KYRGYZ GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION RELAY VIEWS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000365 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION RELAY VIEWS TO AMBASSADOR BISHKEK 00000365 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings with the Ambassador April 3, the prime minister's chief of staff Medet Sadyrkulov and opposition MP Kubatbek Baibolov gave differing assessments of the impact of the appointment of Almaz Atambayev as prime minister. Sadyrkulov said that Atambayev would be able to work constructively, raising tough issues with the president and reaching out to the opposition. Sadyrkulov predicted that President Bakiyev's proposal for a constitutional working group would go forward, likely with the participation of the opposition. Sadyrkulov thought that he and Atambayev could find "common ground" with the opposition prior to demonstrations planned for April 9 and ¶11. Baibolov, however, rejected Atambayev as "weak" and "self-serving" and said that nothing would be resolved without the direct involvement of the president. He said that the opposition would present Bakiyev with a new draft constitution on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Baibolov also suggested that foreign heads of state could play a role in resolving the standoff. END SUMMARY. SADYRKULOV: EVERYTHING UNDER CONTROL -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting April 3, newly appointed PM Chief of Staff Sadyrkulov told Ambassador that since he had "brought in" PM Atambayev as "his project," he would ensure that they would work with the president and opposition forces to effect positive change, and diminish support for the opposition. Sadyrkulov said that a constitutional reform commission would be established by April 4, to include members of the opposition, led by Atambayev. According to Sadyrkulov, the United Front had suggested that the group consist of five members each from United Front, For Reforms, and the Government. Sadyrkulov said that his proposal was that a 10-12 member group be formed of half opposition and half government. (NOTE: During the meeting, Ambassador overheard a telephone conversation between Sadyrkulov and President Bakiyev in which she heard that opposition leader Edil Baisalov might be included within the commission. END NOTE.) ¶3. (C) Sadyrkulov said that the PM would hold a press conference April 4, during which "all questions can be asked openly." The president is also planning to participate in a "direct-line" interview with the media, which would allow questions from the public to be e-mailed or called-in, to be published by April 6. Sadyrkulov was confident that these steps would help take away most, if not all, of the opposition's main rallying points. While he did not think there was any basis for early presidential elections, Sadyrkulov did not exclude the possibility that the president himself could call for early presidential elections if a new constitution is adopted. He added that although the president is ready to institute constitutional reforms, implementing a new constitution would take time, as it would need to be reviewed not only by the Constitutional Court, but possibly the Venice Commission as well. ¶4. (C) Sadyrkulov praised Atambayev's ability to work assertively with the president, citing the dismissal of former First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov as a case in point. Sadyrkulov said the First Deputy Prime Minister slot was being kept open for an opposition figure, possibly MP Omurbek Babanov, and that Atambayev would raise difficult issues with the president -- something Kulov failed to do as PM. He pointed to the "resolution" of turning KTR into a public media entity as an example of Atambayev's "hard work," and said that both he and the PM have "full latitude" to build trust between the opposition and government, and find BISHKEK 00000365 002.4 OF 002 common ground ahead of the mid-April demonstrations. Sadyrkulov closed by stating, in English, that "step by step,8 things are getting better -- one does not make a president overnight." BAIBOLOV: NO WAY OUT -------------- ¶5. (C) In a separate meeting April 3, opposition MP Baibolov was quick to express his dissatisfaction with the president and Atambayev, calling both "weak" and "self-serving." Maintaining that nothing would change without the president's direct involvement, Baibolov dismissed Atambayev's ability to reform the government from within. He went on to predict that Atambayev would not last long in the government, giving him one to two weeks before leaving office. He claimed that Bakiyev's lack of position on any policy means that the president is not able to guide the reconciliation process with the opposition effectively. ¶6. (C) Although Atambayev is willing to meet with the opposition, the president's unwillingness to do so could offset any chance of reconciliation between the opposition and government, said Baibolov. He predicted that changes within the government alone would not suffice, as real constitutional reforms were needed. Baibolov said that a new version of the constitution -- agreed upon by some members of the opposition -- would be published by April 5, and later presented Ambassador with a copy. The MP also laid out three possible scenarios that ranged from early presidential elections by 2009 -- to give the president "another chance" at a five-year term -- to all-out civil war. ¶7. (C) To resolve these issues, Baibolov suggested that heads of state from the U.S., Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan and perhaps China establish a joint plan for Kyrgyzstan that could be shared and implemented by the Kyrgyz accordingly. Stating that Russia was actively working to this end, possibly through Kulov, the MP wondered why the United States could not follow suit. The Ambassador repeated the points that she had made to Sadyrkulov and the F/reign Minister in separate meetings earlier in the day. She said the U.S. position is that this is an internal matter, which the Kyrgyz should decide )- peacefully, constitutionally, legally. Both sides need to show restraint and respect for the rule of law. Baibolov ag2eed, but nevertheless forecast that Kyrgyzstan's political and economic problems would continue for another fifty years, and that the country could turn into "another Afghanistan." COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) As these meetings illustrate, both sides are still far apart. The president and the new prime minister think they are reaching out to the opposition, but the opposition sees little action behind the rhetoric and is not ready to back down. YOVANOVITCH