CARAMAGNA SAYS "DE-PARAMILITARIZATION" OF REGIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003448 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017 TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO SUBJECT: CARAMAGNA SAYS "DE-PARAMILITARIZATION" OF REGIONS POSSIBLE Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS) Director Sergio Caramagna told PolCouns the mission's ninth quarterly report would characterize the demobilization process as positive, with the potential to lead to the "de-paramilitarization" of former paramilitary strongholds. A successful paramilitary process would not solve Colombia's structural social and economic problems, but would remove a major obstacle to addressing them. Still, Caramagna said the report would caution that the GOC's efforts to combat new criminal groups and reintegrate the demobilized would be critical to achieve a positive outcome. International support for the process would also be key. End summary. -------------- Peace Process Results Still Positive... -------------- ¶2. (C) On May 7, Caramagna shared with PolCouns an early draft of the ninth quarterly report, which judges the disarmament and demobilization process with the paramilitaries to be generally positive. The removal of over 30,000 illegal armed actors and 18,000 weapons from the conflict has allowed the GOC to reestablish itself in the regions, regain communities' confidence, and strengthen its legitimacy. Caramagna cited several advances, including a reduction in violence, a growing GOC presence in abandoned regions, the establishment of victims' groups, and the return of displaced communities to their lands. Moreover, the exposure of paramilitary abuses through the Justice and Peace Law and the para-politics scandal was helping to remove the legitimacy that the paramilitaries had enjoyed in many parts of Colombia. -------------- ...But Consolidation of GOC Efforts Crucial -------------- ¶3. (C) Caramagna said the current juncture is critical because it could lead to true "de-paramilitarization" through a truth and justice process, or it could deepen ex-paramilitary participation in narcotrafficking. The paramilitary process cannot solve Colombia's structural social, economic, and political problems, but a successful process would remove a major obstacle to addressing these issues. To achieve a positive outcome, he said the GOC would need to further strengthen state institutions, mount effective reintegration programs, and take decisive action against the emergence and expansion of new criminal groups were vital. Caramagna stressed international support GOC would be key to ensuring the process' success. -------------- -------------- IX Report Results: Rearmament and Security Tendencies -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The MAPP/OAS observed the following rearmament and security tendencies in the zones formerly controlled by the paramilitaries: A) Emergence of new criminal alliances: New strategic alliances are being formed by former paramilitaries and narcotraffickers, such as ex-Central Bolivar Bloc members and the Norte del Valle cartel. Some key ex-paramilitary leaders who did not surrender to GOC authorities, such as Vicente Castano and Pedro Olivero (Cuchillo),are behind the formation of new criminal groups in some areas. B) Leadership structures operating clandestinely: Some former demobilized mid-level commanders are secretly leading new criminal groups. It is hard to identify them since some ex-paras do not appear to have demobilized or they demobilized with a different rank. Some of the most recognized former mid-level commanders are AKA "101" and "Codazzi." C) Recruitment or displacement of demobilized: Pressures on demobilized paras to rearm increased during the time period. The pressure comes mostly from former mid-level paramilitary commanders who are urging ex-members to rearm. These pressures include death threats and selective killings of those unwilling to rearm. Many ex-paras have fled to escape such threats. The departments most affected are Cordoba, Cesar, Norte de Santander, and the Uraba region. D) Adaptability of the modus operandi of emerging criminal groups: The Public Forces' actions against these groups have weakened them, but the GOC has been unable to dismantle them completely. This was the case in southern Cordoba with the "Vencedores de San Jorge," which was hit hard by the Public Forces in early 2006 but regrouped and renamed itself "Aguilas Negras" in early 2007. E) Vulnerable populations affected: The regional dynamics unleashed by the reemergence of armed structures are affecting some vulnerable populations and communities, such as children, women, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous. For example, children and some indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have been caught in the crossfire between these criminal groups and other illegal armed groups battling for control of strategic corridors. Criminal groups are also targeting