DAS FEIGENBAUM AND FM KARABAYEV LAY GROUNDWORK FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BISHKEK 000490 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON MARR AF KG SUBJECT: DAS FEIGENBAUM AND FM KARABAYEV LAY GROUNDWORK FOR COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE BISHKEK 00000490 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During his April 15-19 visit to Bishkek, SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum met twice, over five hours, with Foreign Minister Ednan Karabayev for open and wide-ranging discussions. While many other meetings during the visit were dominated by the fast-changing domestic political situation, Feigenbaum and Karabayev focused on how to expand and develop the bilateral relationship in key areas, including economic, security, and political relations. Karabayev said that over its fifteen years of independence Kyrgyzstan had appreciated the support of the United States, but Kyrgyzstan wanted to raise the relationship to the level where Kyrgyzstan would be a "full partner." Feigenbaum outlined several concrete steps that both sides could take in each major basket to move forward, and he proposed establishing a bilateral Comprehensive Policy Dialogue as a framework for managing difficult challenges in the relationship while also enabling both sides to do some joint policy planning, discussing where the relationship needed to go and how to get it there. Karabayev was receptive to the proposal, and suggested possibly holding an inaugural Comprehensive Dialogue meeting in Washington in the fall. END SUMMARY. Appreciation for U.S. Support -------------- ¶2. (C) SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum met April 16 and 17 with Foreign Minister Ednan Karabayev. Over the course of five hours, they discussed the full range of bilateral issues and focused on ways to move the U.S.-Kyrgyz relationship forward after a difficult and often inconsistent period. Feigenbaum outlined the many accomplishments in the relationship to date, including security cooperation, economics and trade, developments on democracy and human rights, and educational exchanges -- all aimed at bolstering Kyrgyz sovereignty and independence. Karabayev admitted that Kyrgyzstan was not yet a "full partner" in the relationship, but he welcomed further U.S. initiatives in various areas, particularly in trade, investment, and economic development. He said that President Bakiyev had laid out Kyrgyzstan's priorities in his recent address to the nation: transforming the economy from one principally dependent on its natural resource base to a production and industrial base, building small and medium sized enterprises, creating a middle class, forming a policy for municipalities (decentralization),and developing agriculture and agricultural processing. ¶3. (C) Karabayev said he appreciated American support for Kyrgyz sovereignty over its fifteen years of independence, especially in building civil society. Karabayev pointed out that Kyrgyzstan now had a vibrant civil society, and as a result, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had a big influence on government policy. As an example, he cited civil society's role in opposing Kyrgyzstan's participation in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative. Karabayev claimed that public opinion had forced the government to reject HIPC, even though "everyone (in government) thought it was a useful program." Issues with the Base -------------- ¶4. (C) Karabayev said that Kyrgyzstan's active civil society also played a large role in shaping policy toward Manas Air Base. Karabayev said the base drew a lot of attention from civil society, and public opinion "puts us in a difficult position" with regard to the base. Karabayev explained that BISHKEK 00000490 002.2 OF 005 a substantial part of the Kyrgyz population still lived by "moral norms," not by legal complexities. While one could view the base incidents from the perspective of international law, Karabayev said that most Kyrgyz citizens viewed the incidents from a "human perspective" -- and this was why there was such a strong negative reaction to the partial payment to the driver's widow. Karabayev recommended that the U.S. expedite a substantial final payment. Karabayev emphasized that base issues needed to be resolved quickly. ¶5. (C) Karabayev reiterated President Bakiyev's and the government's commitment to keeping the base, and he said they understood the importance of the base to the war in Afghanistan. He said he was disappointed, however, that the Afghan Embassy in Bishkek was closing for lack of funds. How are we supposed to view this development, he asked. He also said the public was concerned that the base would be used in operations against Iran. ¶6. (C) Feigenbaum noted that the U.S. was very grateful for access to the base, especially given the pressure the Kyrgyz faced from certain Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries. Feigenbaum assured Karabayev that the U.S. was working to resolve the outstanding issues, and that U.S. had instituted procedures to improve safety at the base. Feigenbaum suggested moving forward with the proposed U.S.