Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BRASILIA1000
2007-06-04 13:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

BRAZIL: INL A/S PATTERSON'S MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL PINR SNAR PGOV BR 
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O 041336Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9093
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 6113
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4222
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4805
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3691
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY 0344
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 5389
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3473
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 6910
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1031
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE PRIORITY 0189
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2222
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 6261
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 6739
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 4509
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 0012
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001000 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR SNAR PGOV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: INL A/S PATTERSON'S MEETING WITH
INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY MINISTER FELIX

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001000 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 TAGS: PREL PINR SNAR PGOV BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL: INL A/S PATTERSON'S MEETING WITH INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY MINISTER FELIX Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). ¶1. (C). Summary. INL Assistant Secretary Patterson and Ambassador Sobel, accompanied by DCM, Embassy Regional Affairs Chief, and PolCounselor, met on 14 May with General Jorge Armando Felix, chief of the ministerial-level Office of Institutional Security (GSI) in Brazil's Presidency. Felix was accompanied by Paulo Uchoa, head of Brazil's National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD) and other senior officials. Discussion focused on the threat posed to Brazil and the region by Bolivia's expanding coca production, and the violent organized crime gangs that threaten civil order in Rio and Sao Paulo. Felix provided detailed analysis of both problems. He enthusiastically welcomed A/S Patterson and Ambassador Sobel's proposals for Brazil to send a team to study new U.S.-Mexico initiatives in cooperation in law enforcement, and for reinvigorating the U.S.-Brazil law enforcement working group. He also welcomed expanding intelligence cooperation and appeared supportive of possible Brazilian naval contribution at JIATF in Key West. Details are provided below. End summary. ¶2. (C) Felix, a retired army general, combines within his office functions analogous in the U.S. system to the Director of National Intelligence and the White House ONDCP. He oversees Brazil's civilian intelligence service (ABIN),as well as the national drug prevention program (SENAD),and his office houses an interagency crisis management and strategic research nucleus, the only center of its kind in the GOB. He opened the meeting with warm welcoming remarks and expressions of his interest in continuing and expanding intelligence cooperation with the United States, which he characterized as "already excellent." The meeting then moved to specific discussion of key threat issues confronting Brazil. BOLIVIAN COCAINE AND BRAZIL ¶3. (C) General Felix said Brazil had, for many years, viewed itself as primarily a corridor country for narcotics outbound to other countries. The brutal reality of violent, drug-driven crime in Brazil's cities has shattered that outlook, Felix said, and huge quantities of cocaine and other drugs appear in large and small Brazilian communities throughout the country. In that context, Brazil is viewing developments in Bol
ivia with growing alarm. "We are clearly the target" for the low-grade coca based narcotics produced in Bolivia, which are flooding Brazilian cities, with "devastating" social consequences, he said. The GOB has attempted various "indirect channels" as well as policy suggestions (e.g., crop substitution) with the Bolivians to address Brazilian concerns about increasing coca production, but the Bolivians always fall back on the "traditional crop" argument, which shuts down further discussion, Felix said. SENAD Director Uchoa, who chaired the most recent OAS CICADE meeting, added that Bolivia remained intransigently committed to this position and seems to eschew alternative development proposals, despite the vociferous appeals and complaints of almost all of the countries represented at the meeting. ¶4. (C) A/S Patterson said the USG continues also to watch with deep concern the increase in coca production over the past year in Bolivia, and noted statistics that supported the perception that much of the narcotics produced were heading to Brazil. Hence Bolivia poses a threat most immediately to its neighbors, but the U.S. is also deeply concerned that Colombian and Mexican cartels may move into Bolivia, as they flee pressures in their countries and seek Bolivia's more inviting environment. A/S Patterson also outlined mounting USG concern that Venezuela -- which