Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRATISLAVA616
2007-11-16 08:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

SLOVAKIA: DEFENSE MINISTER KASICKY -- OUT OF STEP

Tags:  PREL NATO PARM LO RU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000616 

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STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2017
TAGS: PREL NATO PARM LO RU
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA: DEFENSE MINISTER KASICKY -- OUT OF STEP
ON MISSILE DEFENSE

REF: BRATISLAVA 612 BRATISLAVA 578 BRATISLAVA 487

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000616 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2017 TAGS: PREL NATO PARM LO RU SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA: DEFENSE MINISTER KASICKY -- OUT OF STEP ON MISSILE DEFENSE REF: BRATISLAVA 612 BRATISLAVA 578 BRATISLAVA 487 Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (U) This is an Action Cable. See para 7. ¶2. (C) Summary. During a breakfast meeting with the Ambassador on November 9, Minister of Defense Frantisek Kasicky reviewed the state-of-play on preparations for new Slovak contributions to ISAF and elaborated the Slovak position on Missile Defense. (Due to the Minister's late arrival, the Ambassador did not have an opportunity to raise other topics.) Kasicky confirmed that preparations for additional Slovak deployments in 2008 would proceed in line with GOS discussions with the Dutch. Furthermore, Slovakia would move forward according to its stated plans regardless of the outcome of the Dutch parliamentary debate. On Missile Defense, however, Kasicky repeated arguments that U.S. negotiations with Czech Republic and Poland had had a negative effect on the Alliance and had needlessly provoked the Russians. The Slovak position, i.e., that the only appropriate venues for discussion of Missile Defense in Europe were in NATO and the EU, had been proven right. In response to the Ambassador's offer to arrange a briefing for the GOS on Iranian capabilities, Kasicky said "we don't doubt the Iranian threat," but the important thing is what kind of document (on MD) will be prepared for NATO Ministers. He further suggested that another factor shaping the outcome on MD in Bucharest could be U.S. willingness to "drop certain positions." Kasicky twice stated that the Slovak position on Missile Defense should not be viewed as an "attack on either side," but rather as the "correct" stance from a country that can "take its own positions." Per Ref A, FM Kubis assured Ambassador on November 13 that Kasicky's comments are not official GOS policy. End Summary. Afghanistan -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Vallee expressed appreciation for the government's decision to bolster its contribution to ISAF in 2008, noting the positive impact this contribution would have on the upcoming Dutch parliamentary debate. Kasicky stated that Slovak MOD representatives had met with counterparts in The Hague on November 8 to review the details of the Slovak deployment. Kasicky confirmed that surgical teams slated to
work in the Czech Field hospital in Kabul would be deployed in March or April. The base security unit should deploy in June, per the Dutch request. Reinforcements for PRTs will be sent within a year. MOD Kasicky stated clearly that Slovak deployments would not hinge on the outcome of the Dutch parliamentary vote on ISAF. In addition to the planned increase in Afghanistan, Kasicky confirmed that Slovakia would send two helicopters, with associated support personnel, to Kosovo in December. He predicted that both increases would be approved by the Slovak parliament in its upcoming session. As for post-2008 deployments, the government had no plans to advance any proposals in the near term. (Comment: In a recent conversation with DATT, Kasicky's top advisor indicated that the MOD was considering additional contributions in 2009 and 2010 in which the MOD would recommend an increase of 50 personnel each year. End Comment.) Missile Defense -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador Vallee noted the apparent disconnect between DefMin Kasicky's Missile Defense intervention at the Noordwijk Ministerial -- in which he claimed that bilateral negotiations had undermined Alliance solidarity -- and the current state of play on Missile Defense discussions within NATO and with the Russian Federation. Ambassador Vallee added that almost all Allies had expressed appreciation for the level and frequency of U.S. consultations on the issue. Kasicky said that it has always been the Slovak position that any discussion about Missile Defense in Europe must take place in NATO and the EU because it affects all European countries. This stance had been proven "correct" and the result, Kasicky said, is "exactly what we wanted." The NATO report on MD due in February should be pragmatic and address all legal, political, technical and financial aspects of Missile Defense, according to Kasicky. Although he didn't offer any insights into GOS thinking on what such a document should look like, he did suggest that U.S. willingness to "drop certain positions" could play a role in the NATO decision-making process. When pressed by the Ambassador as to whether Slovakia supported the notion that U.S. negotiations with Poland or the Czech Republic should be subject to NATO approval, Kasicky demurred, saying that was a "hypothetical" question. Independent...or Unwilling to Provoke the Bear? -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Recalling the "clear signals" President Putin sent regarding missile defense at the February Wehrkunde conference, Kasicky suggested that the U.S. had needlessly provoked Russia by its insistence on bilateral negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland. Kasicky characterized the Russian threat to redirect its nuclear capabilities toward Europe as an "exaggerated reaction," but implicitly laid the blame for tensions (with Russia, within the Czech Republic) on the U.S. Kasicky stated that the bilateral approach had not taken into account the security or views of others in the region, nor sensitivities about the deployment of foreign troops in Central Europe. Ambassador responded that any troop presence in this case would be the result of an invitation by sovereign governments and not imposed by outsiders as with the Soviets. Echoing comments made by PM Fico in a November 5 interview about Slovakia's "independence and openness," Kasicky stated at the close of the meeting that "Slovakia is a country that can take its own positions and be articulate about them." These opinions aren't aimed against any party, Kasicky added. ¶6. (C) Ref A reports FM Kubis's firm stance that Kasicky's remarks to the NAC-D are not official GOS policy regarding possible Czech and Polish deployments. That policy, Kubis stressed, remained an issue for the governments of those countries. We recounted Kasicky's remarks to President Gasparovic's foreign affairs advisor, Jan Foltin, on November ¶15. Foltin, who will accompany Gasparovic to Bucharest, told us that Gasparovic was willing to take a responsible position at the NATO Summit in Riga despite Fico's views, and Foltin was sure Gasparovic would be willing to play the same role at Bucharest. ¶7. (C) Comment and Action Request: Under the guise of "independence," Kasicky, like Fico, displays an overweening concern for Russian sensitivities regarding Missile Defense. In Kasicky's rendering, it is due mainly to Russian (and Slovak) intervention that the issue finally is being discussed in the proper venues. He offered no views -- positive or negative -- about U.S. initiatives to address a range of Allied and Russian concerns. In fact, he did not address the core issue, i.e., the nature of the threat and the steps needed to address it, except to note that linking existing and potential systems would be "complex." Perhaps more troubling, however, was Kasicky's tendency to gloss over the issue of the Iranian threat in favor of complaints about the U.S. approach. Taken together with PM Fico's continued public comments opposing Missile Defense, Post believes that a high-level classified briefing on Iran and MD from Missile Defense Agency officials is needed to shine the spotlight where it belongs: on the threat. Such a briefing would help bolster the position of those, such as FM Kubis and NATO PermRep Slobodnik, who maintain that U.S. negotiations with the Czechs and Poles are bilateral issues and who have begun to speak in favorable terms about the possibility of linking complementary NATO and U.S. systems. First-hand exposure to convincing threat information and briefings on U.S. proposals would also make it harder for Fico and Kasicky to oppose the key MD goals Secretary Gates articulated in Noordwijk. Post requests assistance from Washington agencies in securing an MDA visit before the end of the year. End Comment and Action Request. VALLEE

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