SCENESETTER CHECKLIST FOR VISIT OF PRESIDENT BUSH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001472

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER SNAR ECON ETRD PHUM KCRM CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER CHECKLIST FOR VISIT OF PRESIDENT BUSH
TO COLOMBIA

Classified By: CDA Milton K. Drucker
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

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Introduction
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1. (C) Your visit highlights the strength of our bilateral
ties, and comes at a critical time for President Uribe.
Seven months into his second term, Uribe is looking for a
firm U.S. commitment to sustain high aid levels--as well as
U.S. congressional approval of our bilateral Free Trade
Agreement--to help him finish the fight against
narcoterrorism and manage a complex domestic and regional
climate. Uribe has been completely supportive of our efforts
to locate and rescue the three U.S. hostages held by the
FARC. He remains popular, but faces major challenges in
ensuring the reintegration of 32,000 demobilized
paramilitaries into civilian life, prosecution of human
rights violators, reparations for victims of violence, and
exposure of former paramilitary links to members of
Colombia's political, military and economic elites. He
maintains an uneasy, yet cordial, relationship with
Venezuelan President Chavez; the election of Rafael Correa as
president of Ecuador further complicates the regional
environment. Key issues:

-- U.S. Support

-- U.S. Hostages

-- Free Trade

-- Paramilitary Investigations

-- Drug Eradication

-- Colombia's Regional Influence

-- Extradition

-- Human Rights

-- FARC and ELN

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U.S. Support
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2. (C) U.S. assistance remains vital to help Uribe defeat
narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Uribe presented us with
a Plan Colombia Consolidation proposal in January which seeks
to lock in sustained, high levels of U.S. and international
support over the next five years. The proposal emphasizes
continued strong counterterrorism and counternarcotics
efforts aimed at establishing GOC control throughout the
national territory, but also substantially boosts resources
for education, health, Afro-Colombian and indigenous
communities, and social development. We have publicly
welcomed the proposal and are working with Colombia to obtain
European support as well. We are also urging Colombia to
assume an increasing portion of Plan Colombia components
currently financed by the U.S., but little progress has been
made to date.

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U.S. Hostages
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3. (C) The FARC has held three Americans for four years.
Uribe has been completely supportive of our efforts to locate
and rescue them. The FARC has never indicated a willingness
to engage in discussions with the GOC on a humanitarian
exchange of hostages for prisoners.

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Free Trade
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4. (C) Uribe considers FTA ratification essential for
Colombia to receive long-term investment, increase economic
growth, create jobs, and boost government revenues. He is
confident of Colombian congressional approval, but is
concerned the U.S. Congress will force renegotiation of the

text signed last November. U.S. failure to approve the FTA
soon would be a major domestic and regional political blow to
Uribe. It would also boost Venezuelan President Chavez'
alternative Bolivarian economic model.

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Paramilitary Investigations
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5. (C) Uribe's demobilization of the paramilitaries and the
improved security situation have allowed Colombia's
democratic institutions--the Courts, National Prosecutor, and
media--to expose ties between the former paramilitaries and
members of Colombia's political elite. Eight members of
Congress and the former chief of the FBI-equivalent
intelligence service have been arrested for alleged
paramilitary ties; one congressmen is on the lam; and five
more members of Congress are under investigation. Uribe
strongly supports this process even though most of those
implicated to date are members of his coalition. Despite the
scandal, Colombia's Congress continues to function, with
Uribe obtaining passage of most of his legislative agenda in
the session that ended in December.

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Drug Eradication
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6. (C) Uribe is committed to fighting narcotrafficking, but
is frustrated record aerial spray numbers are not reducing
coca crops. Although Uribe does not know yet, this year the
CIA will release data showing an increase in the areas under
coca cultivation for the second year in a row. The increase
reflects a change in the survey's methodology, not a change
on the ground, but the headlines are helping to erode support
for eradication efforts. Uribe may ask for greater U.S.
resources for the fight.

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Colombia's Regional Influence
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7. (C) Uribe is working to strengthen economic and security
cooperation with Peru, Brazil, Central America, and Mexico.
Colombia's close commercial ties and shared border with
Venezuela lead Uribe to maintain cordial relations with
Venezuelan President Chavez despite sharp ideological
differences, but he vigorously defends Colombia's security
and commercial interests. Uribe is reaching out to Ecuador's
Rafael Correa, but fears Correa's unpredictable nature and
close ties to Chavez will lead to rocky bilateral relations.
Cooperation with Colombia's neighbors is vital as the
narcoterrorists use the border regions as a safehaven.

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Extradition
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8. (C) Uribe is aware of the high priority the U.S. Congress
places on extraditions of drug traffickers. Colombia is the
best U.S. partner in the world on extraditions, with over 430
traffickers and terrorists sent to the U.S. since Uribe took
office in 2002. Uribe has suspended the extradition of four
paramilitaries for narcotrafficking due to their
participation in the paramilitary demobilization process.


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Human Rights
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9. (C) Colombia's human rights record is improving, but
progress in the prosecution of major human rights violators,
especially involving military personnel, is uneven. The U.S.
congressionally-mandated human rights certification process
requires steady improvement; proposed military justice reform
is a positive step. We are helping Colombia implement its
unprecedented Justice and Peace Law to achieve truth, justice
and reparations. We support Colombia's efforts to reintegrate
32,000 former paramilitaries into civilian life, but these
efforts are hampered by the magnitude of the problem and
insufficient resources. The lag in reintegration programs
and easy money of narcotrafficking and extortion is tempting
some ex-paramilitaries back to a life of crime in reformed

gangs. These groups lack the national scope and political
ambitions of the defunct United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC),but the Colombians must combat them while
they remain small.

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FARC and ELN
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10. (C) Increased Colombian military pressure has forced the
FARC to withdraw to rural areas and severely weakened its
military capabilities, but has not succeeded in compelling
the group to start serious peace negotiations. Narcotics
trafficking continues to fuel their operations. The families
of the FARC's political hostages, including the Americans,
are pressing Uribe to negotiate a humanitarian exchange with
the FARC. The FARC refuses to provide recent proof of life
of its hostages, and insists that the GOC demilitarize an
area long ago captured from the FARC before starting talks.
The GOC continues peace talks with the ELN, a smaller
left-wing terrorist group, but the two have been unable to
agree on a cease-fire.
DRUCKER