once had rigorous counter-narcotics enforcement -- has now become a virtual BRASILIA 00001000 002 OF 003 open house for narcotics trafficking, with the U.S. estimating that 90 percent of the drugs transiting Venezuela are bound for the United States. Ambassador Sobel added that possible FARC-Venezuelan collaboration, as well as the increase in trans-Venezuela trafficking activities should be a concern of all nations in region, along with the increase in Bolivian coca production. Ambassador Sobel and A/S Patterson both stressed the importance of Brazil's government speaking out forcefully about these concerns, since U.S. influence over Bolivia is limited. Ambassador Sobel noted as an example that Felix's recent testimony on Bolivian narcotics before Brazil's congress had received wide attention in Bolivia, pointing up the influence of Brazilian views. ORGANIZED CRIMINAL VIOLENCE ¶5. (C) A/S Patterson indicated the USG's interest in cooperating with Brazil in its efforts to combat the large and violent organized crime groups that terrorize some Brazilian cities, especially Rio and Sao Paulo, and she asked Felix for his views. Felix observed that the main organized crime gangs -- the PCC in Sao Paulo and Red Command in Rio -- are not structured on a traditional "mafia" paradigm seen in the U.S. and elsewhere. Rather, the groups are more diffuse, and operate in a cellular structure that works on three levels -- small-time criminals, their suppliers (drugs, guns) and the commanders -- but in a loose and non-linear fashion. This can make penetrating and combating the groups difficult, Felix said. ¶6. (C) Narcotics, as well as extortion rackets and robbery, fund the gangs but various factors -- beyond the evident issue of wide-spread poverty -- contribute to their growth in Brazilian society, Felix said. Brazil's prison system is "fragile and flawed," with over-crowding, poor facilities and insufficient control. Moreover, the experience of military dictatorship in Brazil had led the society in the early years of democratic rule to place, at times, a high value on liberties and rights of prisoners, at the expense of the prime mission of prisons -- protecting society from criminals, Felix opined. Constitutional and legal guarantees permitting prison conditions in which gang leaders can openly recruit cadres, intimidate guards and officials, and command major criminal operations outside the prison walls have to be re-assessed and changed, he said. Brazil's police are another part of the problem, Felix said. Lacking sufficient pay, training and resources in many states -- and with the quality of the forces varying vastly depending on states' wealth and commitment to order -- they are often ineffective and vulnerable to corruption and intimidation. Insufficient government force in "ungoverned spaces" and lack of public engagement in combating crime are other challenges, Felix added. ¶7. (C) Felix said the recent request from Rio's governor for federal assistance -- including use of the Brazilian army -- to deal with Rio's rampant violent crime offers an opportunity to try to construct a model for federal intervention in intense crime scenarios that, if successful, can have broader application. The GSI, the federal Public Safety Secretariat (SENASP),Federal Police and Brazilian defense ministry are all involved in an effort to develop this model, Felix said. A/S Patterson asked about use of the Brazilian military in law enforcement missions, and Felix explained that there are legal and constitutional issues, but the army can perform public order missions. The developing federal-state approach in Rio will likely feature army troops taking over "visibility" and routine public order missions from state police, freeing the police to devote more personnel and resources to "chasing the bandits," Felix BRASILIA 00001000 003 OF 003 explained. In a chilling observation, Felix opined that there is some reluctance in the GOB to fully committing the army to the law enforcement fight, "because the army is our last resort, and if it fails, what do we do then?" Information sharing among law enforcement agencies and the military also needs to be improved and streamlined, he said. ¶8. (C) A/S Patterson compared the Brazilian crime crisis with Mexico's experience, and steps that the GOM is taking to enhance police effectiveness and curb intense violence, especially in border areas. The U.S. is working with the GOM in innovative new ways to support this effort, A/S Patterson and Ambassador Sobel asked Felix whether Brazil would be interested in studying Mexico's plans, and offered to facilitate such a project. Felix responded very positively, and said he would put together an appropriate experts group for the project, and then be prepared to discuss it further with the USG and GOM. (Note: Emboffs learned subsequently that Felix's office has already contacted the Mexican Embassy to follow up on this proposal bilaterally. End note.) ¶9. (C) Ambassador Sobel also offered to work with the GOB to re-invigorate the bilateral law enforcement working group, focusing it on contemporary crisis issues and more robust cooperative programs, and to discuss further the possibility of increased Brazilian navy participation at JIATF in Key West. Felix responded enthusiastically to both proposals, and indicated his availability for further engagement. ¶10. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Patterson.

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