SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN FM DE GUCHT'S MAY 11

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 001483 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR FOX E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017 TAGS: CG PGOV PREL US BE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN FM DE GUCHT'S MAY 11 MEETING WITH SECRETARY RICE Classified By: POLCOUNS TED ANDREWS. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Belgian FM De Gucht has three goals for his May 11 meetings in the Department with the Secretary and others -- raising USG consciousness on Great Lakes issues, gaining a firsthand impression of USG goals on Russia, and garnering favorable press as Belgium's June 10 federal election approaches. The Minister also will want to discuss next steps on the Kosovo resolution at the UNSC, and exchange views on Iran. We should offer him a warm welcome, a frank discussion, and listen seriously to his views on the DRC. He is a friend in court who is certain to continue playing a major role, whatever happens on June 10. End Summary. -------------- Political Needs -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On May 10, Belgian FM De Gucht is taking time off from the campaign trail to accompany King Albert to New York for a May 14 special session of the UN Security Council. Belgium's constitution mandates the presence of a minister whenever the Sovereign travels abroad. Because of the upcoming elections, where his party faces an uphill battle, he will be traveling with a large press contingent. With De Gucht's Flemish Liberal party doing poorly in the polls, it is imperative for him (and the party) to show the public that the Liberals are continuing to play an important part on the world stage. -------------- Africa -------------- ¶3. (C) De Gucht will want to intensify the level of interchange with Washington on African issues. The Foreign Ministry's leadership is baffled by the U.S. approach toward the Great Lakes, where they believe we do not fully recognize the fragility of the current situation in Congo and seem to discount Belgium's contribution and their diplomats' experience in the DRC. De Gucht's core message for us will be "engage more actively," particularly in pushing the feckless Congolese leadership to act more responsibly. ¶4. (C) In addition to pressing the Secretary personally on the need to establish a consultative mechanism between the international community and the Kabila government in Kinshasa, De Gucht and his team want to engage directly with the AF bureau and other influential players on AF issues. He will highlight Belgian plans for a special session of the UNSC focused on the protection of resources in the Congo, and outline Belgian views on African peacekeeping too. (Comment: While the GOB has been been busy sponsoring &sustainable practices8 seminars and talking about rooting out corruption and protecting DRC,s natural resources, the Belgian-Congolese conglomerate headed by George Forrest, a naturalized Belgian of New Zealand origin, has been fingered by the UN and others as a contributor to &unjust exploitation8 of DRC,s mineral wealth. Forrest,s relationships with Belgian and DRC officials are murky at best. Septel will provide an update on Belgium,s commercial ties with DRC. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Having spent the first week of May in Sudan, De Gucht and his team will be poised for detailed conversations on Darfur, Somalia, and relations with the African Union. The Belgians strongly support a more activist approach to Darfur, but are wary about calls for them to expend more of their resources. On Somalia, they generally have followed the Italian-lead. They are skeptical about deeper engagement with the African Union, but will be curious to learn more about how we are attempting to bolster the organization's capabilities. -------------- Russia, Kosovo, and Iran -------------- ¶6. (C) Having launched his 2006 stint as Chairman in Office of the OSCE with high hopes for striking pragmatic deals with Moscow, De Gucht has developed a more realistic attitude. He is a harsh critic of Moscow's role in perpetuating the frozen conflicts, and has spoken out publicly with regard to Russia's approach on issues like energy security. It will be useful to probe for indications that electoral considerations might cause him to turn down the volume of his comments about Russia. ¶7. (C) Although we have not been able to broach the issue with him directly, we do not doubt that he was appalled by President Putin's recent statement about ratification of CFE. The Secretary may wish to remind De Gucht that he is now following the skeptical, pragmatic line that she urged him to take during their first meeting in February 2005. For his part, De Gucht will want to learn first-hand what we are going to do next, particularly in the weeks leading up the G-8 summit and the anticipated UNSC vote on Kosovo. ¶8. (C) Despite occasional signs that the MFA bureaucracy favors a go-slow approach, De Gucht remains a firm supporter of the US-EU strategy on Kosovo. We expect him to offer frank assessments about how other EU members and Russia view this strategy. As on other issues, he will want to know more about our bottom line -- he does not want to be surprised by any last minute compromise language on the UNSC resolution. ¶9. (C) On Iran, we expect De Gucht to offer two messages. The first is one of continued strong support for a steady toughening of sanctions. He will welcome any appreciate comments the Secretary might offer about Belgium's leadership of the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee. De Gucht also might use the meeting to echo Solana's recent remarks about the utility of a direct U.S. dialogue with Iran. -------------- Our Goals -------------- ¶10. (C) Bolstering Karel De Gucht's image and standing should be a primary USG objective. Despite occasional outbreaks of foot-in-mouth disease early in his Foreign-ministership, he repeatedly has proven himself to be a friend in court for the U.S. and for U.S. interests. Whatever happens during the elections, he will remain as Foreign Minister during what could be a lengthy process of coalition formation. He is moreover a strong candidate to serve as Belgium's next member of the European Commission. We should show ourselves engaging directly and frankly with the Belgians on their key concerns in Africa and, insofar as possible, do all possible to avoid springing any surprises on Kosovo or Iran. FOX .