GUARDED OPTIMISM ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF GOC-ELN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001139 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017 TAGS: PTER PHUM PGOV PREL CO SUBJECT: GUARDED OPTIMISM ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF GOC-ELN CEASEFIRE AND RELEASE OF ELN KIDNAP VICTIMS REF: BOGOTA 1109 Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reason: 1.4 (b, d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Presidential Counselor Jose Obdulio Gaviria and GOC-ELN guarantor Alvaro Jimenez separately expressed to us guarded optimism about the possibility of a GOC-ELN ceasefire being announced in the near future. Jimenez said the two sides hoped to present a ceasefire agreement at the end of the February 22-28 fifth round of peace talks in Havana. He understood the ceasefire would initially run from May through November, during which period the ELN would release kidnap victims. Still, even if the ceasefire is implemented, it is unclear whether the ELN's Central Command controls fronts that are increasingly involved in narcotics trafficking. End summary. -------------- Caracas Talks -------------- ¶2. (C) Gaviria told us President Uribe's principal goal in talks with the ELN was to secure a ceasefire. Separately, Jimenez said Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo and a delegation from the ELN's Central Command (COCE) are "far advanced" in ceasefire talks. At the conclusion of the February 22-28 fifth round of talks in Havana, Jimenez told us the parties expected to announce a ceasefire and a plan to release ELN kidnap victims. The ceasefire would begin in May and last through November, when it was expected to be renewed. ELN kidnap victims would be released during this initial ceasefire phase. ¶3. (C) Jimenez claimed there was oral agreement by all parties on a ceasefire verification mechanism, led politically by the UN but whose spade work would be done by the OAS. The ELN had dropped its objection to the OAS being involved. ELN fighters would not concentrate; rather, the verification teams would be responsible for ensuring they were in certain zones and that their weapons had not been used. The weapons would not be confiscated during the first phase. ¶4. (C) Gaviria noted President Uribe was willing to allow elements of the ELN to engage in "political" activities. Jimenez understood the ELN would not run candidates itself, but expected to have opportunities to move throughout Colombia during the ceasefire period and launch social initiatives, working with local governments and the GOC to promote regional economic development. -------------- Justice for ELN Victims -------------- ¶5. (C) Gaviria said President Uribe would support terms on justice for ELN victims that were acceptable to the international community. He emphasized international law had evolved since the days when blanket amnesties were feasible, and said any deal the ELN reached with the GOC would have to be made available to the ex-paramilitaries. Jimenez said the guarantors had not yet addressed justice with the COCE, although ELN negotiator Francisco Galan privately told the guarantors there could be no escaping the subject. -------------- Looking Forward -------------- ¶6. (C) Jimenez confirmed the agenda for the second phase (from November forward) was not yet agreed. He said the goal of the guarantors and the GOC was an ELN commitment to reintegrate its combatants by June 2008, which necessarily would involve disarmament and demobilization. Jimenez said he did not know the ELN's position on this matter. After the Havana round, future talks would be in Colombia and Venezuela. ¶7. (C) Gaviria insisted the GOC would not agree to a Constituent Assembly to address the ELN's political agenda. Any legislative success the ELN had would depend on its ability to persuade the Congress to act. The GOC would not make substantive concession to a group with "500 effective fighters". Jimenez said the ELN had dropped its interest in the Assembly. Both Gaviria and Jimenez claimed ELN foot-dragging in recent months was due to its consistent inability to read Colombian politics accurately. Gaviria reported the ELN took seriously Polo Democratico Senator Gustavo Petro's attacks on Uribe and incorrectly regarded the Administration as shaky. ¶8. (C) Jimenez blamed ELN military commander Antonio Garcia for the slow progress in recent months. He claimed the ELN had prepared a ceasefire agreement in December but Garcia had refused to release it to the GOC. Instead, Garcia had pushed for his own idea of small concessions in return for GOC agreement to a broad social agenda, something the GOC had not been keen on. The COCE had recently insisted Pablo Beltran attend all meetings Garcia had with Restrepo. In Jimenez's view, this was positive, and diluted Garcia's idiosyncratic decision making. -------------- Narcotrafficking Complications -------------- ¶9. (C) Even if the GOC and ELN were to reach agreement on a ceasefire, growing evidence of narcotrafficking activities by ELN fronts raise questions about the COCE's ability to deliver during a demobilization and reintegration phase (reftel). If the COCE's admonitions against participating in the drug trade are to be believed, front activities suggest the COCE's writ does not run far. If the COCE's admonitions are disingenuous, it remains unclear how many fronts would agree to demobilize. The alternatives of some ELN fronts joining the FARC or collaborating with ex-paramilitaries cannot be ruled out. DRUCKER