ANALYSTS OFFER GRIM VIEW OF KYRGYZ POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000063 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KG SUBJECT: ANALYSTS OFFER GRIM VIEW OF KYRGYZ POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS REF: A. BISHKEK 50 ¶B. BISHKEK 46 BISHKEK 00000063 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador and visiting Central Asia Office Director Spratlen met January 23 with four leading Bishkek think tank directors and political analysts to discuss the current political turmoil in Kyrgyzstan, as well as the state of U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. The analysts described a Kyrgyz government acting to concentrate authority around a president who had little interest in, or understanding of, public policy or international relations. What motivated President Bakiyev and his inner circle was money and power, which has led to a worsening of corruption, a degradation of society as a whole, and a "commercialization" of international relationships. The analysts agreed that the U.S.-Kyrgyz bilateral relationship would continue to be difficult, and one urged the U.S. to speak out more forcefully about events in Kyrgyzstan. There was no consensus on the way forward for Kyrgyzstan, with one analyst saying that the only hope was for the current administration to "resign voluntarily" and another arguing that early parliamentary elections would give the parliament a fresh mandate to balance presidential power. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador and visiting Central Asia Office Director Spratlen met over dinner January 23 with former Foreign Minister and current Institute for Public Policy president Murat Imanaliyev, former director of the International Institute for Strategic Research Valentin Bogatyrev, Economic Policy Institute chairman and AKIpress director Marat Tazabekov, and former NGO Coalition head Edil Baisalov. Pol-Econ Chief and senior political FSN also attended. No Understanding of Foreign Policy -------------- ¶3. (C) Central Asia Office Director Spratlen began by asking the guests for their views on U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. Former Foreign Minister Imanaliyev said the current Kyrgyz government did not understand that it should have good relations with the United States, and the government's actions of the past summer (specifically, the PNGs) were not the actions of a serious country. Imanaliyev said that President Bakiyev and the team around him did not understand foreign policy or how to manage a country. Further, he said, Bakiyev did not understand the U.S. role in the world. Bakiyev remained oriented toward Russia -- Soviet Russia -- and his greed had led to a "commercialization" of relationships. Imanaliyev said that this made a real "political relationship" with the U.S. impossible. The situation was not only bad for the U.S.; he said China faced similar difficulties dealing with the Kyrgyz Government. "Politics of the Absurd" -------------- ¶4. (C) Imanaliyev was equally scathing about Bakiyev's handling of the domestic political situation. Former President Akayev had made mistakes, especially toward the end of his years in power, but Bakiyev began making mistakes immediately, causing corruption to become worse. While Akayev had tried to control the legislature, Bakiyev was trying to destroy the parliament. Imanaliyev said that this "politics of the absurd" and resulting instability was having a social impact, too, as much of the population was leaving as labor migrants, even to poorer, but more stable, countries BISHKEK 00000063 002.2 OF 003 like Tajikistan. Imanaliyev said that the president was "unteachable" and the only hope was for the "voluntary resignation" of the government. ¶5. (C) Edil Baisalov described domestic politics as a metronome, swinging ever more quickly between good events and bad events. Analyst Valentin Bogatyrev agreed that development of the country had stalled under Bakiyev, but thought some bright, new leaders could rise up during this "slow period." He thought there could be a "renaissance" of political parties, and that early parliamentary elections, perhaps as soon as the fall, would strengthen the role of parliament and give "young leaders" a chance. Baisalov agreed that early elections would give parliament a greater mandate and would eliminate questions about its legitimacy. Imanaliyev cautioned that a new parliament could be even worse, given the problem of criminal elements within the parliament. ¶6. (C) Marat Tazabekov said that the administration was concentrating all power around Bakiyev, first by maneuvering to get rid of Prime Minister Kulov, and then next by going after parliament. Bakiyev's total orientation toward Russia and connections to various Russian groups would continue to affect U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. Tazabekov said that under Bakiyev and his circle, there had also been a "commercialization" of politics and government service, leading to a degradation of internal political debate. Imanaliyev said it was a degradation of the whole society. Kulov Gone, and Won't Be Missed -------------- ¶7. (C) The analysts felt that Bakiyev had outmaneuvered Felix Kulov, and that the parliament likely would not confirm his nomination as prime minister. Baisalov said that the Bakiyev-Kulov "tandem" had been a mistake, and Tazabekov implied that Kulov's departure would not be a great loss, given Kulov's autocratic tendencies. The group did not know who Bakiyev might select in his place, and Bogatyrev pointed out there was no one of similar stature from the north to replace Kulov. Someone suggested that opposition MP Tekebayev was a possibility, because although he is a southerner, he is popular in the north. Speaker Sultanov was also named as a possible successor to Kulov. Base Shapes U.S. Image -- and GOKG Attitudes and Actions -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Baisalov said that the public perception of the U.S. was shaped by the Manas Air Base, and he said that he himself wished for a time when there was no U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan. He said it appeared that all U.S. interests in Kyrgyzstan were viewed through the prism of the base, and as a result, the U.S. turned a "blind eye" to events in the country. He noted that the Kyrgyz government had made the calculation that the USG only cared about the Base, and therefore it could do anything. Tazabekov added that GOKG actions toward the USG could only be characterized as a "slap in the face." Tazabekov said that most Kyrgyz did not understand the scope of U.S. assistance programs focused on democratic development and broad economic projects. What people understood, he said, were small scale, local projects in agriculture and humanitarian assistance, and he urged the U.S. to do more publicly with such type of projects. Comment -------------- BISHKEK 00000063 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C) In past meetings, these analysts have been strongly critical of the Bakiyev government, but the group seemed particularly negative on this occasion, describing a leadership that only understands money and power and whose words are meaningless. In their views, there was little hope of an improved U.S.-Kyrgyz relationship in the near term, not because of U.S. actions, but rather because of the Kyrgyz government's strong orientation toward Russia, its lack of foreign policy understanding, and its inability to stay focused and consistent. YOVANOVITCH