Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BOGOTA32
2007-01-04 18:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL ECON CO 
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FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1687
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7334
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8552
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 4620
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9860
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5277
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000032 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ECON CO
SUBJECT: STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN
CONFLICT

REF: BOGOTA 8793

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000032 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ECON CO SUBJECT: STRUGGLE OVER LAND CONTINUES TO FUEL COLOMBIAN CONFLICT REF: BOGOTA 8793 Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer. Reason: 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Rural land development is a source of conflict in Colombia; repeated land reform efforts have been unsuccessful. A proposed new law aimed at facilitating rural development and promoting land distribution has led to complaints by human rights groups that it could legalize illegal land seizures by paramilitary and other illegal armed groups. Some studies estimate that paramilitary and narcotics traffickers may control at least 10 per cent of Colombia's land. End Summary -------------- Centuries of Land Conflict -------------- ¶2. (U) Armed conflict and land disputes are historically intertwined in Colombia. Jesuit academic Father Fernan Gonzalez explains that Colombia did not follow the common latifundia pattern in which enormous colonial land grants were later distributed to peasants through agrarian reforms. Rather, Colombia's peasants colonized frontier areas and developed unclaimed land. As their land acquired value, rural elites would use political power and violence to seize it. This forced campesinos to move to more remote areas where the cycle would continue. Gonzalez said two factors explain why this pattern has continued for decades: large areas without strong state presence and the absence of serious agrarian reform that provided campesinos with clear land title. Despite the increasingly urbanized nature of Colombia society, Gonzalez said the land issue remains key since almost 15 million Colombians continue to live in rural areas. -------------- Failed Policies -------------- ¶3. (U) Colombia's land reform efforts over the past forty years have had little success. The Instituto Nacional Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria (INCORA) isthemost ambitious program to date. INCORA's goal is to promote reform, largely through subsidizing the sale of land by wealthy landowners to cooperatives. The cooperatives are supposed to develop the land and increase productivity. The World Bank and USAID criticize the program because: (1) projects are generally chosen without legally required technical and economic analyses, (2) the program has not implemented an efficient process for developing resettleme
nt projects, (3) the program distorts land values because owners factor the subsidy into their asking price, and (4) if cooperatives cannot productively use land, legal restrictions placed on program beneficiaries make it very difficult for them to resell it. -------------- A New Proposal with Problems -------------- ¶4. (C) The GOC is considering a new, comprehensive, rural development law. Luis Orozco, deputy director for social issues of Colombia's land titling agency, the Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural ("INCODER"),told us the bill would harmonize a large number of existing laws, accelerate distribution of land to disadvantaged groups, and encourage productive land use. He said it would also help integrate Colombia's rural economy into the global economy. The proposal passed two Senate readings in 2006. Two House readings, which are not expected until mid-2007, are required before it would become law. ¶5. (C) The bill would also increase INCODER's power at INCORA's expense by giving it a monopoly on developing, approving, and implementing resettlement projects. INCODER contends these enhanced powers would enable it to more effectively promote rural development. Critics argue this is politically problematic, because INCODER is widely accused of corruption. Its officials are reportedly involved in land-for-votes schemes, and the media recently linked Luis Ortiz, INCODER's former director, to paramilitaries. Human rights groups and many rural residents claim the organization works with paramilitaries to facilitate land seizures, but we cannot substantiate or disprove these charges. Ministry of Agriculture counselor Lorena Garnica, who helped draft the bill, told us it would reduce the possibility of corruption by making INCODER more transparent and clarifying its responsibilities. ¶6. (C) The bill's most controversial provision, which would have made it easier to acquire legal ownership through "adverse possession," was deleted in the Senate after heated debate. Orozco, Garnica, and bill sponsor Senator Manuel Guillermo Mora told us the provision's purpose was to help disadvantaged groups obtain title to land they already occupy. In contrast, the left wing Polo Democratico party and human rights groups such as the Colombian Commission of Jurists claimed the provision would help paramilitaries legalize land seizures and forced "purchases" from indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups. Garnica said opposition to the provision was politically motivated. She explained that existing law already permits adverse possession in the same circumstances, and that land reserves for indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups are constitutionally protected from adverse possession. Moreover, indigenous and Afro-Colombian lands cannot legally be sold. Still, the Polo party was successful in having the provision dropped during the second Senate reading. ¶7. (C) Other provisions of the bill were also removed. For example, it was supposed to facilitate INCODER's capacity to fast-track reallocation of confiscated narco-properties to campesinos. While the government can already do this, the authority is not extensively used because the current law is complex, time consuming, and makes government officials personally liable if courts later overturn confiscations. The bill would have made confiscation and reallocation more efficient. This provision was stricken by the Senate, apparently at the request of INCODER, to minimize potential liability for itself and employees. -------------- Illegal Armed Groups and Narcotics -------------- ¶8. (U) The World Bank reported that Colombia's land inequality sharply increased in the past 20 years. This is mainly due to large narco-purchases and forced "sales" to illegal armed groups. A 2005 analysis by the UNDP reports that there are 4 to 5 million hectares of "narco-landholding" spread throughout Colombia that could be subject to confiscation. This constitutes between 4 and 5 per cent of Colombia's total land area. There has been widespread criticism that the government has confiscated only a minute fraction of the land it could: over the past fifteen years, less than 150,000 hectares have been seized by the government and virtually none sold. ¶9. (C) Paramilitary "purchases" are significant, especially in the rural, north coast region. Paramilitary leader Jorge 40's recently confiscated computer reportedly contains information on "purchases" of between 2.5 and 6 million hectares in the region (reftel). Other paramilitary leaders have acquired land on the Pacific Coast. There are claims that paramilitaries are displacing Afro-Colombian communities to develop lucrative palm oil plantations. The USG checks all recipients of assistance carefully to ensure that no USG funding directly or indirectly assists those who illegitimately acquired land. Assistance has been refused to some palm oil farmers on these grounds. ¶10. (U) In addition to "purchased" land, paramilitaries, drug lords, and the FARC all repeat the centuries old pattern of seizing land from campesinos or taking control of it and forcingcampesinos to work for them. Between two and three million peasants are estimated to have been violently displaced by illicit armed groups seeking to control territory and/or narco-cultivation in the past decade. This "counter agrarian reform," as political scientist Francisco Leal Buitrago describes it, has largely taken place in rural areas where state presence is weak and land title ambiguous. FARC seizures have generally been concentrated in the south and east of the country. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (U) Any redistribution of land held by drug lords or narco-terrorists is complicated by poorly defined land title and fear of retribution. Colombia's rural areas lack good cadastral surveys. Tradition establishes boundaries, and rural residents "know" which family owns what land. Without adequate plats defining land boundaries, title is ambiguous and the perception of land inequality is reinforced. Returning illicitly acquired land to original owners is difficult, since they never had clear legal title. Additionally, campesinos fear that if they accept land from the government, then the previous "owners" will seek revenge and try to retake the land. Lastly, failure to clearly demarcate land held by indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities undermines their ability to enforce the legal protections afforded them by the Constitution. End Comment WOOD =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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