SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF U/S REUBEN JEFFERY,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001581 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E FOR UNDERSECRETARY REUBEN JEFFERY AND TOM PIERCE E.0. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID ECON ETRD OTRA OVIP PGOV PREL BR SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF U/S REUBEN JEFFERY, AUGUST 19-22, 2007 REF: 07 Bogota 5894 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Your visit comes on the heels of a June setback to the Doha Round discussions, in which talks between the U.S., the EU, Brazil, and India stalled over disagreements concerning tariff cuts for goods and services and over agricultural subsidies. The Brazilian delegation, led by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, left the talks early accusing the U.S. and the EU of collaborating in advance on an agricultural position. All sides have not given up on the talks, which will continue at a multilateral WTO forum in September. On other trade issues, President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva has privately characterized the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as "off his agenda." ¶2. (SBU) While relations between the U.S. and Brazil are friendly, often the USG encounters major difficulties in gaining the cooperation of senior policymakers on issues of significant interest to the United States. Eager to assert its own influence, the Brazilian government shies away from cooperation with the USG - unless it can clearly be characterized as a reciprocal exchange among equals. In contrast, on issues involving matters perceived as technical in nature - law enforcement, science and biofuels - the GoB is eager to engage. End Summary. -------------- MACRO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) President Lula and his economic team have implemented prudent fiscal and monetary policies and pursued reform. Brazil's external accounts have improved substantially over the last three years. Nevertheless, initially reported 2006 GDP growth was only 2.9% (third worst in the hemisphere). In 2007, Brazil revised its methodology for calculating GDP and restated its 2006 GDP as 3.7%. For 2007, Brazil's Central Bank is forecasting 4.7% growth (slightly higher than most private sector forecasts). Inflation over the next three years is forecast to be in line with the central bank's annual target (4.5%). ¶4. (SBU) Buoyed by exports and investment inflows, the real has remained at appreciated levels for most of the year, allowing the government and businesses to pay down external debt. Last year, the government eliminated the last of its restructured debt from Brazil's late-1980's default. Based upon the improving external debt dynamics, Fitch IBCA upgraded its credit rating on Brazil's sovereign debt in February 2006, to BB-. ¶5. (SBU) Nonetheless, key challenges remain. The public sector-debt-to-GDP ratio is on a downward trend but remains high, at about 50%. Real interest rates are among the highest in the world; reducing them will require both reductions in the government's borrowing requirement and reform of the financial sector. Income and land distribution remain skewed. Investment and domestic savings are low, but growing. The informal sector constitutes over 40 percent of the economy, in part because the tax burden (nearly 38 percent of GDP) remains one of the highest among large developing economies. ¶6. (SBU) Sustaining high growth rates in the longer term depends on the impact of President Lula's structural reform program and efforts to build a more welcoming climate for investment, both domestic and foreign. Public-Private Partnerships, a key effort to attract private investment to infrastructure, also passed in 2004, although implementation of this initiative still awaits promulgation of the necessary regulations. Labor reform, additional tax reform and autonomy for the Central Bank were on the agenda for 2005 to 2006, but appear unlikely to be addressed at in the near term. The government still needs to improve the investment regulatory climate; to simplify torturous tax systems at the state and federal levels; and to further reform the pension system. -------------- TRADE POLICY AND MERCOSUL -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The GoB is seeking expanded trade ties with developing countries and seeks to strengthen the Mercosul customs union with Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina. Still, the Brazil-Argentine relationship is rife with trade disputes and Uruguay and Paraguay regularly complain that Brazil and Argentina reap a disproportionate share of benefits from the block. ¶8. (SBU) Yet the bloc remains engaged in external trade negotiations. In 2004, Mercosul concluded free trade agreements with Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru, adding to its existing agreements with Chile and Bolivia to establish a commercial base for the newly-launched South American Community of Nations. Mercosul is BRASILIA 00001581 002 OF 003 in the process of upgrading Venezuela's status from associate to full membership (Venezuela has yet to commit to the Mercosul common trade policy). The block has been drawn into the orbit of Chavez's suggestion to form a Bank of the South. In addition to Cuba, the bloc is currently exploring free trade talks with Israel, the Dominican Republic, Panama and states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as trying to build on partial trade liberalization agreements concluded with India and South Africa in 2004. In an August 2007 visit to Mexico, President Lula made overtures on improving the countries' bilateral trade relationship. ¶9. (SBU) China has increased in importance as an export market for Brazilian soy, iron ore and steel becoming Brazil's fourth largest trading partner. Impelled by a stronger real, China is set to become in 2007, the second largest exporter to Brazil, passing Argentina and second only to the U.S. Low-priced Chinese imports, particularly in the textile, footwear, and toy sectors, are now threatening to displace domestic Brazilian production. Brazilian industry leaders and GoB officials have underlined that concern over the impact of Chinese imports on