Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA8117
2007-11-19 17:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:
USG SUPPORT FOR GOC EFFORTS TO COMBAT
VZCZCXYZ0015 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHBO #8117/01 3231751 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 191751Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0163 INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9556 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV 9068 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5646 RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0830 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6308 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4176 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1514 RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUCNDTA/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1867
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 008117
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS MARR PTER UN CO
SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR GOC EFFORTS TO COMBAT
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS
REF: A. BOGOTA 4340
B. BOGOTA 7395
Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------
SUMMARY
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 008117
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS MARR PTER UN CO
SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR GOC EFFORTS TO COMBAT
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS
REF: A. BOGOTA 4340
B. BOGOTA 7395
Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Colombian Government has made ending extrajudicial
killings (EJES) a top priority, with Defense Minister Santos
and Prosecutor General Iguaran instituting steps to
facilitate civilian investigation of combat deaths, end
jurisdictional disputes between military and civilian courts,
and change promotions/rewards criteria for military personnel
that may contribute to such killings. An interagency group
at post works with the GOC to support its efforts to combat
EJES and promote a transparent, timely investigative process.
Human rights groups and GOC sources estimate the number of
EJES will range from 180-240 in 2007. UNHCHR has no evidence
to suggest that rural community leaders are targeted, as some
human rights groups allege. Most victims are young, poorly
educated peasants--through a small percentage of victims
appear to have links to insurgents groups. We will organize
a conference with senior Colombian military and civilian
officials to highlight the importance of this issue, agree on
an action plan to implement specific policy changes, and
ensure the availability of adequate resources. END SUMMARY.
--------------
DIFFERING CALCULATIONS OF EJES
--------------
2. (C) Calculating the number of EJES remains a challenge due
to lack of information and difficulty in determining what
constitutes such killings. Data from the local UN High
Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR) office, human rights
groups, and GOC authorities indicate the number of such
alleged killings in 2007 will likely range from 180 to 240.
This number appears roughly consistent with last year's
figures. The Inspector General's office (Procuraduria),the
Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoria) and other GOC agencies
recognize 1017 victims between 2002-2007. The Prosecutor
General's office (Fiscalia) has basic data (including full
names) on only 648 of these victims.
3. (C) An October report by the International Commission on
Extrajudicial Executions (a coalition of various human rights
groups) cites 955 victims of EJES between 2002-2007. The
group estimates 236 killings between July 2006 and June 2007.
The UNHCHR and human rights groups say this represents a
sharp increase over the period 2000-2002, but the lack of
detail regarding these case, especially in earlier years,
makes this hard to document. The human rights groups charge
that many victims are community leaders, and link the
perceived increase to the paramilitary demobilization.
UNHCHR officials and Fiscalia Human Rights unit prosecutors
say they have no evidence to support these contentions,
noting that most victims constitute young, poorly educated
peasants. Still, UNHCHR says some EJE victims appear to have
links to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
Army of National Liberation (ELN) or other criminal groups.
--------------
POSSIBLE CAUSES
--------------
4. (C) Multiple factors account for EJES. The UNHCHR 2006
annual human rights report voiced concern that senior
commanders' demands for "results" against illegally armed
groups and the Army's emphasis on combat kills (bajas) as a
measure of success encourage such killings. A 30% increase
in forces since 2002, as well as a tripling of combat
operations and weak military disciplinary controls, also
contribute. The difficulties in applying Colombia's civilian
legal system to detainees in rural areas--or in many cases
the lack of any civilian judicial presence at all--also play
a role. UNHCHR reports the lack of discipline among some
military units sometimes leads to revenge killings.
5. (C) Fabrications also contribute, with the FARC telling
their members to claim any combat death as an extrajudicial
killing to undermine military operations and legitimacy.
Still, Defense Vice Minister Sergio Jaramillo and local
UNHCHR director Juan Pablo Corlazzoli agree that fabricated
cases account for only a small percentage of the total cases
reported. Human Rights unit prosecutors in Medellin have
highlighted their sensitivity to the fabrication issue, and
only initiate cases with strong evidence.
--------------
GOC ACTIONS TO COMBAT EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
--------------
6. (C) Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos and Prosecutor
General Mario Iguaran have made ending EJES, as well as
ensuring civilian investigations of all combat deaths, a
priority. The Fiscalia set up a sub-unit in its Human Rights
unit--consisting of eight prosecutors and eight assistant
prosecutors--on October 19 to expedite the investigation of
alleged security force homicides. The Fiscalia sent
additional prosecutors and investigators to work with the
regional Human Rights units in Medellin and Villavicencio to
move cases. The MOD and Fiscalia also agreed in principle to
set up civilian units to investigate all combat deaths; the
MOD would transport these units to the scene. The Fiscalia
also works with the military criminal justice Luz Marina Gil
to ensure that civilian courts judge all alleged EJES, and
ending the practice of military courts opening parallel
investigations. Medellin Human Rights unit prosecutors
praised Gil for personally intervening with military judges
to transfer cases to civilian jurisdiction.
