NARINO COMMUNITIES SUFFER VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002839 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR INL/LP E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO SUBJECT: NARINO COMMUNITIES SUFFER VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The southwest department of Narino has deteriorated from a peaceful backwater to a conflict hotspot. The rural civilian population suffers violent intimidation and forced coca cultivation at the hands of the FARC, ELN, former AUC, and narco-traffickers. As rival groups compete for control, reprisal homicides and land mine use are rising. Spraying illegal coca crops has fueled displacement. The GOC intends to increase its military presence in Narino, and the leading candidate for governor has ambitious plans for socio-economic investment. Still, poor infrastructure, difficult terrain, and insecurity will hamper development efforts. End Summary. -------------- Perfectly Situated -- for the Drug Trade -------------- ¶2. (C) Narino's remote location has historically led to isolation and state neglect. GOC presence is thin outside the two main cities. 63 percent of the population has basic needs such as potable water unmet. The Pan-American (north-south) and Via del Mar (east-west) are the only major paved roads, leaving much of Narino accessible only by river. A 30-mile trip from the capital to the county seat of Barbacoas takes three or four days by land, says a USAID contractor. Narino's highlands are ideal for growing coca and opium poppy, making it Colombia's fastest growing area of drug cultivation, with about 60,000 hectares of coca sprayed in 2006. Its rivers serve as corridors to move drugs from Narino, Putumayo and Cauca to coastal outlets; they carry a very significant amount of Colombian cocaine output. Much of Putumayo's coca cultivation shifted to Narino after the introduction of Plan Colombia in 2000. -------------- Myriad IAGs Now Competing for Coca -------------- ¶3. (C) The FARC, ELN, new criminal groups, and narco gangs have migrated to Narino over the past five years, vying for control of coca fields and traffic corridors. This began with the FARC, who responded to military and spray operations in Putumayo in 2000 by redeploying fighters from Caqueta to northeastern Narino. As many as 900 FARC cooperated with an estimated 350 ELN in central Narino; the two groups signed a non-aggression pact in early 2006 and fought jointly against the army. Focused on trafficking, supply, and logistics, these FARC fronts generally avoid confrontation with the COLMIL and fight only to defend key assets like labs and camps. The FARC'S trafficking and extortion activities drew in the AUC, mainly in the eastern cordillera and southwest. ¶4. (C) In July 2005, AUC demobilization created a vacuum which has been partially filled by new criminal groups and cartels such as Norte del Valle. These include Nueva Generacion (about 150 members),Mano Negra or Aguilas Negras (80-150),Rastrojos (450),and Traquetos. In December 2006, the FARC broke with the ELN in Narino over the latter's talks with the GOC. The two also fought for control of drug routes. 150 FARC and 30 ELN guerrillas reportedly have died in recent fighting between the two. -------------- Civilians Caught in the Cross-fire -------------- ¶5. (C) The proliferation of narco-terrorist groups has taken a toll on rural communities. The FARC and ELN force peasants to cultivate coca, provide supplies and recruits, and participate in anti-government protests. Communities are often trapped by combat and regular holdups on Narino's two main roads, cutting off food supplies. In areas controlled by armed groups, aid agencies have received reports of brutality, including gang rapes and public tying up of strangers until they are verified as non-guerrillas. The conflict caused 26 large displacements in Narino in the first 10 months of 2006, a level comparable to the 27 such events in the preceding five-year period. Eight were reported in the first two months of 2007. UNHCR estimates internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Narino last year numbered 12,000, many of them Afro-Colombian or indigenous. Septel reports on a recent substantial displacement in Charco municipality. ¶6. (U) Violent deaths have also increased due to targeted homicides, combat, and land mines. The homicide rate fell nationally last year to its lowest level (37 per 100,000) since 1990, but the rate in Narino rose to its highest ever (57 per 100,000). In some municipalities, such as Policarpa, the rate reached 263 homicides per 100,000. Sources say these numbers are understated, given that many disappearances are never reported. As control over areas shifts, civilians suffer reprisal killings for alleged complicity with rival groups. The FARC and ELN also planted more land mines to fend off rivals and protect retreats. -------------- Counterdrug Challenges -------------- ¶7. (C) Local interlocutors complained spraying generates economic migrants, eliminating the livelihoods of campesinos growing coca and threatening entire communities when legal crops are inadvertently destroyed. GOC officials also cited environmental damage and water contamination. (Note: The CICAD study shows that the great majority of environmental damage is caused by coca cultivation and processing, not by aerial spraying.) The Ombudsman said the GOC is not meeting its commitment to investigate claims or pay damages. Local officials recommend that greater coordination with communities precede spraying to help minimize collateral damage and migration. -------------- Security Challenges -------------- ¶8. (C) The COLMIL controls main towns, but its efforts to engage illegal armed groups in rural areas are hampered by the difficult terrain. Police posts now exist in all 64 municipal capitals, which has enabled 33 mayors to return. The local populations welcome the increased police presence, but their reach is limited. The Army is largely engaged in protecting coca manual eradicators and infrastructure, leaving it only 270 soldiers and no helicopter mobility to cover a quarter of the department. Local residents fear reprisals from the FARC and criminal groups once the COLMIL has moved on, making them reluctant to support the COLAR. The COLAR's 2007-10 campaign plan calls for a much-needed new brigade in Narino, but it is unclear when this will occur. ¶9. (C) Human rights groups accuse the COLAR of rough treatment of civilians and alleged collusion with illegal groups. Mass roundups yielding only token arrests are seen as an intimidation tactic. The UNHCR said the COLAR also needs to take more measures to protect civilians during military and spray operations. The COLAR has launched internal investigations into alleged COLAR infiltration by criminal groups and the FARC. The departmental police chief admitted criminal penetration of the public forces is a problem, saying local authorities lack surveillance technologies to conduct effective counterintelligence. -------------- Development Plan -------------- ¶10. (C) Antonio Navarro Wolff, former mayor of Narino's capital, former Secretary General of the opposition Polo Democratico Party, and the favorite to be elected governor in October, said the key to solving Narino's problem is increased social investment and economic development. He said military action should be deferred until after the GOC has won the confidence of residents through consultations and greater state presence. Voluntary manual eradication should be used instead of spraying, but he recognizes that forced eradication should be used if communities fail to fulfill their commitment to zero coca. Development experts active in Narino agreed greater social investment is needed, but cautioned that corruption is a major obstacle to improved governance and development. Drucker