Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRIDGETOWN573
2007-05-09 21:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bridgetown
Cable title:  

(C) GRENADA PM MITCHELL ON CHAVEZ'S BAD LIST?

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR EAID AC DO GJ IS VC VE XL 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWN #0573/01 1292141
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 092141Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4689
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1714
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0091
RUEHCV/USDAO CARACAS VE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0111
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J5 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000573 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EAID AC DO GJ IS VC VE XL
SUBJECT: (C) GRENADA PM MITCHELL ON CHAVEZ'S BAD LIST?

REF: A. BRIDGETOWN 509

B. 06 BRIDGETOWN 315

C. 06 BRIDGETOWN 294

Classified By: DCM Mary Ellen T. Gilroy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000573 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EAID AC DO GJ IS VC VE XL SUBJECT: (C) GRENADA PM MITCHELL ON CHAVEZ'S BAD LIST? REF: A. BRIDGETOWN 509 ¶B. 06 BRIDGETOWN 315 ¶C. 06 BRIDGETOWN 294 Classified By: DCM Mary Ellen T. Gilroy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a somewhat tense mid-April meeting with Charge, Grenada's Keith Mitchell shared his fears that strongly leftist Caribbean leaders, led by St. Vincent's Ralph Gonsalves, had persuaded Hugo Chavez that the pro-American Grenada government should not receive further Venezuelan assistance. Mitchell bewailed the non-receipt of some two-thirds of the USD 30 million Chavez had apparently promised Grenada (timeframe unclear). In an indirect apology for Grenada's lack of convergence with the U.S. on UN and OAS voting, Mitchell claimed he could not control his ambassadors and requested that Charge send him demarches directly. The PM also mentioned that Israel had offered him a state visit, presumably in exchange for Grenada's support in multilateral fora. Mitchell has a history of running to U.S. diplomats when he is in trouble (reftels). His overriding focus, like that of his Eastern Caribbean colleagues across the ideological spectrum, is keeping resources flowing in to ensure his political survival. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Charge d'Affaires Karen Jo McIsaac met with Grenada Prime Minister Keith Mitchell on April 19 at his request. Mitchell expressed his happiness with the April 13-15 visit to Grenada of CODEL Engel (ref A). After a long recapitulation of his relationship with Cuba's Fidel Castro--generally good--and with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez--uncertain--Mitchell arrived at the message he wanted to pass to the USG: he is convinced that "Ralph is dirtying me with Chavez," referring to PM Ralph Gonsalves of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG). Mitchell continued that "he (Gonsalves) is carrying Roosevelt (PM Roosevelt Skerrit of Dominica) and possibly Baldwin (PM & MFA Baldwin Spencer of Antigua) with him" in damaging Mitchell's standing with Chavez. PERFORMING FOR DON FIDEL AND DON HUGO -------------- ¶3. (C) Reaching back to a public event in Cuba that probably took place in early 2006, Mitchell described his discomfort at appearing on the podium after SVG PM Gonsalves delivered a fiery anti-American tirade. Mitchell could not match the rhetoric as the PM assu
red Charge that he values Grenada's relationship with the United States and will not jeopardize it by engaging in public denunciations. Mitchell said he could tell Castro was not happy with his (Mitchell's) more measured intervention, the first time Mitchell has felt such disapproval from the Cuban leader. ¶4. (C) According to PM Mitchell, Venezuela had promised USD 30 million in assistance to Grenada but the country has only received USD 9 million. Given what happened in Cuba, Mitchell said he is convinced Grenada will not see any more. Chavez promised to visit Grenada, but has never asked to come, though he has visited St. Vincent and St. Lucia. For the first time, Mitchell provided a breakdown of expected Venezuelan assistance, in U.S. dollars (Charge has tried to get this before without success): - USD 10 million: hospital construction - USD 10 million: construction of low-income housing - USD 4 million: youth development - USD 5 million: material assistance to low-income Grenadians - USD 1 million: youth rehabilitation Mitchell is convinced that Gonsalves, and perhaps the other Eastern Caribbean leaders he mentioned, are behind Venezuela's failure to deliver on further installments of its promised assistance. ¶5. (C) Mitchell characterized Gonsalves as very close to "my political opponents, all of whom are strongly left-of-center." Grenada's Prime Minister added that he is convinced that, if he takes a