SLOVAKIA'S DEBATE ON KOSOVO STILL SIMMERING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000102 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV YI KOC LO SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA'S DEBATE ON KOSOVO STILL SIMMERING REF: A. BRATISLAVA 87 ¶B. FEB 17 HOH-VALLEE EMAIL Classified By: CDA Lawrence Silverman for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Kosovo remains a delicate topic in Slovak politics, with both opposition and government parties vying to show the strongest support for Serbia, and the MFA struggling to maintain room to maneuver. The final say on Slovakia's position will come from PM Fico. Key will be whether he can be persuaded to look beyond his normal political horizon -- somewhere within Slovakia's borders -- and instead defer to the need to help the international community settle this problem now and to avoid damage to Slovakia's image abroad. End summary. President Gasparovic Cools Tempers -------------- ¶2. (C) After both the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) submitted resolutions for parliamentary approval 2/12 that called for the rejection of any final status for Kosovo to which Serbia did not agree (ref A),President Ivan Gasparovic summoned political party leaders to the presidential palace to discuss the issue. Although Gasparovic himself has a pro-Serb bias and personally opposes independence for Kosovo, his intervention served to calm heads and buy time. The political parties decided to wait until parliament resumes its regular session March 20, rather than calling for an extraordinary session on Kosovo. In public statements, party leaders stressed the need for a united Slovak position, and voiced support for the continuation of negotiations led by S/E Martti Ahtisaari. MFA PolDir Miroslav Lajcak told DCM 2/15 that Gasparovic had been quite helpful. Opposition Leader Dzurinda Still Won't Budge -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador explained U.S. views on Kosovo to SDKU Chair (and former PM) Mikulas Dzurinda 2/14, arguing that a binding parliamentary resolution requiring Slovakia to vote against independence for Kosovo at the UNSC would alienate Slovakia from its transatlantic partners and further destabilize the Balkans. Dzurinda argued emotionally that he felt in his heart Ahtisaari's plan would not work, and would radicalize the region. Dzurinda clearly relished an upcoming fight in Parliament that would give him the chance to take on the Fico government. He admitted that perhaps the language of his draft resolution was too strong and could be modified, but would not agree to withdraw it. In a subsequent conversation with EUR A/S Fried, Dzurinda expressed concern about use of Kosovo as a precedent in other conflicts, humiliating treatment of Serbia, and implications for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia (ref B). Lajcak told us 2/15 that he had spoken to both former FM Eduard Kukan and former advisor to the PM Milan Jezovica, and that Jezovica was very stubborn. Strong collaborators in the past, they had exchanged sharp words over this issue. We also heard that Kubis had tried talking to Dzurinda directly, but made no progress. MFA Working Hard to Persuade Public and Politicians -------------- -------------- ¶4. (U) Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Jan Kubis continued his diplomatic efforts on the homefront. In a 2/13 op-ed in daily "Pravda," he argued that Slovakia must be a responsible international partner. At a pre-scheduled 2/13 talk on Slovakia's foreign policy priorities hosted by think tank Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA),he asked rhetorically why Slovak politicians were so worked up about Kosovo? He recognized the high level of empathy and friendship toward Serbia, but also urged that Slovaks not make decisions based on speculation about the end result of status negotiations. He railed against politicians who would "tie the government's hands." He frankly said that it reflected a tremendous lack of self-confidence on the part of Slovaks to have an irrational fear of some "precedent" for the Hungarian minority. He added that Slovaks had no reason to be insecure, and it was time Slovaks "got over it." The unique circumstances of the Serb government's massive violation of human rights that led to NATO intervention could never be applied in Slovakia. EU unity is crucial. ¶5. (C) Lajcak said that Slovak Ambassador to Washington Rastislav Kacer had written a very good, strong cable home after his 2/13 meeting with DASes Pekala and DiCarlo, and had also called Kukan and Jezovica. The message of the MFA to SDKU leaders has been consistent: "Do not tie our hands." On the cocktail circuit, MFA officials are telling concerned diplomats that FM Kubis is working on the domestic situation and that everything is in control and will work out fine. Privately, however, Lajcak admitted that Kubis is a diplomat, not a politician, and he underestimated the domestic difficulties. Lajcak said the MFA does not know what to expect, including from PM Fico himself, and that the situation is NOT under control. He expressed gratitude for U.S. support and intervention with the politicians. ¶6. (C) Lajcak was also glad that respected leaders of the NGO community, such as (former ambassador to the U.S.) Martin Butora of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO) and Milan Nic of Pontis Foundation, had given helpful media interviews. Lajcak expressed frustration that in the furor over Kosovo, no one speaks about Slovak interests ("we're more Serbian than the Serbs"); no one speaks about Slovakia's duties/responsibilities as EU, NATO, UNSC members, and its relations with the most important strategic partners; and that a complete lack of self-confidence still exists regarding Hungarians. ¶7. (C) Following up on Lajcak's earlier message to us that Serbia's bottom line was "No UN membership for Kosovo and no change in Serbia's borders," he suggested that UN membership is symbolic for Kosovo, but not really necessary. More important is membership in other international organization and international financial institutions. Perhaps there was room for flexibility on the timing of such memberships that would undermine the Slovak political parties' argument that Serbs were being "humiliated." On borders, Lajcak firmly believes that smart lawyers should be able to find the right language to solve this issue. Concerned Diplomats -------------- ¶8. (C) Both the German Ambassador and the UK Charge d'Affairs consulted us 2/16 on next steps. They agree that demarching the MFA on Kosovo is not what is needed. The question is how to influence PM Fico, who in the end can make or break the MFA's position on Kosovo at the UNSC. The UK embassy is recommending a Blair-Fico pull-aside at the March 8-9 meeting of the EU Council (prime minister's meeting) but only if Merkel will do it first. Both Blair and Merkel, we have heard from diplomats here, have been loathe to meet bilaterally with Fico. In addition, the UK embassy is recommending a senior-level call (FCO) to Dzurinda to reinforce U.S. efforts. Our British colleagues here have begun to engage with relevant politicians, and the German Ambassador is hosting a local meeting of the Quint 2/26 to discuss strategy. VALLEE