PDAS SHAPIRO MEETS WITH MOD SANTOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002923 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL CO SUBJECT: PDAS SHAPIRO MEETS WITH MOD SANTOS Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos told WHA PDAS Charles Shapiro that Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa was seeking to provoke a confrontation with Colombia to strengthen his domestic political position. Colombia was working with Peru, Mexico and Chile to deepen economic integration and to provide a contrast to Venezuelan President Chavez' Bolivarian economic model. The Charge stressed that alleged ties between COLMIL units and paramilitaries required investigation and prosecution, not just dismissal. Santos said Vice Minister Pinzon would soon present the GOC's thinking on nationalization to INL A/S Anne Patterson. End summary. ¶2. (U) On April 18, WHA PDAS Shapiro met with Defense Minister Santos. Shapiro was accompanied by WHA Senior PD Advisor Maria Pia Tamburri, CDA Drucker, Polcouns, D/Polcouns, and pol/mil officer (notetaker). Santos was accompanied by Vice Minister Sergio Jaramillo. -------------- Ecuador: Combative vs. Colombia -------------- ¶3. (C) Santos said, "Ecuador wants to pick a fight, for internal reasons," but the GOC would be patient and would continue to seek dialogue with Quito. The GOC's approach was to ignore the GOE's "aggressive language," such as President Correa's recent threat to shoot down spray planes intruding into Ecuadorian airspace. Santos said he countered such provocation with notes to his Ecuadorian counterpart that were so cordial as to be "almost love letters." In ongoing bilateral meetings on the environmental impact of spraying, the Ecuadorians were more interested in blaming the Colombians than in finding solutions. Just as Venezuela's Chavez used the U.S. as an all-purpose enemy, Correa had chosen Colombia -- a "very intelligent strategy" that resonated with Ecuadorian voters tired of being Colombia's "little brother." -------------- A Potential Pacific Bloc -------------- ¶4. (C) Santos said the GOC is working closely with Peru, Mexico and Chile to form a group of like-minded countries committed to deeper economic integration. This bloc would espouse "free trade, free markets, and democracy, highlighting the contrast with Venezuela." Santos said ratification of the bilateral free trade agreement (CTPA) was vital in this regard. Failure would weaken President Uribe and boost Chavez' Bolivarian model. Shapiro assured Santos that the administration would make every effort to secure U.S. congressional passage of the three pending Latin American CTPAs. Santos said the GOC had evidence and arguments to persuade even skeptical U.S. members of Congress on Colombia's progress. He stressed that across the board --labor, environment, displacement--the GOC had met Congressional wishes. -------------- Prosecuting COLMIL Ties to Paras -------------- ¶5. (C) The Charge conveyed U.S. concern over alleged ties between some COLMIL units and new criminal groups, stressing that offenders must be investigated and, if warranted, prosecuted. Mere dismissal would not deter future offenders. Moreover, the Leahy Amendment governing U.S. military aid required that accused members of the COLMIL be investigated and tried, not just removed from duty. Santos agreed human rights violators must be punished, and said he was aggressively using his discretional authority to dismiss such individuals from the military. He understood the importance of also investigating and prosecuting personnel implicated in human rights abuses, but said building criminal cases required more time. Santos asked the U.S. to share evidence of human rights allegations to enable the COLMIL to take more cases to trial. -------------- -------------- Narino: FARC Strategies to Thwart Colmil Operations ¶6. (C) Shapiro said the deteriorating situation in Narino department was a central concern. The Charge warned that El Charco municipality, where more than 9000 residents were recently displaced by fighting between the COLMIL and the FARC, risked becoming Colombia's next human rights and humanitarian crisis. It was essential that the COLMIL incorporate contingency plans to deal with displaced persons into its military operational planning. Santos agreed the situation in Charco was deplorable, but said the displacement was deliberately orchestrated by the FARC before the COLMIL operation had even begun. This was a common FARC tactic to hinder COLMIL operations and harm its public image. He said the COLMIL could not refrain from conducting military operations due to FARC-organized displacements, but recognized the COLMIL needed to be better prepared to deal with humanitarian developments.. -------------- Nationalization -------------- ¶7. (C) PDAS Shapiro raised the issue of USG financial support for Plan Colombia and the GOC's gradual assumption of a greater share of the costs. Shapiro said the U.S. hoped to keep its contribution steady over the next two years, but stressed that funding would begin to gradually fall at that point. Santos said he understood this. His proposal was "to start now, to save money, to nationalize programs that you do now very expensively and we could do more cheaply." Santos said Vice Minister Pinzon would meet soon with INL A/S Patterson to explain GOC thinking on nationalization. ¶8. (U) PDAS Shapiro did not have an opportunity to clear this message. Drucker