KYRGYZSTAN, MANAS AIR BASE AND THE SCO SUMMIT:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 000544 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN, MANAS AIR BASE AND THE SCO SUMMIT: FOOD FOR THOUGHT BISHKEK 00000544 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. With the August 16 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishek only three months away, we need to move to closure now on two contentious incidents -- an aircraft collision and a shooting -- that have undermined public and political support for continued operation of the Manas Air Base. The issues are linked to the summit, as the 2005 SCO summit in Astana was marked by pressure on Kyrgyzstan to close the base, and initial indications are that this pressure will be renewed. The Kyrgyz, who have recently taken a strategic political decision to support the base, tell us that they are being pressured by the Chinese and Russians (and sometimes the Kazakhs) to close down the base. They also tell us they want to deflect this pressure. This Kyrgyz goal is in our interest as well, and over the next three months we have a range of opportunities to influence the direction the SCO summit takes on our key security issues. We will also need to manage renewed calls by the Kyrgyz for increased compensation for the base, fueled by parliamentary debate on the base agreement and anti-American media. This cable lays out Embassy Bishkek's proposals for managing Kyrgyz expectations and laying the groundwork for an SCO summit that does not challenge the presence of Manas Air Base, and that could help validate its role in support of OEF. End Summary. Kyrgyz Update on SCO -------------- ¶2. (C) Kyrgyz officials are concerned that at this year's SCO summit in Bishkek they will again be pressured by Russia, Uzbekistan and China to close Manas Air Base. In an effort to deflect this pressure, the Kyrgyz plan to invite Afghan President Karzai to the summit. According to Deputy FM Sarbayev, the Kyrgyz have passed an oral invitation to Karzai and will follow up with a formal written invitation in coming days. To demonstrate that the SCO is not/not a military alliance, and that it is an "open" organization, the Kyrgyz are also planning to invite UNSYG Ban Ki Moon to attend. Both Karzai and the UNSYG will be invited as guests of President Bakiyev. We should encourage both dignitaries to attend the summit. ¶3. (C) The summit will be preceded by three high-level meetings in Bishkek. SCO member state National Security Secretaries will meet at the end of May; Defense Ministers SIPDIS will meet June 22 or 25; and Foreign Ministers will meet on July 9. These preparatory meetings will not include representatives from any of the four observer states (Iran, India, Pakistan and Mongolia). All six SCO members have confirmed that Heads of Government will attend the August 16 summit. The Observer states have also confirmed participation, but their level of representation has not been settled. The Kyrgyz hope the summit will focus on economic trade and development, and would like to see members commit to invest in one or more large development projects in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz will seek enhanced compensation for Manas Air Base -------------- ¶4. (C) Kyrgyz National Security Advisor Mametov and Deputy Minister of Defense Oruzbayev have separately signaled to the Ambassador that Kyrgyzstan will seek greater compensation for Manas Air Base. The Ambassador understands that FM Karabayev will seek to meet her the week of May 14 to begin these discussions. The Kyrgyz appeal may take several forms, including increased cash transfers, furnishing a ground radar for Manas airport, compensation for alleged environmental BISHKEK 00000544 002.2 OF 004 damage, and direct GOKG participation in contracts for fuel deliveries to the base. When the news of Airman Hatfield's departure from Kyrgyzstan became public, Parliament scheduled committee debate on the terms of the 2001 bilateral base agreement beginning the week of May 21st. Parliament will hold open hearings will begin on the 28th; they are likely to be lopsidedly opposed to the base. The final outcome of parliament's deliberations could be pivotal to the future of the base. We can expect the Kyrgyz Government to use the upcoming SCO summit to leverage us to accommodate their demands. We believe the Kyrgyz leadership wants the base to remain, but they want more in return for its continued operation. We should begin now to plan for ways to engage the Kyrgyz constructively on the issues they raise, while lowering expectations for enhanced compensation. U.S. Interests -------------- ¶5. (C) U.S. regional security interests would be served by a SCO summit that acknowledges, via the presence of President Karzai at the summit, the importance for regional stability of OEF (and thus continued support for Manas Air Base) and that highlights the prospects for enhanced trade, via Afghanistan, with South Asia. To maximize this positive outcome, there are several steps the U.S. can take with respect to Manas Air Base. Moving to closure on Base Issues -------------- ¶6. (C) First and foremost: we should move rapidly to closure during the month of May on two unresolved incidents related to the base: providing compensation for the widow of the Kyrgyz truckdriver shot and killed in December by a U.S. Airman; and providing compensation for the September collision between U.S. and Kyrgyz planes that damaged President Bakiyev's long-haul aircraft. Our understanding is that DOD has completed its process in both cases and has determined to provide compensation. The sooner we can effect these transactions, and get public benefit for coming to closure, the better. It