REFORMING ESDP CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001156 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017 TAGS: EUN MOPS PREL SUBJECT: REFORMING ESDP CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES REF: BRUSSELS 00311 Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Several distinct, but related, efforts are underway within the EU to improve the effectiveness of crisis response capabilities under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) which after 7 years of operation and (shortly) 17 missions, is increasingly seen as having reached the limits of operational capacity. There are discussions of the need for improved planning, and better integration of the civilian and military components of ESDP. We are assured that no one envisions a replay of the 2003 Tervuren debate, but there is gathering momentum for a more effective civilian-military planning process within ESDP. End summary. -------------- Improving Effectiveness -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The European Union is engaged in several restructuring and reform processes designed to respond to identified weaknesses and shortfalls in crisis management response capabilities. These processes are separate, but related. Some are aimed at general restructuring for increased effectiveness, and others are driven by specific mission requirements and lessons learned. There is a pervasive sense within the security-related structures of the EU that the expanding pace of ESDP engagements cannot be maintained without meaningful improvements in efficiency and effectiveness. Including the impending deployment of the Kosovo post-status mission and the police monitoring/mentoring mission in Afghanistan, ESDP will have fielded 17 missions (four of which have been military) on four continents since its inception in 1999. -------------- The Hampton Court Process -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In December 2005, the EU Heads of State and Government, meeting in an informal Summit outside of London, concluded that there was a need to improve the effectiveness of the EU's civilian crisis management "instruments." In a subsequent paper on crisis management structures, Javier Solana noted that the EU was "currently close to the limits of our capacity." He concluded that further steps are needed to increase efficiency, professionalism and capacity. In the view of Solana and the Council Secretariat, the EU's "added value" in crisis management is its ability to bring together civilian and military assets. The 2005 papers called for strengthening command and control of deployed missions, clarifying chains of command and responsibility, and to ensure access to "planned operational facilities in order to deal with situations twenty-four hours/ seven days a week as necessary." The declared full operational capability of the EU Operations Center in January 2007 is one component of this program. Other initiatives underway include dividing the current directorate for civilian crisis management into two components. One will constitute a Civilian Crisis Planning Capability (CCPC) which will be dedicated to operational planning and control of deployed missions, and the "rump" directorate would do concept development and work with international partners. ¶4. (C/NF) As part of this Hampton Court process, newly-arrived Director General of the EU Military Staff, LTG David Leakey, is taking steps to enhance and improve the Military Staff's support to civilian planning and operations. The Military Staff, currently numbering some 190 officers, provides military expertise and support to the Military Committee. It covers many of the expected staff roles (personnel, intelligence, exercises, current operations, logistics, and CIS) but does not have a standing planning capability. There are planners within the EUMS, and individual officers are assigned to work with the civilian directorate on specific mission planning. A closer, more systematic linkage and more effective support - within existing resources -- are among Leakey's goals. A French paper submitted to the PSC on March 27, drew a connection between this process of improving EU crisis management structures and the need for a permanent planning structure within the EU Military Staff they identified as part of the BRUSSELS 00001156 002 OF 003 DRC lessons rQrce generation, infstics were also notessed. The Secretariat paed shortum, Spain, SwedFrance, Portugal, Geece and Germany) argued that there is a need fQr a limited standing planning capability withQn the EU in order to address the problems made evident by the EUFOR DRC mission. The Ministes did not endorse the need for an EU OperatiQnal Headquarters. -------------- PSC Qonsideration -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) UQ comments on the original Secretariat paper submitted to the PSC argued that the ability to stnd up the existing Operations Center provides the EU with an additional capability toplan and run operations in circumstances where a joint civilian-military response is required and where no national HQ has been identified. They call for a clearer role for the Civ-Mil cell within the EUMS in strategic contingency planning, and for the Operational Commander to establish procedures in the OPLAN for in-theater coordination with other actors. ¶7. (C/NF) In PSC discussions March 27, Spain, Greece, and Portugal pressed for further consideration of internal planning requirements, and France proposed ideas on EU pre-planning in the phase before the identification of an OHQ. Their non-paper proposed that "the EUMS should be reinforced with a permanent planning capability for military operations." Another paper urged that "consideration be given to the provision of residual (EU and non-EU) capability in the planning of future operations." The UK stressed that the priorities facing ESDP were the successful launch of the mission in Kosovo and Afghanistan and the implementation of the Hampton Court Agenda. They accepted the conclusion that there is scope for practical and technical improvements as a result of a bottom-up lessons learned process, provided it was not used as a means to re-open "hard-fought" agreements on terms of reference for the Operations Center or the EUMS. -------------- State of Play -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) We were assured by the German ESDP Counselor on March 30 that in discussing planning needs for the EU, there is no desire to reignite the "Tervuren" debate of 2003. He maintained that Germany, both as EU Presidency and as a matter of national policy, is determined to avoid any controversy with the US over developments within ESDP. He said that Germany had fallen away from the EU OHQ idea even during the Schroeder administration, and that under the current government, there is no support for such an approach. He said that the French had retreated from their initial proposals, and that there seemed to be a growing consensus that what is needed is civilian-military planning, rather than a solely military capability. A March 27 Secretariat paper makes the case for moving in that direction. This is seen as an area in which the EU can bring "added-value," and as a capability that does not exist elsewhere. The need to move toward an EU role in noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) is another common thread running through the various BRUSSELS 00001156 003 OF 003 analyses. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) These separate internal processes are easily conflated, and there are those within the Council Secretariat who tend to blur the distinctions in conversations with us. It is clear that previous missions -both civilian and military -- have been run on a shoestring and a prayer. They have been spared disaster largely by their small scale and a good dose of luck. The comparatively large scale - and the risks -- of the upcoming missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan have focused hearts and minds in Brussels as well as influential Member State capitals. In our judgment, it is virtually certain that the Operations Center will be activated to oversee the Kosovo mission. We also judge that some limited standing civilian-military planning capability is probably an inevitable development, and that ESDP NEOs are a likely future development. We are told that the UK views the current tug-of-war with the French as one of scope rather than philosophy. Unless the EU is prepared to abandon its comprehensive approach to crisis management entirely (a decision we see as unlikely),a critical mass among Member States will continue to develop for a more effective command and control system and better integration between the civilian and military components of ESDP. McKinley .