domestic manufacturers is one root cause behind their unwillingness to agree to the non-agricultural tariff cuts proposed by both the USG and the EU during the Doha Round. -------------- DOHA AGENDA - WTO -------------- ¶10. (SBU) While Brazil emphasizes South-South trade through Mercosul's bilateral negotiations; it has used the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations as the main forum for engaging with developed country partners. Brazil leads the G-20 group of developing countries in pressing for agricultural trade reform in the DDA. Even before the June 2007 G-4 meetings failed to reach an agreement on agricultural subsidies and non-agricultural market access, Brazil appeared to be hedging its bets by seeking out bilateral and regional trade agreements, working through the Mercosul framework. -------------- BIOFUELS -------------- ¶11. (U) Brazil's ethanol program is a model for the world in terms of alternative energy. Brazil's comparative advantage is its ability to inexpensively produce ethanol from sugarcane, which has the highest starch content of any plant stock. In addition to obtaining five harvests from one planting, cane hulls are used to power the conversion process. Cane also requires less processing than ethanol produced from corn. At the pump, ethanol receives favorable tax treatment from the Brazilian government. It is exempted from the largest federal tax on gasoline (CIDE) and is subject to lower rates on two other federal levies (PIS and COFINS). Nevertheless, ethanol prices can vary substantially from state to state. In contrast, gasoline prices vary less and are controlled by the government. ¶12. (SBU) Since the 1980s, Brazil has attempted to promote ethanol fuel exports to the United States. U.S. tariffs and charges make Brazilian imports less competitive. In addition to import tariffs of 1.9 to 2.5 percent, the U.S. imposes a 54 cents/gallon surcharge on ethanol imported for use as fuel, which has led to a strong Brazilian push to lower or eliminate it. Given the requirements of its fast-growing domestic market, Brazil may not be able to produce enough ethanol to supply international markets. Some estimate that over the next one to two years, the maximum percentage of Brazil's cane crop that could be devoted to ethanol production is 54%. If so, this would mean that Brazilian ethanol production is already running at 95 percent of capacity; and the country's ability to expand its sugarcane acreage is limited to perhaps 20 percent over the next 3-4 years. -------------- AGRICULTURE -------------- ¶13. (U) Agriculture is a major sector of the Brazilian economy, and accounts for 13% of GDP (and 30% when including agribusiness) and 33% of Brazilian exports. Brazil is the world's largest producer of sugar cane, coffee, tropical fruits, frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ),and has the world's largest commercial cattle herd (50% larger than the U.S.) at 180 million head. Brazil is also an important producer of soybeans (second to the United States),corn, cotton, cocoa, tobacco, and forest products. The remainder of agricultural output is in the livestock sector, mainly the production of beef and poultry (second to the U.S.),pork, milk, and seafood. BRASILIA 00001581 003 OF 003 -------------- FOREIGN POLICY -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Brazil has long seen itself as the natural leader of the region and covets a permanent UN Security Council (UNSC) seat. President Lula has run an activist foreign policy with a focus on South America and the Third World, seeking to forge alliances with other mid-sized powers (South Africa, India, etc.)- the 'South-South Policy.' Lula has refused to condemn Cuba for human rights violations and, in fact, has pushed for Cuban membership in the Rio Group and a Cuba-Mercosul trade pact. The GoB has worked to increase both its economic and political ties with Venezuela. Enhanced integration of the two countries' energy sectors is high on its agenda. Lula has been especially solicitous of Chavez. In the past, Lula has praised the Venezuelan President's democratic credentials and declared that the Chavez government had been demonized by its foes. Recently, rifts have appeared over Venezuela's apparent involvement in Bolivia's decision to nationalize its oil and gas industry and Chavez's biting remarks to Brazilian Congress members who condemned the GoV's decision to close an independent television station. -------------- ENVIRONMENT -------------- ¶15. Internationally, Brazil is an energetic advocate on environmental issues and strongly supports the Kyoto Protocol. The GoB is actively involved in international climate negotiations and strongly supports the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) where Brazil has taken an active role in the discussion of reducing emissions from deforestation. Brazil has proposed a "results oriented" fund, which is not consistent with USG policy on climate change. Thus far, Brazilian reaction to President Bush's Global Climate Change (GCC) initiative has been lukewarm - they fear it will undermine the work of the UNFCCC. -------------- Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) -------------- ¶16. On April 30, 2007, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) elevated Brazil to "Watch List" status in its Special 301 Annual Report as a result of the country's progress, particularly in copyright protection and IPR enforcement. Included in the USTR announcement was notice that Brazil will be subject to an Out-of-Cycle Review to monitor its progress on outstanding IPR concerns and to evaluate the sustainability of recent enforcement progress. --Compulsory Licensing ¶17. (SBU) On May 4, 2007 the GoB announced the issuance of a compulsory license for Merck Pharmaceutical's HIV/AIDS medicine Stocrin. GOB officials cited cost reduction for their free HIV/AIDS public health program as the motivation for this action. In contrast, some pharmaceutical Industry representatives feel new Minister of Health Jose Gomes Temporao was driven more by ideology than by concern of future damage to Brazil's investment climate as a result of this action. The current situation between Merck and the GoB is extremely tense, with bad feelings on both sides. SOBEL