SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY USTR JOHN

UNCLAS BOGOTA 005651 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR E STAFF TOM PIERCE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD CO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY USTR JOHN VERONEAU, AUGUST 7-12, 2007 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Post welcomes Deputy USTR John Veroneau to Colombia. With U.S. help, President Uribe has made great strides in fighting drug trafficking and terrorism. The economy is growing, the investment climate is strong, and there is both anticipation and nervousness over the fate of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) in hands of the Congress in Washington. In January, the GOC presented a Plan Colombia consolidation strategy, with a heightened emphasis on social development. USAID programs aim to strengthen democratic institutions, foster a culture of human rights, create alternative development opportunities, and assist people displaced by internal violence. Colombia's human rights record is improving. Truth about links between paramilitaries, politicians and others is coming out as a result of the paramilitary demobilization and the Justice and Peace Law process. Talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN) are focused on establishing a cease-fire agreement; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have yet to start talks with the GOC. The FARC has held three U.S. citizens for more than four years; their safe recovery is a top priority. End Summary -------------- Positive Economic Outlook -------------- ¶2. (U) Significant gains in security have helped boost the Colombian economy. 2006 GDP growth was 6.8 percent, while 2007 first quarter growth reached 8.1 percent, the highest in Colombian history. Both exports and imports grew more than 20 percent in 2006. The U.S. is Colombia's largest trade partner (approximately 40 percent of exports and 28 percent of imports). Colombian exports to the U.S. have grown USD 1 billion per year since ATPDEA's inception in late 2002, while U.S. exports to Colombia increased approximately USD 2 billion. The largest U.S. investors - Drummond (coal),ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil - are planning considerable expansion due to the improved investment climate and security situation. 2006 Foreign Direct Investment increased to USD 8.9 billion, quadruple the FDI in 2002. Although unemployment has fallen from 18 percent when President Uribe took office to 11 percent, it has remained in 11-13 percent range since 2006. ¶3. (SBU) The CTPA remains the GOC's highest economic priority. The Colombian Congress approved the CTPA in June. The modification protocol signed in June was introduced in the Colombian Congress on July 20. The GOC expects a vote on the protocol in September or October. The U.S. Congress has extended trade preferences for Colombian exporters under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) through February 2008. ¶4. (SBU) There is tremendous business confidence in Colombia, and international investors are eyeing the country both for its domestic market and as a platform to reach regional markets. Standard and Poors raised Colombia's credit rating in early 2007 to a step below investment grade due to the GOC's strong fiscal performance. Political controversies have thus far not dampened the business climate; however, the international investment community is concerned over the fiscal impact of proposed changes in the transfer of funds from the central government to local governments. Inflation remains moderate, but has risen gradually in 2007 is expected end the year at between 6 and 7 percent. Meanwhile the Colombian peso has increased approximately 25 percent against the U.S. dollar in the last year, putting cost pressures on Colombian exporters and leading the GOC to impose limited currency controls in May. -------------- Labor -------------- ¶5. (U) In June 2006, the GOC, trade confederations, and business representatives signed a Tripartite Accord at International Labor Organization (ILO) in Geneva, removing Colombia from discussion in the ILO's Committee for the Application of Standards for the first time in 21 years. A resident ILO representative arrived in Colombia in January to implement the agreement committing the government to financing the ILO Special Technical Cooperation program and allocated USD 1.5 million to the Fiscalia to prosecute cases of violence against trade unionists. The GOC has assigned nearly 100 prosecutors and investigators to this task. Labor leaders and the UNHCHR's local representative praise the initiative. ¶6. (U) Although trade unionists continue to be victims of violence for political reasons and due to common crime, the GOC is determined protect labor. In 2006, the GOC's Protection Program assisted 1,200 trade unionists and 10,000 human rights activists, journalists, politicians, witnesses and other individuals under threat. -------------- U.S. Assistance -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In January, the GOC presented a Plan Colombia consolidation strategy. The proposal contains a heightened emphasis on social development, assigning new resources to human rights, displaced people, and Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. It also aims to reintegrate 42,000 demobilized ex-combatants and deserters and to promote Colombia's competitiveness and licit exports. The GOC is seeking funding from the United States and European countries. ¶8. (SBU) USG security assistance combats drug trafficking and terrorism and includes training, material aid, and technical assistance to security forces and other institutions. The US is Colombia,s most important ally and the GOC recognizes it. Colombia is the closest ally of the U.S. in the region and the GOC knows that too. -- Plan Patriota, the