Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRATISLAVA153
2007-03-14 16:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:
VISITING IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI'S MESSAGE FOR THE U.S.
how-toVZCZCXRO5418 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHSL #0153 0731640 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 141640Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA TO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0769 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0059 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0033 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0405 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 0353 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0145
S E C R E T BRATISLAVA 000153
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: PREL IR LO
SUBJECT: VISITING IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI'S MESSAGE FOR THE U.S.
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lawrence R. Silverman, for reaso
ns 1.4 (B) (D) (E)
S E C R E T BRATISLAVA 000153
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: PREL IR LO
SUBJECT: VISITING IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI'S MESSAGE FOR THE U.S.
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lawrence R. Silverman, for reaso
ns 1.4 (B) (D) (E)
1. (S) FM Kubis asked AMB to meet early morning March 14 to
pass along the results of his discussions with visiting
Iranian FM Mottaki March 13, including a message that he said
Mottaki had conveyed for the U.S. (see para 3). Kubis made
clear throughout our conversation that he did not think FM
Mottaki's position on the nuclear issue or his message to us
contained anything really new. Kubis stressed he was just
passing the message, not making any case and not pursuing the
matter further. Kubis specifically informed Slovak PermRep to
the UN Burian that there was nothing fundamentally new in
Mottaki,s ideas, and instructed him to continue his efforts
in the UNSC as Slovakia had planned, i.e., supporting further
Chapter VII sanctions. We would guess Mottaki will be
conveying the same message at his other stops on this trip,
including Italy, Slovenia, Belgium and Switzerland.
2. (S) On the nuclear issue, Mottaki,s bottom line message
was a plea for Slovak support in getting the UNSC to issue a
statement (Presidential or press) rather than passing a
second resolution. Protesting unconvincingly to Kubis that,
of course, Iran was not afraid of a resolution, Mottaki said
the GOI understood that the UNSC had to take some action.
But that if the UNSC would forego a resolution for awhile,
the GOI would "agree to the additional IAEA protocol" on
further controls and verification. The GOI would then be
ready to engage in 4-6 weeks of discussion on the larger
issues. "What is the rush?", Mottaki asked. Kubis said he
told Mottaki that the international community,s "rush" was
prompted by the Iranians, rush to enrich uranium. Mottaki
claimed Iran was ready "to do many things," including looking
into the idea of a mutual suspension of enrichment and
sanctions. But the proper environment had to be created to do
so, and that meant no resolution now. Kubis told the
Ambassador, however, that he did not get the sense Iran was
really willing to suspend enrichment. He noted, for example,
that Mottaki had said Iran would be willing to consider
al-Baradei,s time out proposal, but only after the
environment had been prepared by the adoption of a statement
vice resolution. Kubis said that the only thing he heard from
Mottaki that he had not heard previously was Mottaki,s
reference to the recent developments with North Korea and the
possibility of looking at that as a model. Kubis said
privately and publicly that the GOS would continue to back
further sanctions. Mottaki commented that sanctions did not
work, and that the U.S. would not be able to sow dissension
within Iran with such measures.
3. (S) At the end of the dinner, Mottaki asked to speak to
Kubis privately, then said he had a message for the USG. Iran
understands the importance of the situation in Iraq. Given
that it is a top USG priority, Iran was ready to discuss this
and non-Iraq issues with the US, if the environment were
"ripe" (i.e., no UNSC resolution). Mottaki claimed the Iraqi
government would have Tehran,s cooperation regardless of
what happened with a resolution, but without a quid pro quo,
the GOI would do nothing to help the US Administration in
Iraq. Mottaki claimed to Kubis that Amb. Khalilzad had
approached the Iranian representative twice during the
Baghdad Neighbors' conference on March 10 to discuss a
bilateral meeting/channel for communication, but that Mottaki
responded that a channel already existed, and that Iran would
not participate in a different one.
4. (S) FM Kubis also emphasized that the GOS had refused
Mottaki,s request to see PM Fico. The Iranians told the
Slovaks in the run-up to the visit that Mottaki would be
seeing the heads of government in Italy, Belgium and
Slovenia. When The Slovaks told Mottaki he would not be
seeing Fico (Kubis strongly recommended to the PM that he
decline, and Fico did),Mottaki said he would the reconsider
whether he should come at all. The GOS told the GOI that
decision was up to Mottaki, but Kubis would be the highest
level available. Obviously, Mottaki came. Mottaki also asked
Kubis to visit Tehran. Kubis said the circumstances were not
appropriate for a visit now.