-Kyrgyz joint commission to provide a structure for resolving any future issues. He also said that, in response to President Bakiyev's request, the base was looking at ways to increase local sourcing for foodstuffs or other goods consumed by the base. Stability in Afghanistan -------------- ¶7. (C) Feigenbaum told Karabayev that the mission of the base remained to support operations to stabilize Afghanistan. Feigenbaum said there had been significant progress in Afghanistan and noted some example of this, but there was much to do in terms of building infrastructure, fighting drugs, and training police and troops. In addition, the war against the Taliban was far from finished, and Manas Air Base remained crucial to the Coalition effort. Feigenbaum said that the U.S. wanted to find better ways to familiarize Kyrgyz officials with the situation in Afghanistan, including briefings and a possible orientation trip. Feigenbaum pointed out that stability in Afghanistan was in everyone's security interest, or should be. Feigenbaum noted that each of the SCO member states, including Russia, had told the United States individually that stability in Afghanistan was a strategic priority; if so, Feigenbaum said, it followed logically that they ought to reach the same conclusion as a group that they had reached individually; he emphasized this point, noting that the topic of the Base might be on the agenda for the August SCO Summit in Bishkek. Regional Relations and Integration -------------- ¶8. (C) Karabayev said that Kyrgyzstan was interested in economic integration "in the region and beyond the region" but that "real integration" was difficult because of uneven levels of economic development. Kyrgyzstan had adopted a "practical" approach to integration, because with so many citizens working abroad, Kyrgyzstan had to deal with labor, immigration, and border issues. Karabayev suggested that Central Asia should consider a single labor market, a common trading zone, and even a common energy space, but the BISHKEK 00000490 003.2 OF 005 countries first needed to deal with border and security problems. Karabayev said that the current state of the borders did not allow the countries to deal effectively with drug smuggling or terrorist threats. ¶9. (C) Karabayev said that Kyrgyzstan was also interested in integration to the south, with Pakistan and India, and east to China, as potential consumers of Kyrgyz (and Tajik) electricity. Karabayev suggested that Kyrgyzstan could host a regional summit on water and energy, following on the earlier Year of the Mountains summit, possibly tying a debt swap for sustainable development. Feigenbaum detailed a number of U.S. initiatives to develop a north-south energy corridor. He also noted a number of challenges with debt swap schemes. Millennium Challenge -------------- ¶10. (C) FM Karabayev said that after being considered for the Millennium Challenge Account program for almost two years, Kyrgyzstan was ready to move forward with its Threshold Country Plan proposal targeting judicial and law enforcement reform. Feigenbaum explained that the MCC Board would likely soon vote on the funding, but the unstable political environment and the government's rejection of HIPC had caused some in Washington to question whether there was the political will to implement a reform program and also whether there was sufficient stability among Kyrgyz administrative personnel who would work on the program. Feigenbaum said that Kyrgyzstan could improve its own prospects for MCA funding if it followed through on several specific reform commitments. Karabayev responded that there was strong political will behind the program and its proposed reforms, and he pointed out that the package of required legislative changes was now before parliament. Karabayev said that the opposition rallies were not a sign of "chaos," but were part of "normal political development" in a democracy. A (Strange) Aside on the OSCE Chairmanship and Kyrgyzstan -------------- ¶11. (C) Karabayev asked Feigenbaum about Kazakhstan's bid to be OSCE chairman. Karabayev said that Kyrgyzstan would, without doubt, support Kazakhstan's candidacy for 2009, but if Kazakhstan were unsuccessful, he hoped that "the quota" could remain for a Central Asian chair. Karabayev suggested that Kyrgyzstan might be considered as a "second choice" as OSCE Chairman. Feigenbaum pointed out that bidding for the chairmanship would bring a great deal of scrutiny, especially on the political dimension of development in Kyrgyzstan, including the status of media reform, judicial reform, treatment of the opposition, etc. Karabayev said that Kyrgyzstan had something to say on all these points: Kyrgyzstan was working on judicial reform, and would make greater progress with the MCA program; the Kyrgyz parliament had developed into an independent actor and an effective body (despite the behavior of some parliamentary deputies); and state television was being transformed into a public entity. Karabayev said there were still problems, but much of this was just "noisy democracy." (COMMENT: We think the Foreign Minister was engaging in a bit of academic debate on OSCE, one former professor to another; he surely understands the (incredibly) long odds against his proposal, but still wanted to throw Kyrgzystan's hat into the ring if no consensus emerges on Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, Karabayev does believe that Kyrgyzstan was moving in the right direction in terms of BISHKEK 00000490 004.2 OF 005 democracy and governance. END COMMENT.) Challenges to the Relationship -------------- ¶12. (C) Turning back to the U.S.