7. (C) Santos issued an annex to Directive 10 on October 31
which highlights Armed Forces Commander Freddy Padilla's
order directing troops to immediately notify civilian
investigators of any combat death. The annex holds
commanders responsible for reporting such killings and for
cooperating with any Fiscalia investigation. The committee
set up under Directive 10 has met six times since its
creation in July 2007, and includes representatives of the
Fiscalia, the UNHCHR, the Presidential Program on Human
Rights, and the Human Rights Ombudsman's offices. The
committee has developed a detailed list of alleged
extrajudicial killings, clarified the rights of military
personnel under investigation, and monitored progress in
specific investigations.
8. (C) To address concerns that an emphasis on kills
inadvertently fosters EJES, Santos also instructed Padilla to
set up a group to develop new criteria to evaluate officers'
eligibility for promotions and awards. The group will look
to reward demobilizations or captures over kills, and to
develop promotion criteria based on commanders' successful
implementation of their overall campaign plans. The group
will also consider requiring commanders to explain the
position (i.e. front commander, finance officer, etc.) that
claimed kills held within an illegal criminal group. The MOD
hopes these measures will ease the pressure on soldiers to
show results through body count and discourage them from
killing peasants to inflate numbers. Still, Jaramillo told
us despite Minister Santos's support, several key generals
continue to resist these changes.
--------------
USG ACTIONS TO SUPPORT GOC EFFORTS
--------------
9. (C) Post has formed an interagency group--including State,
USAID, Milgroup, and the Department of Justice--to coordinate
efforts to support the GOC strategy. Our efforts will focus
on: 1) promoting cooperation between civilian and military
justice officials through cross-training, cross-assignments,
joint conferences, liaison procedures, fellowships, etc., 2)
strengthening prevention measures such as internal military
disciplinary controls and legal awareness (internal
inspectors, training/deployment of operational lawyers, rules
of engagement, promotion policies, etc.),and 3) closing the
gap between military and civilian judicial presence in the
field to facilitate civilian processing of detainees and
investigation of combat deaths (forward locating civilian
investigators, etc.). Providing civilian investigators with
the airlift and other resources needed to conduct timely,
on-site investigations of combat deaths.
10 (C) The Embassy will hold an off-site meeting with the MOD
and Fiscalia to bring together senior Colombian military and
civilian officials to highlight the importance of the issue,
confirm an action plan to implement key policy changes,
ensure the availability of resources, and identify
appropriate areas for USG assistance. Padilla and Jaramillo
consider such an event crucial to addressing the problem.
Post will report on the results of the session.
Brownfield
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS MARR PTER UN CO
SUBJECT: USG SUPPORT FOR GOC EFFORTS TO COMBAT
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS
REF: A. BOGOTA 4340
B. BOGOTA 7395
Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Colombian Government has made ending extrajudicial
killings (EJES) a top priority, with Defense Minister Santos
and Prosecutor General Iguaran instituting steps to
facilitate civilian investigation of combat deaths, end
jurisdictional disputes between military and civilian courts,
and change promotions/rewards criteria for military personnel
that may contribute to such killings. An interagency group
at post works with the GOC to support its efforts to combat
EJES and promote a transparent, timely investigative process.
Human rights groups and GOC sources estimate the number of
EJES will range from 180-240 in 2007. UNHCHR has no evidence
to suggest that rural community leaders are targeted, as some
human rights groups allege. Most victims are young, poorly
educated peasants--through a small percentage of victims
appear to have links to insurgents groups. We will organize
a conference with senior Colombian military and civilian
officials to highlight the importance of this issue, agree on
an action plan to implement specific policy changes, and
ensure the availability of adequate resources. END SUMMARY.
--------------
DIFFERING CALCULATIONS OF EJES
--------------
2. (C) Calculating the number of EJES remains a challenge due
to lack of information and difficulty in determining what
constitutes such killings. Data from the local UN High
Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR) office, human rights
groups, and GOC authorities indicate the number of such
alleged killings in 2007 will likely range from 180 to 240.
This number appears roughly consistent with last year's
figures. The Inspector General's office (Procuraduria),the
Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoria) and other GOC agencies
recognize 1017 victims between 2002-2007. The Prosecutor
General's office (Fiscalia) has basic data (including full
names) on only 648 of these victims.
3. (C) An October report by the International Commission on
Extrajudicial Executions (a coalition of various human rights
groups) cites 955 victims of EJES between 2002-2007. The
group estimates 236 killings between July 2006 and June 2007.
The UNHCHR and human rights groups say this represents a
sharp increase over the period 2000-2002, but the lack of
detail regarding these case, especially in earlier years,
makes this hard to document. The human rights groups charge
that many victims are community leaders, and link the
perceived increase to the paramilitary demobilization.