strong stance against Chavez, Gonsalves will fund the Grenadian opposition in a big way, or "more than he already may be doing." In response to a question about campaign financing laws, Mitchell said there is no law against taking money from non-Grenadians, only the anti-money laundering laws requiring the reporting of imports of large amounts of money. MULTILATERAL CHALLENGES -------------- ¶6. (C) Having finished with Venezuelan assistance, Mitchell moved on to UN and OAS votes. He told Charge that he was speaking as a friend, but wanted to point out U.S. errors in trying to garner Eastern Caribbean support in multilateral fora. In particular, he spoke about the 2005 vote for the OAS Secretary General when the United States supported El Salvador's former President Francisco Flores. Mitchell said that if we had asked him first, he could have told us Flores would not get Caribbean support. Charge accepted the criticism but pointed out that we do engage Grenada's ambassadors in Washington and New York on issues of importance to the United States at the UN and the OAS all the time. She suggested that Grenada's ambassadors may not be serving the country well if they are not communicating what the U.S. tells them to the GOG. In one case, Charge was aware that Grenada's ambassador at the UN appeared to be deliberately avoiding the U.S ambassador charged with briefing Caribbean ambassadors. In addition to U.S. diplomats demarching Grenada's ambassadors in New York and Washington, Charge added, the Embassy in St. George's provides the information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, generally via diplomatic note, but when the issue is really urgent, by telephone as well. ¶7. (C) In a burst of candor, Mitchell admitted that he had trouble controlling his ambassadors, particularly Ruth Rouse, who was at the UN until recently. She was recalled several months ago and replaced by Angus Friday. Rouse was very close to the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) and Mitchell did not trust her not to tell NDC leaders in advance about actions he wanted taken. In one instance, Mitchell said, when he asked Rouse why she voted a particular way, she told him she had talked to other CARICOM member ambassadors about how they were voting and followed their lead. (Note: During the CODEL's visit, Grenada's Ambassador to the U.S. and the OAS since 1995, Denis Antoine, told Charge that he was "appalled" when he saw Grenada's UN and OAS voting record. His remark seems disingenuous, as though he was suddenly noticing what we have complained about for years--and that he had nothing to do with it. End Note.) ¶8. (C) Mitchell said he wants to improve Grenada's relations with Israel and asked that Charge let the GOG know of votes coming up where it would be "easy for Grenada to support Israel." Israel has apparently offered Mitchell a state visit. Charge reiterated that we provide lots of information about votes during UNGA and other UN and OAS meetings. The Prime Minister asked that Charge fax them to his office directly when they are important. Charge agreed to do so. Mitchell concluded by saying he does not want Grenada to be too robotic in its voting. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Mitchell appeared to have trouble getting to the point in the conversation, going over ground he has covered in multiple other conversations with Charge as well as with the Ambassador and other U.S. officials (reftels). There were several moments when Charge thought he was not going to actually say anything significant, an unusual hesitancy for a very skilled public speaker and thorough politician. At times the Prime Minister appeared to be in physical pain, squirming in his seat, squinting, and not finding anyplace to rest his hands. When at last he blurted out Gonsalves' name, he seemed relieved, flopping back in his chair limply, arms outspread, and resting his head against the back. Once through that point, the conversation turned brisk and matter-of-fact. ¶10. (C) Mitchell may have gotten the message about USG disappointment with Grenada's voting record in multilateral fora, although Venezuela's lack of follow-through on assistance may be what has finally driven him to look elsewhere for support. With about 20 percent of homes in Grenada still suffering from some level of damage from Hurricanes Ivan (2004) and Emily (2005),the PM is clearly thinking about maintaining his razor-thin political edge (one vote in parliament) over the opposition. This is the first crack Charge has seen in the close relationship between Grenada and Venezuela. We have an opportunity to gently peel Grenada away from the Eastern Caribbean pack if we move carefully. CODEL Engel gave Mitchell hope that the United States may be prepared to engage again, which may have helped him get over his obvious reluctance to air internal Eastern Caribbean dirty laundry. OURISMAN

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