PRESSURE INCREASES ON ELN TO REACH PEACE DEAL WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002283 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017 TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM KCRM CO SUBJECT: PRESSURE INCREASES ON ELN TO REACH PEACE DEAL WITH GOC REF: BOGOTA 2103 Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reason: 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The GOC, Catholic Church, guarantors, and international community are pressing the ELN to agree to a ceasefire and release its kidnap victims when the next round of talks resumes in Cuba on April 12. Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said publicly on April 8 the ELN's failure to reach such an agreement would deal a death blow to the talks, and told us he still put the prospects of success as 50-50. Norwegian Charge Dag Nylander told us the ELN was struggling to accept that its leverage was limited, and its legacy uncertain. End summary. -------------- Restrepo Issues Ultimatum -------------- ¶2. (U) On the eve of the next round of GOC-ELN talks in Cuba, scheduled to start April 12 and last for up to 6 weeks, Restrepo publicly told the ELN the time for "interminable" talking was over and said the terrorist group should commit to a ceasefire and release its kidnap victims. If it failed to reach a deal in Cuba, the peace process would be mortally wounded. Colombians would not accept the ELN's continued kidnapping and increasing involvement in drug trafficking. ¶3. (U) Restrepo confirmed in an April 8 press interview that the GOC would insist on justice and truth for ELN victims. He said crimes against humanity, such as kidnapping, could not receive amnesty, and ELN leaders would have to face Justice and Peace Law terms, or a legal process akin to it. Lower-ranking ELN members who had not committed such atrocities could participate in the political process. Restrepo criticized the ELN for disavowing deals its negotiators reached during the Andres Pastrana presidency (1998-2002). He urged the ELN to include in its negotiating team military commander Antonio Galan, to ensure the ELN respected any deal concluded in Havana. ¶4. (C) Restrepo told us on April 3 he still estimated the prospects for success in Havana as 50-50. He said the ELN continues to focus on a proposed agenda of social/political issues rather than on a framework accord that would include a ceasefire and release of kidnap victims. The GOC is stepping up pressure on the ELN, including by cutting off funding for the Casa de Paz in Medellin and the negotiating "mesa" (thereby limiting opportunities for the ELN to travel within and outside Colombia),reducing contacts between the ELN and the international community (especially the Spanish, Swedish, Swiss, Italian, and Dutch Ambassadors),and hardening the GOC's public comments. ¶5. (C) If the talks in Havana are not successful, Restrepo told us the GOC would slowly reduce the ELN's privileges. The GOC would end the Casa de Paz, revoke its authorization for Antonio Garcia, Pablo Beltran and other ELN negotiators to move freely in Venezuela (although it was unsure if the GOV would cooperate),and push the international community to break contact with the group. -------------- Facilitator Says ELN Worried About Legacy -------------- ¶6. (C) Norwegian Charge Dag Nylander told us on April 5 the ELN understands its leverage in the talks is limited to whether and how to release its kidnap victims. After 40 years of struggle, it has no other cards to play. If it were to agree to ceasefire and release the victims, the ELN worries the GOC will not participate in "national convention" sessions at which the ELN planned to advocate social reforms. Without at least obtaining GOC commitments to participate in the national convention, the ELN's legacy for 40 years of struggle would be a few seminars. Nylander was somewhat more optimistic than Restrepo that the Havana talks would produce an agreement, but coincided with Restrepo that the ball was in the ELN's court. ¶7. (C) Nylander suggested the GOC's public pressure on the ELN was working. International community representatives were losing patience with the ELN's inability to make decisions. The ELN was frustrated the Casa de Paz funds were being cut off, annoyed it could no longer talk to the international community without a GOC presence, and embarrassed by public Catholic Church calls for a ceasefire and release of kidnap victims. He said even the civil society guarantors, who are generally considered sympathetic to the ELN, have threatened to walk away if the ELN refuses to reach a deal. Drucker