COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q3'07

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007625 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR MCAP OAS CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE - Q3'07 REF: A. BOGOTA 297 ¶B. BOGOTA 3096 ¶C. BOGOTA 4995 ¶D. BOGOTA 6668 Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield - Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The following reflects the Country Team's quarterly review of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and GOC activities. During the third quarter of 2007, the FARC shifted forces to its core territories between Meta Department and the Pacific coast -- evidently to hunker down, protect key assets, and wait out President Uribe's term. Some Colombian military (COLMIL) officers fear that force strength, mobility, and GOC resources remain insufficient to control all of the national territory. If the FARC moved further east to escape COLMIL pressure, it would pose less of a national security threat but could continue narcotrafficking. To offset its military setbacks, the FARC has tried to strengthen its political influence over local governments through pre-election violence and intimidation. The main combat areas remained the same as in prior quarters, though with increased activity on the southern border. End Summary. -------------- FARC Focus on the Meta-Valle Corridor -------------- ¶2. (C) The FARC appears to have reinforced its fronts between Meta and the Pacific coast to protect its historic heartland in Meta, lines of communication and logistics in Tolima and Huila, and transportation corridors for drugs and supplies in Valle. After earlier reports that the FARC had moved fighters to Meta from Antioquia, Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O) now detects movement of FARC forces from eastern Meta/Vichada and Amazonas. Tolima, Huila, Cauca and Valle del Cauca bore the brunt of attacks against police and political candidates ahead of the October 28 local elections. FARC presence has also grown in northern Tolima near Bogota, as the FARC seeks to fill the vacuum left by the paramilitary demobilization. On the Pacific coast, FARC forces have moved northward from Narino and Cauca to the Cali-Buenaventura corridor. These moves suggest the FARC may be protecting its core coca-growing territories and drug exfiltration routes while waiting for the end of President Uribe's term in 2010. -------------- Concern for Momentum -------------- �00A; ¶3. (C) The GOC's sustained military offensives in the Omega zone of Meta, Caqueta, and Guaviare Departments have weakened the FARC but did not drive the group from its core territories. The FARC's commitment to these areas reflects its deep historic roots as well as its coca fields, infrastructure (camps, arms caches, drug labs, makeshift medical facilities, and materiel workshops),and access to Bogota. The FARC has detailed knowledge of the terrain as well as protective family ties and militia networks. Still the military has challenged the FARC's dominion, expanding troop levels along mountain corridors and penetrating Meta's jungles. The COLMIL has weakened the FARC during the last five years, but momentum has slowed due to logistical and resource constraints. With limited air-mobility assets, "mobile" brigades tend to become fixed and offensive operations hard to sustain. Long-term success remains contingent on following military force with civilian services and development. ¶4. (C) If the COLMIL succeeds in keeping the pressure on the key Meta-Valle corridor, it may push the FARC out of the region and into more sparsely populated, remote departments to the east and south. Displacement of the FARC to these areas would relieve the vast majority of the population from the FARC threat, a major achievement. The FARC would then find it difficult to rebuild the human and physical infrastructure lost in Omega. Still, given the lack of facilities, shortage of airlift, and longer supply lines, such a FARC shift would pose even greater logistical challenges for the COLMIL. Strikes against high value targets (HVTs) could help the military regain the initiative, but it needs to develop the capacity to operate simultaneously against multiple targets and to coordinate its actions with law enforcement to dismantle FARC support networks. Aerial eradication and interdiction also remain key to keeping the pressure on the FARC in these areas. -------------- Election Violence: Seeking Local Control -------------- ¶5. (C) Post expects few significant attacks during local elections on October 28, but the FARC has engaged in violence and intimidation leading up to the vote. In the 2002 and 2006 presidential and congressional elections, FARC threats to disrupt polling did not materialize, in part due to GOC security efforts. The COLMIL and police will deploy an estimated 177,000 personnel for election security. Violence against candidates continues, but at lower levels than in recent campaign seasons (Ref A). Embassy contacts state that the FARC has candidates in Florida and Pradera -- the Valle municipalities the FARC wants "demilitarized" for a humanitarian exchange. Control over local government remains important to the FARC as it attempts to offset military setbacks with political initiatives -- especially in the main cities of its target corridor like Cali, Buenaventura, Neiva, Ibague, Pereira, and Armenia. The OAS also warns of ongoing FARC efforts to rebuild intelligence and militia networks in ex-paramilitary areas (e.g. Cordoba's "Nudo de Paramillo," area, Uraba, south Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Tolima, and Narino),as a base for future terrorist or military action. -------------- Main Conflict Areas -------------- ¶6. (C) The FARC concentrated its attacks against politicians, police, and the electrical infrastructure in Colombia's southwest departments of Huila, Tolima, Cauca and Valle del Cauca. Higher combat frequency in those areas reflects more aggressive joint operations by the Third and Fifth Divisions as well as the FARC's greater willingness to engage. The three primary combat zones, similar to prior quarters, consisted of Meta, Antioquia (on its southern border with Caldas, on its northern border with Cordoba, and in Uraba),and the Montes de Maria region (Sucre/Bolivar). In the latter effort, the new Joint Decisive Action Force (FUCAD) continues on the offensive, bolstered by the police arrests of support militia and the surrender of FARC front commander Rafael Velasquez (aka El Indio). Martin Caballero remains the FUCAD's primary objective in the Montes region. ¶7. (C) Fighting continued in Catatumbo and Arauca/Casanare, with the FARC and the Army of National Liberation (ELN) issuing a joint communiqu of cooperation in the former while fighting each other in the latter. FARC-ELN combat also spilled into Venezuela. COLMIL/FARC hostilities abated in the Sierra Nevada region (Cesar/La Guajira). Buenaventura and Cali remained quiet, due to large, sustained police and Marine deployments. A new mobile brigade in Narino destroyed illegal arms caches and drug labs and drew the FARC into combat. Brigades in Putumayo took the offensive against FARC border fronts after a long lull, supported by drug eradication efforts. Harassment of manual eradicators has dropped, resulting in less casualties. Brownfield