is not in our interest for these issues to be left hanging at the time of the SCO summit. While we will not win the battle for public opinion in the case of the shooting incident, being able to show that we have acted on the widow,s claim will at least give us a defensible public position. ¶7. (C) The intense MEDIA hype and speculation surrounding the May 7 traffic accident involving a U.S. civilian contractor in which a Kyrgyz pedestrian was killed shows how tenuous the political atmosphere remains related to the base. We need to wrap these incidents up as long before the SCO summit as possible, especially in the expectation that the results of the U.S. investigation into the shooting incident, which are likely to exonerate the U.S. Airman, will be completed prior to the SCO summit. There is no/no political or public comprehension that the Airman could possibly be exonerated, so pervasive is the commonly held belief that he murdered the Kyrgyz truck driver. Building up support for OEF -------------- ¶8. (C) There are also steps we can take to persuade Kyrgyz leaders and the public that OEF is an important, ongoing, worthy undertaking that directly benefits Kyrgyz security. On May 19, the Embassy and Manas Air Base are sponsoring a VIP orientation flight for 15 senior Kyrgyz government and parliament leaders. The flight, aboard a KC-135 refueling tanker, will demonstrate in-flight refueling of a C-17 cargo BISHKEK 00000544 003.2 OF 004 plane to reinforce the logistical mission of Manas Air Base for OEF operations. ¶9. (C) We are also working with CENTCOM and Embassy Kabul to organize a VIP visit to Afghanistan in mid-June for cabinet ministers and parliamentarians. We foresee three main purposes for this 1-2 day trip. First, to allow senior Kyrgyz leaders to see first-hand operations in Afghanistan to persuade them that the struggle continues and the Taliban continue to pose a threat to regional security. Second, to permit the senior Kyrgyz leadership to meet with their Afghan counterparts, to hear from them how important OEF is to the successful development of their country. Third, through a visit to a PRT, to show that we are not pursuing a military-only strategy, and that reconstruction and civil-military operations are at the core of our presence. This will also serve to give the Kyrgyz some idea of the types of reconstruction projects underway, given Kyrgyz interest in bidding on contracts in Afghanistan. ¶10. (C) Finally, we would urge USAID and DOD to send a small team of experts to Bishkek to meet with Krygyz government and business leaders to explain how the contracting and sub-contracting process in Afghanistan works. It is in our interest to walk the Kyrgyz through this process in detail, and encourage them to submit bids on projects. Significantly, both of these VIP events should be completed prior to the meetings of SCO Defense and Foreign Ministers in the run-up to the summit. Pre-Summit Demarches -------------- ¶11. (C) As the Department considers a strategy for pre-summit demarches, we would urge that they include not just SCO members, but also Afghanistan and SCO observers India and Pakistan. For Afghanistan, President Karzai can be encouraged to participate, make the point that OEF contributes to SCO stability, and publicly thank Kyrgyzstan for hosting Manas Air Base. India and Pakistan can be encouraged to send senior economic representatives who can encourage the development of a regional energy market. Using upcoming visits -------------- ¶12. (C) We can also maximize the effectiveness of a series of upcoming visits by senior U.S. military and civilian leaders. Ambassador Neumann will visit in late May, Secretary of Defense Gates plans a stopover in early June, followed by SCA A/S Boucher and CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, also in June. It is essential that each of these visitors reinforce the importance of OEF to Kyrgyz and regional security, and engage their Kyrgyz interlocutors on the planning and agenda for the SCO summit. Ideally, these visits would occur in the wake of having completed compensation payments for the shooting and collision incidents. Timeline -------------- ¶13. (C) This cable lays out a complicated series of events which, if carefully orchestrated, can combine to lay the groundwork for an SCO summit that does not challenge the presence of Manas Air Base, and that could in fact validate its role in support of OEF. Here follows a timeline of upcoming events and opportunities to affect this result. Week of May 14: Kyrgyz request enhanced compensation for Manas Air Base BISHKEK 00000544 004.2 OF 004 May 19: Orientation refueling flight for Kyrgyz VIPs May 21: Kyrgyz parliament begins committee discussion of Manas Base agreement May 23: Visit of Ambassador Ron Neumann; briefing to National Security Council and MOD May 28: Kyrgyz parliament begins open hearings on Manas Base Agreement End May: SCO National Security Advisors meeting in Bishkek TBD: Compensation payment to widow TBD: Compensation payment for collision TBD: Completion of U.S. investigation into shooting incident at Manas Air Base TBD: SCO Demarche cable to SCO, observer states and Afghanistan June 5: Visit of Secretary of Defense Gates June 9: Visit of A/S Boucher (TBC) June 11-12: VIP Flight to Afghanistan for Kyrgyz leadership TBD: Visit of DOD/USAID Contracting specialists to Bishkek June 14-15: Visit of CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon June 22 or 25: SCO Defense Ministers meeting in Bishkek July 9: SCO Foreign Ministers meeting in Bishkek August 16: SCO summit in Bishkek ¶14. (C) The SCO summit clock has already started ticking; we should begin to synchronize our actions to it as soon as possible. YOVANOVITCH