military campaign to re-take areas dominated by the FARC has been successful over the last three years. Terrorists have not been successful in mounting a major attack against Bogota and its environs since November 2003, although they have tried. The military is now focused well to the south in the heartland of the FARC and in some of the best coca growing regions in the country. Landmines, IEDs, disease, logistic issues, limited airborne mobility, and distance restrain the public forces, but they are nonetheless making progress. Nonetheless, the FARC remains able to launch attacks on isolated or smaller government targets, but generally avoids direct contests with larger units. -- Center for Coordinated Integral Action: With U.S. support, the GOC formed in 2005 an interagency center to facilitate delivery of social services in seven areas that have traditionally lacked state presence and been controlled by illegal armed groups. The Center focuses on providing immediate social services once security has been established, including documentation, medical care, and longer-term development projects. More than 40,000 individuals have been enrolled in state health care. Judges, investigators, and public defenders are moving into newly libnerated areas. The showpiece of this effort is San Vicente del Caguan, which served as the unofficial capital of the FARC's demilitarized zone during the peace process with President Pastrana, but now has government schools, clinics, justice services, etc. -------------- Drug Eradication and Interdiction -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and interdiction of cocaine and heroin are at record levels, but political support for aerial eradication is deteriorating in the US Congress and in Colombia. Manual eradication cannot fully replace aerial eradication without a sharp increase in expenditures. Moreover, the National Police and military forces seized over 203 metric tons of cocaine (HC1) and coca base in 2006, a near record quantity, and destroyed 200 HC1 laboratories, also a record. -------------- -------------- U.S. Assistance to Development and Democracy Building -------------- -------------- ¶10. (U) The USAID Mission in Columbia funds programs in four key strategic sectors. Alternative economic development,and economic reform; modernization of the criminal justice system, promote access to justice for disenfranchised Colombians, and human rights; demobilization/reintegration of former members of illegal armed; assistance to internally displaced persons (Colombia has between 2 and 3 million displaced persons. -------------- -------------- Military Justice and Improved Human Rights Record -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress on human rights cases involving military abuse or collaboration with paramilitaries. Human rights training is mandatory for all members of the military and police. Minister of Defense Santos has identified military justice reform as a top priority; in October, he named the first civilian - and the first woman - as director of the Military Criminal Justice System. In January 2007, MOD Santos relieved Colonel Hernan Mejia Gutierrez, a highly decorated colonel, from command of the 13th Mobile Brigade due to allegations tying him to former paramilitary leader Jorge 40. This was the first time the MOD had taken such action against an active commander for alleged paramilitary ties. The UN Human Rights Commission and private NGOS are all active here to promote human rights. Progress on certain high profile human rights cases against the public security forces has been agonizingly slow and has injured the GOCs reputation in the international community. -------------- Extradition -------------- ¶12. (SBU) President Uribe is a strong supporter of the U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship. Since taking office, he has approved over 450 extraditions to the United States ) 72 cases so far in 2007. -------------- Demobilization and Peace Process -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized since 2002, and a further 11,000 have deserted from all illegal armed groups (about half from the FARC). Some renegade former AUC members have joined new criminal Groups. This is the largest such reintegration program ever attempted and it is ongoing while the GOC continues to battle the FARC and ELN. Job creation continues to be priority one, but many of the recently demobilized have few employable skills and need both psychosocial and vocational training before they can enter the labor force. The lure of returning to illegal activity remains the &easy way8 out for them. ¶14. (SBU) The Justice and Peace Law confessions (version libres) of ex-paramilitary chiefs began with ex-leader Salvatore Mancuso testifying in December 2006. Rigorous implementation of the law and ensuring the safety of witnesses and victims are key to ensuring peace and justice in Colombia. The version libre and related processes continue to reveal truths that no other Colombian administration has come close to discovering. President Uribe strongly supports the Colombian Supreme Court's investigations into links between paramilitaries and politicians, even links between political allies and the ¶s,8 and has called for the Supreme Court,s investigative unit to probe deeper. ¶15. (SBU) The ELN has been negotiating with the GOC for well over a year, but so far without success. Prospects remain doubtful. Although the ELN retains hostages, their military capability has been dramatically degraded. -------------- U.S. Hostages -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in February 2003 are the longest held U.S. hostages in the world. Their safe release continues to be a top priority. The Colombians are providing full assistance. President Uribe has assured us that the U.S. hostages will be included in any humanitarian exchange. Drucker