UNHCHR officials and Fiscalia Human Rights unit prosecutors
say they have no evidence to support these contentions,
noting that most victims constitute young, poorly educated
peasants. Still, UNHCHR says some EJE victims appear to have
links to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
Army of National Liberation (ELN) or other criminal groups.
--------------
POSSIBLE CAUSES
--------------
4. (C) Multiple factors account for EJES. The UNHCHR 2006
annual human rights report voiced concern that senior
commanders' demands for "results" against illegally armed
groups and the Army's emphasis on combat kills (bajas) as a
measure of success encourage such killings. A 30% increase
in forces since 2002, as well as a tripling of combat
operations and weak military disciplinary controls, also
contribute. The difficulties in applying Colombia's civilian
legal system to detainees in rural areas--or in many cases
the lack of any civilian judicial presence at all--also play
a role. UNHCHR reports the lack of discipline among some
military units sometimes leads to revenge killings.
5. (C) Fabrications also contribute, with the FARC telling
their members to claim any combat death as an extrajudicial
killing to undermine military operations and legitimacy.
Still, Defense Vice Minister Sergio Jaramillo and local
UNHCHR director Juan Pablo Corlazzoli agree that fabricated
cases account for only a small percentage of the total cases
reported. Human Rights unit prosecutors in Medellin have
highlighted their sensitivity to the fabrication issue, and
only initiate cases with strong evidence.
--------------
GOC ACTIONS TO COMBAT EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
--------------
6. (C) Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos and Prosecutor
General Mario Iguaran have made ending EJES, as well as
ensuring civilian investigations of all combat deaths, a
priority. The Fiscalia set up a sub-unit in its Human Rights
unit--consisting of eight prosecutors and eight assistant
prosecutors--on October 19 to expedite the investigation of
alleged security force homicides. The Fiscalia sent
additional prosecutors and investigators to work with the
regional Human Rights units in Medellin and Villavicencio to
move cases. The MOD and Fiscalia also agreed in principle to
set up civilian units to investigate all combat deaths; the
MOD would transport these units to the scene. The Fiscalia
also works with the military criminal justice Luz Marina Gil
to ensure that civilian courts judge all alleged EJES, and
ending the practice of military courts opening parallel
investigations. Medellin Human Rights unit prosecutors
praised Gil for personally intervening with military judges
to transfer cases to civilian jurisdiction.
7. (C) Santos issued an annex to Directive 10 on October 31
which highlights Armed Forces Commander Freddy Padilla's
order directing troops to immediately notify civilian
investigators of any combat death. The annex holds
commanders responsible for reporting such killings and for
cooperating with any Fiscalia investigation. The committee
set up under Directive 10 has met six times since its
creation in July 2007, and includes representatives of the
Fiscalia, the UNHCHR, the Presidential Program on Human
Rights, and the Human Rights Ombudsman's offices. The
committee has developed a detailed list of alleged
extrajudicial killings, clarified the rights of military
personnel under investigation, and monitored progress in
specific investigations.
8. (C) To address concerns that an emphasis on kills
inadvertently fosters EJES, Santos also instructed Padilla to
set up a group to develop new criteria to evaluate officers'
eligibility for promotions and awards. The group will look
to reward demobilizations or captures over kills, and to
develop promotion criteria based on commanders' successful
implementation of their overall campaign plans. The group
will also consider requiring commanders to explain the
position (i.e. front commander, finance officer, etc.) that
claimed kills held within an illegal criminal group. The MOD
hopes these measures will ease the pressure on soldiers to
show results through body count and discourage them from
killing peasants to inflate numbers. Still, Jaramillo told
us despite Minister Santos's support, several key generals
continue to resist these changes.
--------------
USG ACTIONS TO SUPPORT GOC EFFORTS
--------------
9. (C) Post has formed an interagency group--including State,
USAID, Milgroup, and the Department of Justice--to coordinate
efforts to support the GOC strategy. Our efforts will focus
on: 1) promoting cooperation between civilian and military
justice officials through cross-training, cross-assignments,
joint conferences, liaison procedures, fellowships, etc., 2)
strengthening prevention measures such as internal military
disciplinary controls and legal awareness (internal
inspectors, training/deployment of operational lawyers, rules
of engagement, promotion policies, etc.),and 3) closing the
gap between military and civilian judicial presence in the
field to facilitate civilian processing of detainees and
investigation of combat deaths (forward locating civilian
investigators, etc.). Providing civilian investigators with
the airlift and other resources needed to conduct timely,
on-site investigations of combat deaths.
10 (C) The Embassy will hold an off-site meeting with the MOD
and Fiscalia to bring together senior Colombian military and
civilian officials to highlight the importance of the issue,
confirm an action plan to implement key policy changes,
ensure the availability of resources, and identify
appropriate areas for USG assistance. Padilla and Jaramillo
consider such an event crucial to addressing the problem.
Post will report on the results of the session.
Brownfield