victims' organizations in some areas, as in the case with Yolanda Izquierdo who was killed in Monteria late January. F) Narcotrafficking structures taking over areas once controlled by paramilitaries: Most post-demobilization analysis expected the FARC to take over para-corridors, but in reality, most of these structures are being controlled by narcotraffickers. Very few confrontations have occurred between the FARC and the emerging criminal groups, and in some areas, such as Narino, Cauca, Caqueta and southern Choco, the two are working together. -------------- -------------- IX Report Results: GOC Reaction against Rearmament -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The MAPP/OAS Mission report notes its high-level monthly meetings with the GOC on rearmament have encouraged information sharing and sparked police or military action against the groups; the most successful operations have taken place in Caqueta, Norte de Santander, Magdalena, and Antioquia. In Norte de Santander, the GOC created its first special squadron--consisting of officials from the police, armed forces, Fiscalia, Department of Administrative Security (DAS),and Inspector General's Office--in late 2006. In its first month, the special squadron captured AKA "Sinai," a criminal group leader. The most recent high-level capture was ex-paramilitary leader Ever Veloza (Hernan Hernandez or HH),who was caught in April 2007. ¶6. (C) The MAPP/OAS Mission report recognized GOC efforts to establish a police presence in 107 administrative units or "corregimientos" in areas with large demobilized populations. The National Police reports that since 2006, the GOC has captured 1,095 criminal group members, with demobilized accounting for less than 17 percent (193) of the total. The report addressed the growing infiltration of these criminal groups into GOC regional institutions. It also warned that the Public Forces' practice in some areas of incorporating demobilized into their "red de cooperantes," has been poorly received by the public. -------------- IX Report Results: Reintegration of Ex-Paras -------------- ¶7. (C) The MAPP/OAS report says delays in implementation of the Reintegration Program--previously managed by the Justice and Interior Ministry and now led by High Commissioner Frank Pearl--have generated false expectations and resentment among the demobilized. The Program's failure to extend benefits--over 1,000 demobilized members from the Catatumbo, Bananero, Calima, Mojana, and Cordoba blocs saw their aid cut off several months ago--has further fueled discontent. Moreover, the High Commissioner's Office's informational sessions have been undermined by the movement of ex-paras to other departments and criminal groups' pressure on the demobilized not to attend. Caramagna warned further delays would encourage demobilized paras to join new criminal groups or resort to other criminal activities. -------------- -------------- IX Report Results: Justice and Peace Law Application -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The report says important JPL advancements during the reporting period include the start of the voluntary confessions or "version libres," informational sessions held by the National Reconciliation and Reparations Commission for the public and efforts by the Inspector General's Office (Procuraduria) and Ombudsman's Office (Defensoria) to increase victims' access to information about the JPL process. Some examples are: A) Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia): In the last six months, the JPL Unit started taking the version libres of demobilized paramilitaries while encouraging victims' participation in the process. The most notable ex-para leaders that began their version libre process were Salvatore Mancuso, Jose Baldomero (Guillermo Torres),and Juan Francisco Prada (Juancho Prada). The JPL process has generated information on 57 mass graves containing 468 cadavers. The Mission acknowledged the efforts of the JPL Unit, but criticized the GOC's failure to provide it more resources, personnel, and protection. The report notes several JPL victims have refused to participate in the process due to insufficient protection for them and their families. B) The National Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (CNRR): The Commission organized activities with regional victims' groups and other organizations to motivate victims to better organize themselves and participate in the JPL process. The CNRR also opened regional offices in Bogota, Medellin, Sincelejo, and Bucaramanga. C) Procuraduria and Defensoria: The Procuraduria trained 216 officials, magistrates, and tribunal auxiliaries on JPL. Meanwhile, the Defensoria created a specialized unit to coordinate related JPL issues and also trained 20 public defenders. Thus far, only seven demobilized paramilitaries have sought the assistance of the Defensoria's public defenders. The Defensoria is also assisting in the orientation of individual victims on the judicial and reparations process. Drucker