-Kyrgyz relationship, Feigenbaum identified three broad challenges: first, inconsistency, with serious ups and downs evident in the relationship over the past two years; second, unfulfilled potential in some areas, such as trade; and third, the uncertain domestic political environment, which affected perceptions of Kyrgyzstan as a partner and of its commitment to reforms. ¶13. (C) Karabayev acknowledged that the bilateral relationship had been plagued by inconsistency over the past two years. He said that when Bakiyev came to power in the chaos of the "tulip revolution," there were few professional people advising him, and Bakiyev himself had little knowledge of international relations. Karabayev said many approached foreign policy with "too high a trust" in the neighbors, and this contributed to biased perceptions. Many problems could also be attributed to (deliberate) misinformation, Karabayev added. While Russia would always be Kyrgyzstan's strategic partner, Karabayev said, sometimes there was no place for Kyrgyzstan in Russia's foreign relations. Karabayev pointed to his own appointment as foreign minister as a sign of Bakiyev's maturation in foreign policy. Steps Forward -------------- ¶14. (C) DAS Feigenbaum suggested some specific steps that both sides could take to move the relationship forward in all baskets, thus hopefully overcoming the three broad challenges he had outlined. He offered a series of ideas in three baskets especially: on economic issues, security cooperation, and in the political dimension. On the economic front, Feigenbaum stressed that Kyrgyzstan needed to create the conditions to attract private sector investment, and it needed to move to take advantage of opportunities in regional integration and also from its World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. Feigenbaum said that the U.S. could assist in several areas. He suggested that the government -- specifically the prime minister's office -- reinstate a U.S. Treasury economic policy advisor, who could work in a number of areas. Feigenbaum also urged high level Kyrgyz participation at the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) meeting, likely to take place this summer in Washington. He offered to facilitate separate bilateral meetings with Washington economic agencies, depending on the level and quality of the Kyrgyz delegation. Feigenbaum also suggested that Kyrgyzstan participate in follow-on meetings to the recent USTDA-sponsored telecoms conference. In response to President Bakiyev's specific request to former Senator Dole, Feigenbaum said that the U.S. could provide advice and information about the process of contracting and sub-contracting for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, and he asked Karabayev to tell Bakiyev that, in so doing, we were seeking to be responsive to his questions about the contracting process. ¶15. (C) On security cooperation, Feigenbaum said that negative public opinion had led to Kyrgyz government inconsistency on the base, and putting support for the base on a sounder footing was a priority for the United States. He reiterated that making the joint base commission operational would be a step forward, and he assured the BISHKEK 00000490 005.2 OF 005 minister that the U.S. was working to follow up on President Bakiyev's request for more base contracts by exploring what the possibilities might be. Feigenbaum said that while he did not have specific proposals, there were possibilities for greater cooperation on border security, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrrism. He urged Kyrgyz participation at the Marshall Center. ¶16. (C) On political development, Feigenbaum said there were some positive steps that the Kyrgyz government could take right away. He said that following though on the list of MCA commitments would help the prospects for funding the Threshold Country Plan. Feigenbaum said that following through quickly to make state broadcaster KTR a public broadcaster would be a positive sign; the U.S. had welcomed and been encouraged by Bakiyev's decision and now looked forward to implementation; in that area, the U.S. could provide some advice and assistance. Another big issue would be how the current political demonstration was resolved, whether the government and opposition acted with restraint, and whether both sides acted non-violently, legally, and constitutionally. (NOTE: These meetings took place before the demonstration ended when police cleared Ala-Too Square the evening of April 19. END NOTE.) Feigenbaum said that resolving outstanding issues for foreign NGOs on accreditation and social fund payments would also be seen as a big step forward. Comprehensive Policy Dialogue -------------- ¶17. (C) Feigenbaum suggested that both sides needed a framework to work through all of these issues, to do some policy planning, to coordinate their respective visions of the relationship, but especially to push forward specific actions. He proposed that the two countries establish a Comprehensive Policy Dialogue (CPD); the goal, he noted, was not simply discussion but development of a dynamic agenda for joint action. The CPD could include regular meetings, with interagency participation from both countries. Feigenbaum was agnostic on whether the first meeting be held in Bishkek Washington, but noted that the venue could alternate for future meetings. Karabayev welcomed the proposal and said he would discuss it within the government. He suggested that the first meeting might be held in the fall in the United States, in conjunction with his travel to UNGA. Comment -------------- ¶18. (C) Throughout both meetings, the mood was relaxed and upbeat. Very much the former professor, Karabayev was full of ideas. Karabayev was clearly interested in expanding the relationship with the United States, particularly on economic development and trade, but also on reform and democratic initiatives. He was also interested in DAS Feigenbaum's particular policy suggestions and receptive to establishing a Comprehensive Policy Dialogue that could move the relationship to a new level. ¶19. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Feigenbaum. YOVANOVITCH