Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRASILIA431
2007-03-13 12:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

BRAZIL: U/S BURNS MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL

Tags:  PREL BR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3815
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0431/01 0721234
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131234Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8323
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 5980
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4143
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4633
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3633
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0340
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 5229
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3395
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 6783
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1027
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0184
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2164
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 6128
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 6337
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 3984
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 9377
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000431 

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CORRECTED COPY: SIGNATURE LINE ADDED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: U/S BURNS MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000431

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CORRECTED COPY: SIGNATURE LINE ADDED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: U/S BURNS MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).


1. (C) Summary. U/S Burns and WHA A/S Shannon, in Brasilia
for strategic dialogue talks with the Brazilian Foreign
Ministry (MRE),joined with Ambassador, PolCounselor and
S/P officer William McIlhenny to meet on
February 7 with Marco Aurelio Garcia, President Lula da
Silva's international affairs advisor. Garcia was
accompanied by his senior deputy, Marcel Biato. U/S Burns
provided an overview of the transition in USG global
strategy toward focus on building relations with regional
powers like Brazil, and noted the importance of
collaboration on bio-fuels to this relationship. Brazilian
views on developments in the region and Cuba also were
focal points of the discussion. In the region, Garcia said
there is a consensus on integration among disparate but
democratically elected governments that facilitates
communication and limits conflict. Brazil does not admire
Hugo Chavez's political model, but needs to pursue good
relations with Venezuela as part of a foreign
policy driven by Brazil's vital interests and
domestic economic priorities. In Cuba, it is clear Fidel
is fading rapidly and permanently, but transition scenarios
are hard to predict. The largest step the U.S. could take
to encourage a peaceful transition to democracy would be
elimination of sanctions, Garcia said. End summary.

THE REGION


2. (C) U/S Burns outlined for Garcia the ongoing shift in
USG strategic focus away from a Europe and
toward increased engagement with major and emerging
regional powers, including Brazil. U.S.-Brazil cooperation
in Haiti and the promising bilateral collaboration on
bio-fuels are building blocks for this enhanced
relationship. The USG also values Brazilian insights on
regional affairs. In that context, U/S Burns invited
Garcia to share his views on developments in the region,
especially in Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba -- all countries
Garcia has visited frequently as Lula's special envoy.


3. (C) Garcia said South America has been undergoing a
major transformation in the past several years, with
democratically elected governments seeking economic
recovery and growth, while also addressing grave social

problems. There has been at least a general consensus in
the region on the importance of integration, and that has
permitted countries with disparate political situations and
ethnic cultures to work together on many issues. While
there is still conflict, communication is more the norm,
Garcia said.


4. (C) With Venezuela, Brazil has worked to maintain a
positive dialogue, focusing on points of convergence,
e.g., joint projects in infrastructure and energy. On the
political level, "We do not agree with Chavez's path, and
it is not the one we chose," Garcia declared, echoing a
similar statement made by FM Amorim in a meeting with U/S
Burns earlier in the day. That said, Garcia said it needs
to be recognized that "Chavez is a product of Venezuela's
crisis, not its cause."


5. (C) Brazil's relationship with Argentina is "strategic,"
and is analogous in some ways to the Franco-German
relationship in Europe -- i.e., sometimes tense, but
crucial for regional stability and progress. Relations
with Chile are similarly important and growing, Garcia
said, as are Brazil's relations with Colombia. Indeed,
Brazil is practicing "variable geometry diplomacy" in the

BRASILIA 00000431 002 OF 002


region, adjusting and shifting constantly to build and
exploit opportunities in a foreign policy that is still
mainly driven by domestic priorities, he added.

CUBA


6. (C) Turning to Cuba, Garcia noted that his deputy
advisor, Marcel Biato, had just returned from five months
as Brazil's charge d'affaires in Havana, and his views were
incorporated in Garcia's perspective. Garcia said the GOB
believes it is highly unlikely Fidel Castro will ever
return to exercise real power. The waning of Fidel over
the past year had caused the Cuban population to begin
contemplating a different future, but everyone has
difficulty imagining what that future will look like,
Garcia said. Cuba, in the past forty years, had a system
built on a single charismatic figure, and that is not
sustainable. Raul Castro is not his brother and seems more
inclined to take a committee approach to leadership that is
pragmatic, at least on economic issues. Garcia was
doubtful Cuba can replicate the "China model" with economic
opening but continued centralized political control.
"China is a civilization, Cuba is not... they do not have
the patience, resources or organization" to emulate China's
approach," he opined. Moreover, Cuba today lacks an
"economic vocation," and has not been able to place its
tourism industry, its medical capacity or its bare handful
of other productive sectors into a strategy for
productivity or increased self reliance. Brazil wants to
help, and is offering to provide both assistance and
markets for Cuba, but the Cubans have to define a direction
for themselves, Garcia said.


7. (C) Asked by U/S Burns about Brazil's views on Chavez's
role in Cuba's transition, Garcia said that Cuba and
Venezuela in the near term are mutually dependent (i.e.,
"oil exchanged for expertise"),but Fidel's passing will
leave a vacuum Chavez will try to fill. However, Chavez's
brand
of strident populism "has less space to grow in Latin
America than you may think," Garcia said, and could be
curtailed if Cubans perceived other openings -- especially
if the U.S. lifted sanctions on their economy. This would
be the single biggest step the U.S. could take in easing
the transition in Cuba toward a positive direction, Garcia
opined. Conversely, the U.S. needs to avoid public
recommendations to Cubans about their political future,
since Cubans' traditional nationalism and sensitivity to
U.S. influence assure negative reactions.


8. (C) A/S Shannon said the United States has tried to
assume a careful, low-key position in public on the Cuban
transition, but the U.S. believes that others in the region
need to speak out for democracy there. If a transitional
government could take certain concrete steps -- e.g.,
release of political prisoners -- the positive reaction
within the U.S. would be considerable. But someone
other than the U.S. must pressure Cuban leaders toward such
actions, he said.
CHICOLA