since its inception. He expressed displeasure with the behavior of the newer members ("we don't like this approach, it demoralizes our voters; our strength is to be unified to the outside world"). He hoped the problems were over, but thought dissent would continue to occur as the party grew, especially between the old guard and the newer generation. In the meantime, "VB is not going to implode." But, while there should be room for discussion, differences should be kept within the party. ¶3. (C) He was mildly critical of Flemish parliamentarian Marie-Rose Morel, one of the most important public critics of VB who scored rather well in the October election and sought to position herself as a potential party leader. Morel has urged the VB leadership to adopt a softer party line that would attract conservative voters otherwise scared off by the party's image. He said, while Morel has a great future inside VB, "she did not go through the desert, the way older members did," bringing the party from 0.7 percent of the vote to the present day average of around 25 percent. Party leaders chose not to follow the "soft" line advocated by Morel, but to "get back to basics." He also commented on the VLD (Liberals) ejected maverick senator Jean-Marie Dedecker, who, aware of his popularity, had asked too high a price to join VB ranks: i.e., a starring role in the June election. Dedecker has since formed his own party, "List Dedecker," which our contact called "VB light." He expressed disdain for a party created around one individual, but also feared that Dedecker might attract potential VB voters and negatively affect the party's growth. (Comment: This is not an unreasonable fear, according to many observers here. The Prime Minister's Flemish Liberals and the opposition Christian Democrats are all hopeful that Dedecker's group will help split the far right electorate. End comment.) ¶4. (C) Meanwhile, the VB election campaign is in high gear. A VB campaign brochure depicts the three traditional parties (Liberals, Socialists, and Christian Democrats),as deaf, dumb, and blind chimpanzees and VB as "the real alternative." Our VB contact said the party, of course, wants to win the June 10 election, but, more realistically, VB was setting its sights on Flemish parliamentary elections in 2009. The goal was to emerge as the premier opposition party in 2007, which would give VB a prominent platform for 2009, outside of a coalition government. (VB continues to try to break out of the "cordon sanitaire" imposed by the more traditional parties to ostracize VB by preventing it from joining any coalition government at any level.) VB anticipates getting at least eighteen percent of the vote in June ("if we don't get eighteen percent, it will be a defeat"),but really wants a minimum of twenty four percent. -------------- Leterme's Hands Tied By State Reform -------------- ¶5. (C) VB is keeping its eye on the candidacy of Yves Leterme, the Flemish Christian Democratic (CD&V) opposition leader who is vying to be Prime Minister. (Our contact had little to say about the prospects for outgoing PM Guy Verhofstadt to retain the job.) VB leaders see a potential government crisis looming if current opposition leader CD&V gets enough votes to be part of a government coalition. Leterme is thought to be hampered by the need to follow through on his state reform promise ("or he will lose face"), a promise to which his election partner, the New Flemish Alliance (NVA) will hold him. VB sees the Francophone Socialists, a potential partner in a government coalition, as the problem with this plan because "no French-speaking party wants state reform." VB, which supports Flemish independence, opposes state reform as "just a way to keep Belgium alive." (Note: state reform generally means devolving more powers to the regions, particularly in the field of employment policy and, possibly, the financing of social security. End note) ¶6. (C) Comment: While the Vlaams Belang appears less fearsome this election year because of its disappointing showing in 2006 local elections and its publically aired internal disputes, it is still a force to be reckoned with on the Belgian political scene. Its anti-immigrant, nationalist message continues to appeal to a diverse group of voters. If VB succeeds in its main goal for June elections, i.e., becoming Belgium's major opposition party, it will have a bigger, more visible platform to attract more voters and position itself well for 2009 Flemish parliamentary elections. FOX