VALLEE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: PREL IR LO
SUBJECT: VISITING IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI'S MESSAGE FOR THE U.S.
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lawrence R. Silverman, for reaso
ns 1.4 (B) (D) (E)
1. (S) FM Kubis asked AMB to meet early morning March 14 to
pass along the results of his discussions with visiting
Iranian FM Mottaki March 13, including a message that he said
Mottaki had conveyed for the U.S. (see para 3). Kubis made
clear throughout our conversation that he did not think FM
Mottaki's position on the nuclear issue or his message to us
contained anything really new. Kubis stressed he was just
passing the message, not making any case and not pursuing the
matter further. Kubis specifically informed Slovak PermRep to
the UN Burian that there was nothing fundamentally new in
Mottaki,s ideas, and instructed him to continue his efforts
in the UNSC as Slovakia had planned, i.e., supporting further
Chapter VII sanctions. We would guess Mottaki will be
conveying the same message at his other stops on this trip,
including Italy, Slovenia, Belgium and Switzerland.
2. (S) On the nuclear issue, Mottaki,s bottom line message
was a plea for Slovak support in getting the UNSC to issue a
statement (Presidential or press) rather than passing a
second resolution. Protesting unconvincingly to Kubis that,
of course, Iran was not afraid of a resolution, Mottaki said
the GOI understood that the UNSC had to take some action.
But that if the UNSC would forego a resolution for awhile,
the GOI would "agree to the additional IAEA protocol" on
further controls and verification. The GOI would then be
ready to engage in 4-6 weeks of discussion on the larger
issues. "What is the rush?", Mottaki asked. Kubis said he
told Mottaki that the international community,s "rush" was
prompted by the Iranians, rush to enrich uranium. Mottaki
claimed Iran was ready "to do many things," including looking
into the idea of a mutual suspension of enrichment and
sanctions. But the proper environment had to be created to do
so, and that meant no resolution now. Kubis told the
Ambassador, however, that he did not get the sense Iran was
really willing to suspend enrichment. He noted, for example,
that Mottaki had said Iran would be willing to consider
al-Baradei,s time out proposal, but only after the
environment had been prepared by the adoption of a statement
vice resolution. Kubis said that the only thing he heard from
Mottaki that he had not heard previously was Mottaki,s
reference to the recent developments with North Korea and the
possibility of looking at that as a model. Kubis said
privately and publicly that the GOS would continue to back
further sanctions. Mottaki commented that sanctions did not
work, and that the U.S. would not be able to sow dissension
within Iran with such measures.
3. (S) At the end of the dinner, Mottaki asked to speak to
Kubis privately, then said he had a message for the USG. Iran
understands the importance of the situation in Iraq. Given
that it is a top USG priority, Iran was ready to discuss this
and non-Iraq issues with the US, if the environment were
"ripe" (i.e., no UNSC resolution). Mottaki claimed the Iraqi
government would have Tehran,s cooperation regardless of
what happened with a resolution, but without a quid pro quo,
the GOI would do nothing to help the US Administration in
Iraq. Mottaki claimed to Kubis that Amb. Khalilzad had
approached the Iranian representative twice during the
Baghdad Neighbors' conference on March 10 to discuss a
bilateral meeting/channel for communication, but that Mottaki
responded that a channel already existed, and that Iran would
not participate in a different one.
4. (S) FM Kubis also emphasized that the GOS had refused
Mottaki,s request to see PM Fico. The Iranians told the
Slovaks in the run-up to the visit that Mottaki would be
seeing the heads of government in Italy, Belgium and
Slovenia. When The Slovaks told Mottaki he would not be
seeing Fico (Kubis strongly recommended to the PM that he
decline, and Fico did),Mottaki said he would the reconsider
whether he should come at all. The GOS told the GOI that
decision was up to Mottaki, but Kubis would be the highest
level available. Obviously, Mottaki came. Mottaki also asked
Kubis to visit Tehran. Kubis said the circumstances were not
appropriate for a visit now.
VALLEE