FICO: I WILL NOT ALLOW MY GOVERNMENT TO BE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000133 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KOC YI LO SUBJECT: FICO: I WILL NOT ALLOW MY GOVERNMENT TO BE ISOLATED FROM THE EU ON KOSOVO Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for reason 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Fico told the Ambassador that he will not allow his government to be isolated in Europe on the issue of Kosovo, which is what he believes to be the aim of opposition leader Mikulas Dzurinda. Fico expressed firm support for FM Kubis, who in turn gave public remarks expressing firm support for Ahtisaari and emphasizing the importance of European unity on the issue of Kosovo. Given the positive messages coming from the government and the leading coalition party, we recommend that Slovakia be brought into the UNSCR drafting process as soon as possible. End summary. ¶2. (C) In a 1 1/2 hour long breakfast meeting March 2, Prime Minister Robert Fico (Smer party) told the Ambassador that he would not allow his government to be isolated in Europe on the Kosovo issue. Fico theorized that opposition leader (former PM) Mikulas Dzurinda was using Kosovo as a domestic political issue because he has no other issue that resonates. Fico believes Dzurinda wants to force the Fico government into isolation from the rest of Europe. Fico seemed very determined to make certain his government was respected in European and transatlantic circles. Fico appreciated the support the embassy and USG officials were giving to Foreign Minister Jan Kubis, especially in emphasizing bluntly to Dzurinda that Slovakia must not derail European consensus in support of Ahtisaari's plan for final status. ¶3. (C) Fico's domestic strategy includes trying to ensure that the Kosovo does not become an issue of debate in Parliament. He said he planned to speak to coalition partner Jan Slota of the Slovak National Party and ask that SNS withdraw its draft parliamentary declaration on Kosovo, saying that parliament is not the place to resolve the issue. If, despite all attempts by the government and international partners, a parliamentary resolution sponsored by SDKU or SNS comes to the floor, Fico is certain that coalition parties Smer and HZDS, plus opposition Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) will have the votes to block it. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador explained that U.S. embassy officers as well as officials such as EUR DAS Rosemary diCarlo were having private discussions with the entire range of Slovak politicians. Fico encouraged the U.S. to continue these activities and our support for Kubis. He said the Kosovo status discussions were politically sensitive for the GOS, although "among the population at the gas stations" there was little concern about Kosovo other than the ten percent of Slovaks that support SNS. ¶5. (C) Fico asked about the Russian position on Kosovo. The Ambassador explained that although the Russians were not happy, they had never told us they would block the final resolution. EU unity, and an affirmative Slovak vote in New York, were essential to send the right signal to Russia. Fico said he would discuss Kosovo during his April 3-4 visit to Moscow, and offered to de-brief the Ambassador afterwards. Fico said he was suprised how well-informed the Chinese were on the Kosovo issue during his recent visit to Beijing. The Pro-Status Parties -------------- ¶6. (C) Fico's position, as expressed in private, seems to be moving in the right direction. We got a foretaste of this during EUR DAS Rosemary diCarlo's February 28 meeting with other Smer party members, including Chair of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Boris Zala. Zala had just returned from Berlin where he met with Martti Ahtisaari, Javier Solana, and German FM Steinmeyer. He expressed Slovakia's "emotional experience of history" and said it was painful to accept a country being forced to be split. But his bottom line was that Slovakia was realistic and understood there was no other way. He made a plea for strong language from EU and U.S. leaders, and perhaps even in the draft resolution, that Kosovo must be understood as a unique case and not a precendent. ¶7. (C) SMK leaders told DAS DiCarlo of their committment to: --uphold EU unity; --endorse a UNSCR; --support Ahtisaari and the contact group; --protect human and minority rights, as well as religious and cultural monuments; and --push for swift integration of Western Balkans countries to the EU. Hungarian party leaders resent the use of fictional Hungarian demands for autonomy as an excuse for Slovak politicians to support a position counter to the EU consensus. The guarantees in the Ahtisaari plan to protect minority rights of Serbs is more relevant to SMK than the prospect of ethnically-based demands for independence. ¶8. (C) Vladimir Meciar's party, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS),is saying the right things about European unity and the need for Serbia to move forward toward European integration. The Parties Opposed to Independence -------------- ¶9. (C) The Slovak National Party has its own warped view of history and will never be convinced to support independence for Kosovo. An SNS MP told DiCarlo, "Serbia was never a multi-ethnic state, it has always been a Serb Nation with ethnic minorities," causing the SMK MP present to nearly fall out of his chair. The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) does not like the prospect of independence for Kosovo, but has neither the political clout domestically nor the desire to oppose its partners internationally to take a leading role in the debate. ¶10. (C) The most worrisome opposition voice continues to be that of Dzurinda's SDKU. It believes that Slovakia can move the EU position and buy more time for Serbia and argues unconvincingly that this might lead to some movement in the Serb position toward compromise. SDKU insiders have told us that they are determined to pursue their parliamentary resolution, although they understand they don't have the votes to pass it. (Comment: Since pursuing the resolution will have no practical impact on the government, it is clearly designed to embarrass the Fico government domestically and internationally. We, and other contact group embassies (especially German and UK) continue to emphasize that the issue of Kosovo is too important to play domestic political games. End comment) Kubis is Consistent -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In remarks to the press after his March 2 meeting with Ahtisaari in Vienna, FM Kubis said that SDKU's position on Kosovo (that Slovakia would not accept independence for Kosovo without the agreement of Serbia) had shocked partners in the EU. Kubis stressed that such a position would isolate Slovakia in the EU and NATO and could even lead to the inability to adopt the necessary UNSCR. Kubis repeated that Slovakia must take care to ensure that the resolution of Kosovo's status will guarantee security and stability in the region and a European perspective for Serbia and Kosovo. European unity is essential, he said, and confirmed that on the question of Kosovo, EU unity exists. Comment: -------------- ¶12. (C) The Ambassador was somewhat encouraged after his meeting with Fico by three specific points: --Fico expressed clear support for FM Kubis. --Fico does not want Slovakia to be the European outlier. --Fico does not believe most Slovak voters are interested in Kosovo's final status. What Fico did not say was how Slovakia would vote on the UNSCR. Nonetheless, Fico's message, combined with Kubis' public statement, was positive enough that we recommend Slovakia be brought into the UNSCR drafting process as soon as possible. Allowing Slovakia to point to success (perhaps including specific language important to Slovakia in the UNSCR) will show domestically that the government is involved in the process; this buy-in will make them more likely to vote enthusiastically and affirmatively when the time comes. VALLEE